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‘Institutional critique’ is best known through the critical practice 
that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by artists who pre-
sented radical challenges to the museum and gallery system. Since 
then it has been pushed in new directions by new generations of  
artists registering and responding to the global transformations of  
contemporary life. The essays collected in this volume explore this 
legacy and develop the models of  institutional critique in ways that 
go well beyond the fi eld of  art. Interrogating the shifting relations 
between ‘institutions’ and ‘critique’, the contributors to this volume 
analyze the past and present of  institutional critique and propose 
lines of  future development. Engaging with the work of  philoso-
phers and political theorists such as Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, 
Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno and others, these es-
says refl ect on the mutual enrichments between critical art practices 
and social movements and elaborate the conditions for politicized 
critical practice in the twenty-fi rst century.
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of the present are increasingly restricted. In this context, MayFlyBooks 
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Preface 
The essays collected in this volume were selected from Transform, a 
three-year (2005-8) research project of the European Institute for 
Progressive Cultural Policies (eipcp). Following up on the eipcp’s 
previous Republicart project (2002-5), Transform supported a wide 
range of activities, research and exchanges focused on investigating 
political and artistic practices of ‘institutional critique’. These included 
exhibitions, conferences and the publication of the web journal 
transversal, in which all of the following essays appeared.  
For the Transform project, artists, activists, writers, theorists and 
researchers were encouraged to interrogate the history of the relations 
between ‘institutions’ and ‘critique’ and to consider the present and 
future possibilities for the theory and practice of institutional critique 
along three related but still distinct lines of inquiry. These lines were 
sketched as follows at the beginning of the project, in the summer of 
2005: 
1. The line of art production. The thesis here is that following the 
two phases of institutional critique in the 1970s and 1990s, now a 
new phase of critique is emerging, which goes beyond the two 
earlier phases, particularly as a combination of social critique, 
institutional critique and self-critique. 
2. The line of art institutions. Here questions will be raised about the 
development of radical positions taken by critical art institutions, not 
only against the background that open, socially critical art 
associations, museums and initiatives are increasingly under 
pressure, partly from authoritarian repressive cultural policies, partly 
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from neo-liberal populist cultural policies. Beyond this defensive 
figure and the question of counter-strategies, new forms of the 
organization of critical art institutions are to be reflected on. 
3. The line of the relationship of institution and critique as 
movement: at this most general level the question of the mutual 
interrelationship of institution and movement, machines and state 
apparatuses, is to be addressed, and how this relationship can be 
made productive in the sense of emancipatory policies and beyond 
the abrupt demarcation between the two poles. 
From the beginning of the Transform project, it was clear that 
‘institutional critique’ has long been an established stream of artistic 
practices with, now, well over three decades of history and development 
behind it. From its now almost mythical origins, this stream has given 
rise to transversal practices that cannot be classified as purely or 
exclusively ‘artistic’. The institutional critique of the 1960s and 70s 
formed a loose, barely coherent nexus that can only be understood 
within the context of micro and macro-political developments before 
and around 1968. Accordingly, the Transform project has oscillated 
over the last three years between the three lines sketched at the outset 
and the fields and practices from which they can hardly be separated. At 
the same time, a movement became discernible – even if not a rigidly 
linear one – from the major concerns of the first to the second and 
finally the third line of inquiry. 
I. What is Institutional Critique? 
The timeliness of the project quickly became apparent. Although it was 
conceived in 2004, its concrete beginnings in September 2005 coincided 
with a wave of renewed interest in institutional critique within the field 
of art itself – an interest confirmed by a series of symposia, publications 
and themed issues of art journals and magazines. These debates, which 
included diverse perspectives on the genealogy of institutional critique 
and on the operations of its canonization, are fully reflected in the first 
of twelve Transform issues of the web journal transversal, under the title 
‘Do You Remember Institutional Critique?’ (January 2006). What 
appears in retrospect as the ‘first wave’ of institutional critique was 
initiated in the 1960s and 70s by artists such as Michael Asher, Robert 
Smithson, Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke and Marcel Broodthaers, among 
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others. They investigated the conditions of the museum and art field, 
aiming to oppose, subvert or break out of rigid institutional 
frameworks. In the late 1980s and 90s, in a changed context, these 
practices were developed into diverse artistic projects by new 
protagonists like Renee Green, Christian Philipp Müller, Fred Wilson 
and Andrea Fraser. To the economic and political discourse of their 
predecessors, the practices of this ‘second generation’ added a growing 
awareness of the forms of subjectivity and the modes of its formation. 
Second wave practices continued however to circulate under the name 
of institutional critique. 
The process by which these first two waves of institutional critique 
have become a recognized part of art history was not without 
controversy and debate.  Still, the canonization of these practices 
proceeds on a terrain that is quite orderly, operates by clear rules and 
borders, and is characterized by a certain amount of depoliticization and 
self-reference. However, our thesis concerning a ‘third phase’ of 
institutional critique provoked some very different interpretations 
among the participants of the Transform project. Some of the authors 
in this book focus on art institutions themselves, insofar as these are 
emerging as the new and paradoxical agents of institutional critique.  
Others seek to analyze the ‘extradisciplinary investigations’ undertaken 
by contemporary artist-activists and to reflect on what some see as a 
new artistic internationalism developing in conjunction with political 
activism. And while the attention of the mainstream art world has 
moved on from the debates about institutional critique, the question of 
the character of, what we have called, ‘instituent practices’ remains 
especially relevant for the actors in the overlapping fields of art and 
politics. Without over-determining the concept of ‘instituent practices’, 
we can say that it refers to strategies and initiated processes that in some 
respects take their bearings from traditions of institutional critique, even 
as in other respects they go beyond anything recognizable in the 
movement now canonized as part of art history. As the texts in this 
volume show, this tendency towards new activist and instituent 
practices is one direction in which practitioners and theorists are actively 
attempting to renew and reinvent institutional critique under difficult 
contemporary conditions. 
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II. Institutions of Exodus 
The second line of inquiry inescapably had to pass through a reflection 
on the pressure of economic and administrative logics bearing down on 
all institutions in the cultural field, including those with which the eipcp 
has collaborated in realizing the Transform project. The eipcp’s own 
position as ‘project institution’ within the paradoxes of a relative and 
critical autonomy created a self-reflexive debate on the future of critical 
institutions as such. In fact, the very idea of a ‘project institution’ is 
glaringly contradictory. For if the concept of ‘institution’ implies a desire 
for long-term duration, continuity and security, the concept of ‘project’ 
by contrast implies limited duration and the negative effects, such as 
precarization and insecurity, associated with it. Accordingly, one issue of 
transversal took on the tasks of reflecting on the conditions that make 
critical institutions possible and of seeking to specify the modes of 
action for politicizing these conditions, fractures and contradictions 
under the title ‘Progressive Institutions’ (April 2007).  
The questions that begin to emerge at this point are of course not 
limited to institutions of the cultural field: they concern the conditions 
for critical and resistant institutions generally. Various recent 
approaches in philosophy and political theory, including those advanced 
by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Antonio Negri and 
Paolo Virno, among others, as well as by some authors in the present 
volume, have undertaken to develop a ‘non-dialectical’ concept of 
resistance and critique, one seeking above all to establish a different 
conceptualization of contradiction, negation and reaction. The 
proposals for this conceptual development extend from the various 
figures of ‘flight’ (nomadism, desertion, destitution, withdrawal and 
treason) to differing concepts of ‘exodus’.  As thought by the authors in 
this volume, exodus is not a naïve exit ‘out of every kind of institution’, 
but refers rather to the deliberations and actualizations of ‘institutions 
of exodus’. 
III. Instituent Practices and Monster Institutions 
Over the course of the project, the third line of inquiry brought the 
relations between social movements and their institutions to the 
foreground. In play here are the marked degradation of representative 
democracy in Europe, the frustrations and processes of internal 
transformation to be seen in the alter-globalization movement following 
September 11 and the so-called ‘war on terror’, as well as increasing 
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social marginalization and misery seen by many as an effect of national 
and transnational institutions. In any case, the third line helped to clarify 
as a concrete question the problem that became central to the debates 
generated by the project: which form of institutions and instituting do 
contemporary social movements need?  
For answers to questions of this kind, two concepts became most 
important for the project: ‘instituent practices’ and ‘monster 
institutions’. Deriving from Antonio Negri’s concept of ‘constituent 
power’, understood as a permanent process of constitution, instituent 
practices thwart the logics of institutionalization; they invent new forms 
of instituting and continuously link these instituting events. Against this 
background, the concept of ‘instituent practices’ marks the site of a 
productive tension between a new articulation of critique and the 
attempt to arrive at a notion of ‘instituting’ after traditional 
understandings of institutions have begun to break down and mutate. 
When we speak of an ‘instituent practice’, this actualization of the future 
in a present becoming is not the opposite of institution in the way that 
utopia, for instance, is the opposite of bad reality. Nor is it to be 
understood simply in the way that Antonio Negri’s concept pair 
‘constituent power/constituted power’ is conceptualized, necessarily in 
relation to being instituted or constituted power. Rather, ‘instituent 
practice’ as a process and concatenation of instituent events means an 
absolute concept exceeding mere opposition to institutions: it does not 
oppose the institution, but it does flee from institutionalization and 
structuralization. 
But while fleeing, ‘instituent practice’ searches for a weapon. 
Introducing monsters into existing institutions, it gives birth to new 
forms of institutions, monster institutions. Deliberations of such a kind 
led, by the end of the project, to a collaboration with the Spanish 
Universidad Nómada on an issue of transversal entitled ‘Monster 
Institutions’ (May 2008). The essays in it reflect on the possibilities for 
new forms of institutionality in conjunction with social movements and 
with a clear focus on the new generation of social centers in Europe. 
From this perspective it is also possible to reverse the movement 
described above: the transversal quality of artistic institutional critique 
does not only challenge and thwart the borders of the field of art; the 
strategies and specific competencies of art can also be deployed to spur 
on a general reflection on the problems of institutions, the predicaments 
of critique and the openings for new ‘instituent practices’.  

  
I 
WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE?

  3 
1 
 
Instituent Practices: Fleeing, Instituting, 
Transforming* 
Gerald Raunig 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
When we propose in the announcement of our Transform project the 
provisional thesis that a new ‘phase’ of institutional critique will now 
emerge,1 following the two previous ‘phases’ – the first beginning in the 
late 1960s, the second in the late 1980s – this thesis is based less on 
empirical evidence than on a political and theoretical necessity to be 
found in the logic of institutional critique itself. Both ‘phases’ of this 
now-canonized practice developed their own strategies and methods 
within their respective contexts. The resemblances between them are 
deep – and go beyond even what the categories of art history and 
criticism would suggest. At the same time, there are clear divergences 
grounded in the differing social and political conditions within which 
each emerged. Things have changed tremendously since Michael Asher, 
Robert Smithson, Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, Marcel Broodthaers and 
others initiated what appears in retrospect as the first wave of 
institutional critique. In the late 1980s and 90s, in a changed context, 
these practices developed into diverse artistic projects that continued to 
circulate under the same name. Now, if institutional critique is not to be 
fixed and paralyzed as something established in the field of art and 
remaining constrained by its rules, then it must continue to change and 
develop in a changing society. It must link up with other forms of 
critique both within and outside the art field – whether these forms 
emerged in opposition to existing conditions or were the resistance that 
provoked those conditions in the first place.2 Against the background of 
this kind of transversal exchange among forms of critique – but also 
without naively imagining spaces somehow free from domination and 
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institutions – institutional critique needs to be rethought as a critical 
attitude and as what I call an ‘instituent practice’. 
In his 1978 lecture ‘What is Critique?’ Michel Foucault describes the 
spread and replication of governmentality in Western Europe in the 
sixteenth century, claiming that along with this governmentalization of 
all possible areas of life and finally of the self, critique also developed as 
the art not to be governed like that. Even without going into more depth 
here on the continuities and breaks between the historical forms of 
developing liberal governmentality and the current forms of neo-liberal 
governmentality (see Isabell Lorey’s essay in the third section of this 
volume), it may be said that the relationship between government and not 
to be governed like that is still a prerequisite today for reflecting on the 
contemporary relationship between institution and critique. In 
Foucault’s words:  
[T]his governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather 
characteristic of these societies in Western Europe in the sixteenth 
century, cannot apparently be dissociated from the question ‘how not 
be governed?’ I do not mean by that that governmentalization would be 
opposed in a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation, ‘we do not 
want to be governed, and we do not want to be governed at all’. I mean 
that, in this great preoccupation about the way to govern and the search 
for the ways to govern, we identify a perpetual question which could be: 
‘how not be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, 
with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such 
procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them’. (Foucault, 1997a: 
28) 
Here Foucault insists on the shift from a fundamental negation of 
government toward a maneuver to avoid this kind of dualism: from not 
to be governed at all to not to be governed like that, from a phantom battle for a 
big other to a constant struggle in the plane of immanence, which – as I 
would like to add – is not (solely) actualized as a fundamental critique of 
institutions, but rather as a permanent process of instituting. Foucault 
continues:  
And if we accord this movement of governmentalization of both society 
and individuals the historic dimension and breadth which I believe it 
has had, it seems that one could approximately locate therein what we 
could call the critical attitude. Facing them head on and as 
compensation, or rather, as both partner and adversary to the arts of 
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governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting 
these arts of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, of 
finding a way to escape from them or, in any case, a way to displace 
them. (Foucault, 1997a: 28)  
These latter categories are the ones I want to focus on in terms of the 
transformation and further development of the question of 
contemporary forms of institutional critique: transformations as ways of 
escaping from the arts of governing, lines of flight, which are not at all 
to be taken as harmless or individualistic or escapist and esoteric, even if 
they no longer allow dreaming of an entirely different exteriority. 
“Nothing is more active than a flight!” as Gilles Deleuze and Claire 
Parnet write (2002: 36) and as Paolo Virno echoes almost literally: 
“Nothing is less passive than the act of fleeing, of exiting” (2004a: 70).  
If the ‘arts of governing’ mean an intertwining of governing and 
being governed, government and self-government, then ‘transforming the 
arts of governing’ does not consist simply of any arbitrary 
transformation processes in the most general sense, because 
transformations are an essential aspect of the context of 
governmentality itself. It is more a matter of specifically emancipatory 
transformations, and this also rescinds a central aspect of the old 
institutional critique. Through their emancipatory character these 
transformations also assume a transversal quality, i.e. their effects extend 
beyond the bounds of particular fields. 
In contrast to these kinds of emancipatory transversal 
transformations of the ‘arts of governing’, there is a recurring problem 
in art discourse: that of reducing and enclosing more general questions 
in one’s own field. Even though (self-)canonizations, valorizations and 
depreciations in the art field – as well as in debates on institutional 
critique practices – are often adorned with an eclectic, disparate and 
contradictory selection of theory imports, these imports frequently only 
have the function of disposing of specific art positions or the art field. A 
contemporary variation of this functionalization consists of combining 
poststructuralist immanence theories with a simplification of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s field theory. The theories that argue, on the one hand, 
against an outside in the sense of Christian or socialist transcendence, 
for instance, and, on the other, for the relative autonomy of the art field, 
are blurred here into the defeatist statement, “We are trapped in our 
field” (Fraser, 2005). Even the critical actors of the ‘second generation’ 
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of institutional critique do not appear to be free from these kinds of 
closure phantasms. Fraser, for instance, conducts an offensive self-
historicization in her essay ‘From the Critique of Institutions to an 
Institution of Critique’, published in Artforum in 2005. In her account, all 
possible forms of institutional critique are ultimately limited to a critique 
of the ‘institution of art’ (Bürger, 1984) and its sub-institutions. 
Invoking Bourdieu, she writes:  
[J]ust as art cannot exist outside the field of art, we cannot exist outside 
the field of art, at least not as artists, critics, curators, etc. And what we 
do outside the field, to the extent that it remains outside, can have no 
effect within it. So if there is no outside for us, it is not because the 
institution is perfectly closed, or exists as an apparatus in a ‘totally 
administered society’, or has grown all-encompassing in size and scope. 
It is because the institution is inside of us, and we can’t get outside of 
ourselves. (Fraser, 2005: 282) 
Although there seems to be an echo of Foucault’s concept of self-
government here, there is no indication of forms of escaping, shifting, 
transforming. Whereas for Foucault the critical attitude appears 
simultaneously as ‘partner’ and as ‘adversary’ of the arts of governing, 
the second part of this specific ambivalence vanishes in Fraser’s 
account, yielding to a discursive self-limitation that barely permits 
reflection on one’s own enclosure. Against all the evidence that art – 
and not only critical art – over the whole twentieth century produced 
effects that went beyond the restricted field of art, she plays a worn-out 
record: art is and remains autonomous, its function limited to its own 
field. “With each attempt to evade the limits of institutional 
determination, to embrace an outside, we expand our frame and bring 
more of the world into it. But we never escape it” (Fraser, 2005: 282). 
Yet exactly this kind of constriction is refused in Foucault’s concept 
of critique, the critical attitude: instead of inducing the closure of the 
field with theoretical arguments and promoting this practically, thus 
carrying out the art of governing, a different form of art should be 
pushed at the same time which leads to escaping the arts of governing. And 
Foucault is not the only one to introduce these new non-escapist terms 
of escape. Figures of flight, of dropping out, of betrayal, of desertion, of 
exodus: these are the figures that several authors advance as post-
structuralist, non-dialectical forms of resistance in refusal of cynical or 
conservative invocations of inescapability and hopelessness. With these 
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kinds of concepts Gilles Deleuze, Paolo Virno and others attempt to 
propose new models of non-representationist politics that can be turned 
equally against Leninist concepts of revolution aimed at taking over the 
state and against radical anarchist positions imagining an absolute 
outside of institutions, as well as against concepts of transformation and 
transition in the sense of a successive homogenization in the direction 
of neo-liberal globalization. In terms of their new concept of resistance, 
the aim is to thwart a dialectical idea of power and resistance: a positive 
form of dropping out, a flight that is simultaneously an ‘instituent 
practice’. Instead of presupposing conditions of domination as an 
immutable horizon and yet fighting against them, this flight changes the 
conditions under which the presupposition takes place. As Paolo Virno 
writes in The Grammar of the Multitude, exodus transforms “the context 
within which a problem has arisen, rather than facing this problem by 
opting for one or the other of the provided alternatives” (Virno, 2004a: 
70).  
When figures of flight are imported into the art field, this often leads 
to the misunderstanding that it involves the subject’s personal retreat 
from the noise and babble of the world. Protagonists such as Herman 
Melville’s Bartleby in Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben or the ‘virtuoso’ 
pianist Glenn Gould in Virno are seen as personifications of individual 
resistance and – in the case of Bartleby – of individual withdrawal. In a 
conservative process of pilferage and reinterpretation, in critical art 
discourse these figures are displaced so far from their starting point that 
flight no longer implies, as it does with Deleuze, fleeing to look for a 
weapon. On the contrary, here the old images of retreat into an artist 
hermitage are rehashed, which are not only deployed by the new circles 
of cultural pessimism against participative and relational spectacle art, 
but also against collective interventionist, activist or other experimental 
strategies. For example, when Texte zur Kunst editor Isabelle Graw turns 
to “the model of the preoccupied painter working away in his studio, 
refusing to give any explanation, ostentatiously not networking, never 
travelling, hardly showing himself in public”, it is allegedly to prevent 
the principle of the spectacle from “directly accessing his mental and 
emotional competencies” (Graw, 2005: 46). 
Although Graw refers to Paolo Virno directly before the passage 
quoted, neither Virno’s problematization of the culture industry nor his 
concept of exodus tends toward these kinds of bourgeois expectations 
of salvation by the artist-individual. With the image of the solitary 
Gerald Raunig 
 8 
painter, who eludes the “new tendency in capitalism to take over the 
whole person” (Graw, 2005: 47) by obstinately withdrawing his person, 
Graw links a contemporary analysis with an ultra-conservative result. 
Even after the countless spectacular utilizations of this stereotype, it 
appears that the same old artist image – contrary to Virno’s ideas of 
virtuosity – can today still or once again be celebrated as anti-
spectacular. 
What the poststructuralist proposals for dropping out and 
withdrawal involve, however, is anything but this kind of relapse into 
the celebration of an individual turning away from society. The point is 
to thwart dichotomies such as that of the individual and the collective, 
to offensively theorize new forms of what is common and singular at 
the same time. Paolo Virno in particular has lucidly developed this idea 
in A Grammar of the Multitude. Alluding to Karl Marx’s notion of the 
‘general intellect’ from the Grundrisse, Virno posits the notion of a 
‘public intellect’. Following Marx, ‘intellect’ is not to be understood here 
as a competence of an individual, but rather as a shared link and 
constantly developing foundation for individuation. Thus Virno neither 
alludes to media intellectuals in the society of the spectacle, nor to the 
lofty ideas of the autonomous thinker or painter. That kind of 
individualized publicity corresponds more to Virno’s negative concept 
of ‘publicness without a public sphere’: “The general intellect, or public 
intellect, if it does not become a republic, a public sphere, a political 
community, drastically increases forms of submission” (Virno, 2004a: 
41).  
Virno focuses, on the other hand, on the social quality of the 
intellect.3 Whereas the alienated thinker (or even painter) is traditionally 
drawn as an individual withdrawing from idle talk, from the noise of the 
masses, for Virno the noise of the multitude is itself the site of a non-
state, non-spectacular, non-representationist public sphere. This non-
state public sphere is not to be understood as an anarchic place of 
absolute freedom, as an open field beyond the realm of the institution. 
Flight and exodus are nothing negative, not a reaction to something 
else, but are instead linked and intertwined with constituent power, re-
organizing, re-inventing and instituting. The movement of flight also 
preserves these ‘instituent practices’ from structuralization and closure 
from the start, preventing them from becoming institutions in the sense 
of constituted power.  
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What does this mean in relation to the artistic practices of 
institutional critique? From a ‘schematic perspective’, the ‘first 
generation’ of institutional critique sought a distance from the institution; 
the ‘second’ addressed the inevitable involvement in the institution. I call 
this a schematic perspective, because these kinds of ‘generation clusters’ 
are naturally blurred in the relevant practices, and there were attempts – 
by Andrea Fraser, for instance – to describe the first wave as being 
constituted by the second (including herself) and also to attribute to the 
first phase a similar reflectedness on their own institutionality. Whether 
this is the case or not, an important and effective position can be 
attributed to both generations in the art field from the 1970s to the 
present, and in some cases relevance is evident that goes beyond the 
boundaries of the field. Yet the fundamental questions that Foucault 
already implicitly raised, which Deleuze certainly pursued in his book on 
Foucault, are not posed with the strategies of distanced and 
deconstructive intervention in the institution: do Foucault’s 
considerations lead us to enclose ourselves more and more in power 
relations? And most of all, which lines of flight lead out of the dead end 
of this enclosure? 
To make use of Foucault’s treatments of this problem for the 
question of new ‘instituent practices’, I would like to conclude this 
article by returning to the later Foucault, specifically to his Berkeley 
lecture series ‘Discourse and Truth’, delivered in the autumn of 1983, 
and to the term parrhesia broadly explained there.4  
In classical Greek, parrhesia means ‘to say everything’, freely speaking 
truth without rhetorical games and without ambiguity, even and 
especially when this is hazardous. Foucault describes the practice of 
parrhesia using numerous examples from ancient Greek literature as a 
movement from a political to a personal technique. The older form of 
parrhesia corresponds to publicly speaking truth as an institutional right. 
Depending on the form of the state, the subject addressed by the 
parrhesiastes is the assembly in the democratic agora, the tyrant in the 
monarchical court.5 Parrhesia is generally understood as coming from 
below and directed upward, whether it is the philosopher’s criticism of 
the tyrant or the citizen’s criticism of the majority in the agora: the 
specific potentiality of parrhesia is found in the unequivocal gap between 
the one who takes a risk to express everything and the criticized 
sovereign who is impugned by this truth. 
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Over the course of time, a change takes place in the game of truth 
“which – in the classical Greek conception of parrhesia – was constituted 
by the fact that someone was courageous enough to tell the truth to 
other people… [T]here is a shift from that kind of parrhesiastic game to 
another truth game which now consists in being courageous enough to 
disclose the truth about oneself” (Foucault, 1997b: 150). This process 
from public criticism to personal (self-)criticism develops in parallel to 
the decrease in the significance of the democratic public sphere of the 
agora. At the same time, parrhesia comes up increasingly in conjunction 
with education. One of Foucault’s relevant examples here is Plato’s 
dialogue Laches, in which the question of the best teacher for the 
interlocutor’s sons represents the starting point and foil. The teacher 
Socrates no longer assumes the function of the parrhesiastes in the sense 
of exercising dangerous contradiction in a political sense, but rather by 
moving his listeners to give account of themselves and leading them to a 
self-questioning that queries the relationship between their statements 
(logos) and their way of living (bios). However, this technique does not 
serve as an autobiographical confession or examination of conscience or 
as a prototype of Maoist self-criticism, but rather to establish a 
relationship between rational discourse and the lifestyle of the 
interlocutor or the self-questioning person. Contrary to any 
individualistic interpretation especially of later Foucault texts (imputing 
a ‘return to subject philosophy’, etc.), here parrhesia is not the 
competency of a subject, but rather a movement between the position 
that queries the concordance of logos and bios, and the position that 
exercises self-criticism in light of this query. 
In keeping with a productive interpretation for contemporary 
institutional critique practices, my aim here is to link the two concepts 
of parrhesia described by Foucault as a genealogical development, to 
understand hazardous refutation in its relation to self-revelation. 
Critique, and especially institutional critique, is not exhausted in 
denouncing abuses nor in withdrawing into more or less radical self-
questioning. In terms of the art field this means that neither the 
belligerent strategies of the institutional critique of the 1970s nor art as a 
service to the institution in the 1990s promise effective interventions in 
the governmentality of the present.  
What is needed here and now is parrhesia as a double strategy: as an 
attempt of involvement and engagement in a process of hazardous 
refutation, and as self-questioning. What is needed, therefore, are 
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practices that conduct radical social criticism, yet which do not fancy 
themselves in an imagined distance to institutions; at the same time, 
practices that are self-critical and yet do not cling to their own 
involvement, their complicity, their imprisoned existence in the art field, 
their fixation on institutions and the institution, their own being-
institution. ‘Instituent practices’ that conjoin the advantages of both 
‘generations’ of institutional critique, thus exercising both forms of 
parrhesia, will impel a linking of social criticism, institutional critique and 
self-criticism. This link will develop, most of all, from the direct and 
indirect concatenation with political practices and social movements, 
but without dispensing with artistic competences and strategies, without 
dispensing with resources of and effects in the art field. Here exodus 
would not mean relocating to a different country or a different field, but 
betraying the rules of the game through the act of flight: ‘transforming 
the arts of governing’ not only in relation to the institutions of the art 
field or the institution art as the art field, but rather as participation in 
processes of instituting and in political practices that traverse the fields, 
the structures, the institutions. 
 
Notes 
*  The author thanks Isabell Lorey and Stefan Nowotny for critical remarks 
and advice. 
1.  The project announcement, first published online in 2005, is reprinted – in 
revised format – in the preface to this volume. 
2.  On the temporal and ontological priority of critique-resistance, see Deleuze: 
“The final word of power is that resistance comes first” (1988: 89, trans. 
modified). See also Raunig (2007: 48-54). 
3.  Klaus Neundlinger and I discuss the social character of ‘intellect’ more fully 
in our introduction to the German edition of A Grammar of the Multitude 
(Virno, 2005: 9-21). 
4.  My ideas on Foucault and parrhesia were first developed for the eipcp 
conference ‘Progressive Art Institutions in the Age of the Dissolving 
Welfare State’, held in Vienna in 2004, and first published online (Raunig, 
2004). 
5.  The oldest example of political parrhesia is the figure of Diogenes, who, 
precarious in his barrel, commands Alexander to move out of his light. Like 
the citizen expressing a minority opinion in the democratic setting of the 
agora, the cynic philosopher also practices a form of parrhesia with regard to 
the monarch in public. 
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The Institution of Critique 
Hito Steyerl 
In speaking about the critique of institutions, the problem we ought to 
consider is the opposite one: the institution of critique. Is there anything 
like an institution of critique and what does it mean? Isn’t it pretty 
absurd to argue that something like this exists at a moment when critical 
cultural institutions are undoubtedly being dismantled, underfunded, 
subjected to the demands of a neo-liberal event economy and so on? 
However, I would like to pose the question on a much more 
fundamental level. The question is: what is the internal relationship 
between critique and institution? What sort of relation exists between 
the institution and its critique or on the other hand – the 
institutionalization of critique? And what is the historical and political 
background for this relationship? 
To get a clearer picture of this relationship we must first consider 
the function of criticism in general. On a very general level, certain 
political, social or individual subjects are formed through the critique of 
institutions. Bourgeois subjectivity as such was formed through such a 
process of critique, and encouraged to leave behind ‘self-incurred 
immaturity’, to quote Immanuel Kant’s famous definition of 
enlightenment (Kant, 2000: 54). This critical subjectivity was of course 
ambivalent, since it entailed the use of reason only in those situations 
we would consider as apolitical today, namely in the deliberation of 
abstract problems, but not the criticism of authority. Critique produces 
a subject who should make use of reason in public circumstances, but 
not in private ones. While this sounds emancipatory, the opposite is the 
case. The criticism of authority is according to Kant futile and private. 
Hito Steyerl 
14 
Freedom consists in accepting that authority should not be questioned. 
Thus, this form of criticism produces a very ambivalent and governable 
subject; it is as much a tool of governance as of that resistance with 
which it is often assumed to be aligned. But the bourgeois subjectivity 
formed thereby was very efficient. And in a certain sense, institutional 
criticism is integrated into that subjectivity, something which Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels explicitly refer to in their Communist Manifesto, 
namely as the capacity of the bourgeoisie to abolish and to melt down 
outdated institutions and everything else that is useless and petrified, as 
long as the general form of authority itself isn’t threatened. The 
bourgeois class had formed through a limited, so to speak, 
institutionalized critique and also maintained and reproduced itself 
through its continuous application. And in this way critique had become 
an institution in itself, a governmental tool that produces streamlined 
subjects.  
But there is also another form of subjectivity that is produced by 
criticism and also institutional criticism. An obvious example is the 
French citizen, a political subject of French formed through an 
institutional critique of the French monarchy. The latter institution was 
eventually abolished and even beheaded. In this process, an appeal was 
already realized that Marx was to launch much later: the weapons of 
critique should be replaced by the critique of weapons. In this vein one 
could say that the proletariat as a political subject was produced through 
the criticism of the bourgeoisie as an institution. This second form 
produces forms of subjectivity that probably are just as ambivalent, but 
with a crucial difference: it abolishes the institution that it criticizes 
instead of reforming or improving it.  
So in this sense institutional critique serves as a tool of 
subjectivation of certain social groups or political subjects. And which 
sort of different subjects does it produce? Let’s take a look at different 
modes of institutional critique within the artfield of the last decades. 
To simplify a complex development: the first wave of institutional 
criticism in the art sphere in the 1970s questioned the authoritarian role 
of the cultural institution. It challenged the authority that had 
accumulated in cultural institutions within the framework of the nation 
state. Cultural institutions such as museums had taken on a complex 
governmental function. This role has been brilliantly described by 
Benedict Anderson in his seminal work Imagined Communities, where he 
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analyzes the role of the museum in the formation of colonial nation 
states. In his view, the museum, in creating a national past, retroactively 
also created the origin and foundation of the nation, and that was its 
main function (Anderson, 1983). But this colonial situation, as in many 
other cases, points at the structure of the cultural institution within the 
nation state in general. And this situation, the authoritarian legitimation 
of the nation state by the cultural institution through the construction of 
a history, a patrimony, a heritage, a canon and so on, was the one that 
the first wave of institutional critique set out to criticize in the 1970s.  
Their justification in doing so was ultimately a political one. Most 
nation states considered themselves to be democracies founded on the 
political mandate of the people or citizens. In that sense, it was easy to 
argue that any national cultural institution should reflect this self-
definition and that any national cultural institution should thus be 
founded on similar mechanisms. If the political national sphere was – at 
least in theory – based on democratic participation, why should the 
cultural national sphere and its construction of histories and canons be 
any different? Why shouldn’t the cultural institution be at least as 
representative as parliamentary democracy? Why shouldn’t it include for 
example women in its canon, if women were at least in theory accepted 
in parliament? In that sense the claims that the first wave of institutional 
critique voiced were of course founded in contemporary theories of the 
public sphere, and based on an interpretation of the cultural institution 
as a potential public sphere. But implicitly they relied on two 
fundamental assumptions. First, this public sphere was implicitly a 
national one because it was modeled after the model of representative 
parliamentarism. Institutional critique justified itself precisely on this 
point. Since the political system of the nation state is at least in theory 
representative of its citizens, why shouldn’t a national cultural institution 
be? And this analogy was more often than not grounded in material 
conditions, since most cultural institutions were funded by the state. 
Thus, this form of institutional critique relied on a model based on the 
structure of political participation within the nation state and a Fordist 
economy, in which taxes could be collected for such purposes.  
Institutional critique of this period related to these phenomena in 
different ways. Either by radically negating institutions altogether, by 
trying to build alternative institutions or by trying to be included in 
mainstream ones. Just as in the political arena, the most effective 
strategy was a combination of the second and third model, which 
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demanded for example that cultural institutions include minorities and 
disadvantaged majorities such as women. In this sense institutional 
critique functioned like the related paradigms of multiculturalism, 
reformist feminism, ecological movements and so on. It was a new 
social movement within the arts scene.  
But during the next wave of institutional criticism in the 1990s, the 
situation was somewhat different. It wasn’t much different from the 
point of view of the artists or those who tried to challenge and criticize 
institutions that, in their view, were still authoritarian. Rather, the main 
problem was that they had been overtaken by a right-wing form of 
bourgeois institutional criticism, precisely the process by which “all that 
is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 38). Thus, the claim that 
the cultural institution ought to be a public sphere was no longer 
unchallenged. The bourgeoisie had de facto decreed that a cultural 
institution was primarily an economic one and as such had to be 
subjected to the laws of the market. The belief that cultural institutions 
ought to provide a representative public sphere broke down with 
Fordism, and it is not by chance that, in a sense, institutions which still 
adhere to the ideal of creating a public sphere have survived longer in 
places where Fordism is still hanging on. Thus, the second wave of 
institutional critique was in a sense unilateral since claims were made 
which at that time had at least partially lost their legitimative power.  
The next factor was the relative transformation of the national 
cultural sphere that mirrored the transformation of the political cultural 
sphere. First of all, the nation state is no longer the only framework of 
cultural representation – there are also supranational bodies like the 
European Union. And secondly, their mode of political representation is 
very complicated and only partly representative. It represents its 
constituencies symbolically rather than materially. To play on the 
additional meanings in the German word for ‘representation’: Sie stellen 
sie eher dar, als sie sie vertreten (‘They portray more than they represent’). Thus, 
why should a cultural institution materially represent its constituency? 
Isn’t it somehow sufficient to symbolically represent it? And although 
the production of a national cultural identity and heritage is still 
important, it is not only important for the interior or social cohesion of 
the nation, but also very much to provide it with international selling 
points in an increasingly globalized cultural economy. Thus, in a sense, a 
process was initiated which is still going on today. That is the process of 
the cultural or symbolic integration of critique into the institution or 
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rather only into the surface of the institution without materially altering 
the institution or its organization in any deeper sense. This mirrors a 
similar process on the political level: the symbolic integration of 
minorities, for example, while maintaining political and social inequality, 
the symbolic representation of constituencies into supranational political 
bodies and so on. In this sense the bond of material representation was 
broken and replaced with a more symbolic one. 
This shift in representational techniques by the cultural institution 
also mirrored a trend in criticism itself, namely the shift from a critique 
of institution towards a critique of representation. This trend, which was 
informed by cultural studies, feminist and postcolonial epistemologies, 
somehow continued in the vein of the previous institutional critique by 
comprehending the whole sphere of representation as a public sphere, 
where material representation ought to be implemented, for example in 
form of the unbiased and proportional display of images of women or 
black people. This claim somehow mirrors the confusion about 
representation on the political plane, since the realm of visual 
representation is even less representative in the material sense than a 
supranational political body. It doesn’t represent constituencies or 
subjectivities but creates them; it articulates bodies, affects and desires. 
But this is not exactly how it was comprehended, since it was rather 
taken for a sphere where one has to achieve hegemony – a majority on 
the level of symbolic representation, so to speak – in order to achieve an 
improvement of a diffuse area hovering between politics and economy, 
state and market, subject as citizen and subject as consumer, as well as 
between representation and representation. Since criticism could no 
longer establish clear antagonisms in this sphere, it started to fragment 
and to atomize it, and to support a politics of identity which led to the 
fragmentation of public spheres and their replacement by markets, to 
the culturalization of identity and so on.  
This representational critique pointed at another aspect, namely the 
unmooring of the seemingly stable relation between the cultural 
institution and the nation state. Unfortunately for institutional critics of 
that period, a model of purely symbolic representation gained legitimacy 
in this field as well. Institutions no longer claimed to materially 
represent the nation state and its constituency, but only claimed to 
represent it symbolically. And thus, while one could say that the former 
institutional critics were either integrated into the institution or not, the 
second wave of institutional critique was integrated not into the 
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institution but into representation as such. Thus, again, a Janus-faced 
subject was formed. This subject was interested in more diverse and less 
homogenous forms of representation than its predecessor. But in trying 
to create this diversity, it also created niche markets, specialized 
consumer profiles, and an overall spectacle of ‘difference’ – without 
effectuating much structural change. 
But which conditions are prevailing today, during what might 
tentatively be called an extension of the second wave of institutional 
critique? Artistic strategies of institutional critique have become 
increasingly complex. They have fortunately developed far beyond the 
ethnographic urge to indiscriminately drag underprivileged or unusual 
constituencies into museums, even against their will – just for the sake 
of ‘representation’. They include detailed investigations, such as for 
example Allan Sekula’s Fish Story, which connects a phenomenology of 
new cultural industries, like the Bilbao Guggenheim, with documents of 
other institutional constraints, such as those imposed by the World 
Trade Organization or other global economic organizations. They have 
learned to walk the tightrope between the local and the global without 
becoming either indigenist and ethnographic, or else unspecific and 
snobbish. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of most cultural 
institutions that would have to react to the same challenge of having to 
perform both within a national cultural sphere and an increasingly 
globalizing market.  
If you look at them from one side, then you will see that they are 
under pressure from indigenist, nationalist and nativist demands. If you 
look from the other side, then you will see that they are under pressure 
from neo-liberal institutional critique, that is to say, under the pressure 
of the market. Now the problem is – and this is indeed a very 
widespread attitude – that when a cultural institution comes under 
pressure from the market, it tries to retreat into a position which claims 
that it is the duty of the nation state to fund it and to keep it alive. The 
problem with that position is that it is an ultimately protectionist one, 
that it ultimately reinforces the construction of national public spheres 
and that under this perspective the cultural institution can only be 
defended in the framework of a New Left attitude seeking to retreat 
into the remnants of a demolished national welfare state and its cultural 
shells and to defend them against all intruders. In other words, it tends 
to defend itself ultimately from the perspective of its other enemies, 
namely the nativist and indigenist critics of institution, who want to 
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transform it into a sort of sacralized ethnopark. But there is no going 
back to the old Fordist nation-state protectionism, with its cultural 
nationalism, at least not in any emancipatory perspective. 
On the other hand, when the cultural institution is attacked from 
this nativist, indigenist perspective, it also tries to defend itself by 
appealing to universal values like freedom of speech or the 
cosmopolitanism of the arts, which are so utterly commodified as either 
shock effects or the display of enjoyable cultural difference that they 
hardly exist beyond this form of commodification. Or it might even 
earnestly try to reconstruct a public sphere within market conditions, for 
example with the massive temporary spectacles of criticism funded by 
the German Bundeskulturstiftung (National Foundation for Culture). But 
under reigning economic conditions, the main effect achieved is to 
integrate the critics into precarity, into flexibilized working structures 
within temporary project structures and freelance work within cultural 
industries. And in the worst cases, those spectacles of criticism are the 
decoration of large enterprises of economic colonialism such as in the 
colonization of Eastern Europe by the same institutions that are 
producing the conceptual art in these regions. 
If in the first wave of institutional critique criticism produced 
integration into the institution, in the second one only integration into 
representation was achieved. But now in the third phase there seems to 
be only integration into precarity. And in this light we can now answer 
the question concerning the function of the institution of critique as 
follows: while critical institutions are being dismantled by neo-liberal 
institutional criticism, this produces an ambivalent subject which 
develops multiple strategies for dealing with its dislocation. It is on the 
one side being adapted to the needs of ever more precarious living 
conditions. On the other, the need seems never to have been greater for 
institutions that could cater to the new needs and desires that this 
constituency will create. 
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Anti-Canonization: 
The Differential Knowledge of Institutional 
Critique 
Stefan Nowotny 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
Wanting to canonize artistic practices of institutional critique is a rather 
paradoxical endeavor. The reason is quickly evident. Canonization itself 
belongs to the specifically institutional practices that institutional 
critique refers to – and indeed critically refers to. Tacitly ignoring one of 
these critical impulses is hence inscribed in every canonization attempt, 
even though a retrospective acknowledgement of the relevance of these 
impulses is intended. ‘Relevance’ itself is categorized in the framework 
of a historiography that is entangled in its own preconditions, clinging 
jealously to the notion that in the end it has to be the art whose history 
is to be written. 
The results are well known, not only in terms of the art subsumed 
under the name ‘institutional critique’, but also in terms of what is called 
‘political art’ in general. Bert Brecht is treated as a revolutionary of 
theater art who was eccentric enough to be a communist as well; the 
Situationists are seen as oddballs of fine art who no less eccentrically 
maintained that changing perceptions of the streets was more important 
than changing perceptions of painting. And the ‘art’ of ‘institutional 
critique’? As a ‘current’ it has meanwhile also aged sufficiently to 
provide a welcome occasion for various historicizations, self-
historicizations or even ‘examinations of topicality’, which – instead of 
examining it – regularly become entangled in the self-referentiality 
specific to the art field, and specifically examining it as institutional 
practice.  
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It is not particularly helpful when one established canon or another 
is itself declared – in a duplication of the retrospective gesture – the 
object of negotiation by contrasting it with a possible ‘other’ or 
expanded canon. This is naturally not intended to deny that a critical 
query and contestation of dominant canonizations, their complicity with 
social-political power relations, their legitimizing and stabilizing function 
in terms of these hegemonic relations were (and are) an important 
element of the insights of institutional critique. Nevertheless, guidelines 
for action are not to be seamlessly derived from theoretical insights in 
the sense that the end of changing criticized conditions is already to be 
reached with the means of an expanded or counter-canon. This 
circumvention suffers from the problem of all superficial theories of 
hegemony: an insufficient reflection on the level of the means 
themselves. Where the critical impulse is at least maintained as a social-
political one, this is usually accompanied by a fetishization of the ends, 
which ultimately obscures a critical examination of the means 
altogether; where it withdraws into the self-contemplation of the 
contexts it started from (and this is of particular interest here), the result 
is the fetishization of a certain form of ends.  
What is fetishized in the latter case is less the end itself, but rather 
the form in which it is sought, that is, more precisely, the form of 
aiming at something or the link binding means and ends together. And 
this link proves to be all the more deceptive, since an incautious 
consideration of the form of ends and means may depict one and the 
same thing. Pursuing an end according to a certain form and treating it 
solely within the confines of this form, however, does not at all signify a 
sufficient reflection on the means. Instead, it simply signifies fixing the 
means as such to a spectrum placed beyond the realm of critique, a 
spectrum that yet results from a specific, fundamentally contingent 
connection between means and ends in need of reflection. And it 
ultimately signifies constraining the possible ends themselves, to the 
extent that the only acceptable end is one that corresponds to a given 
spectrum of means.1 
A flagrant example of fixing institutional critique art practices to art 
as the form of ends is found, for instance, in an issue of Texte zur Kunst 
devoted to institutional critique. There, Isabelle Graw proposes 
expanding the canon of ‘the usual suspects’ (Michael Asher, Daniel 
Buren, Hans Haacke, Andrea Fraser, etc.) with artists such as Jörg 
Immendorff or Martin Kippenberger. The concern that the existing 
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canon could be ‘at the expense’ of certain artists, whose work “could be 
equally regarded as questioning the institution of art or as an attack on 
it” (Graw, 2005: 47) is just as characteristic as the ‘expense’ rhetoric that 
Graw utilizes, which appears at least ambiguous in the context of the 
magazine that conceptually addresses a match between art criticism and 
the art market (or more precisely: that is to be read against the 
background of the highly conflictual interweaving of symbolic and 
material valuation systems, which is characteristic of the art field 
throughout modernism). 
No less characteristic is the specification of Graw’s concern, which 
immediately follows: this relates to painting, the canonical neglect of 
which is deplored as a proven medium of institutional critique. 
Accordingly, the figure of the ‘ostentatiously’ solitary atelier painter, 
who withdraws his ‘mental and emotional competences’ from public 
access, is stylized into the carrier of an institutional critique revolt, into 
an anti-neo-liberal spectacle dissident. The genius in individual revolt 
need only withdraw and produce; all the others can devote themselves 
to the contemplative viewing of the fruits of his competences 
(Nowotny, 2005), specifically – why not? – in the form of ‘institutional 
critical’ painting. Meanwhile, the ‘institution of art’ carries on in its old 
familiar bourgeois variation undeterred – if it were not for the 
unfortunate battle against its neo-liberal adversaries, in which it is 
entangled. 
The irony of all this is that Graw’s concerns are not only due to the 
dissatisfaction that art fixed to “its presumed capability of critique” is 
“underestimated”, but also that they claim to do justice to another 
concern, namely that an “inflationary assertion of critique” could 
ultimately lead to the “neutralization of every possibility of really 
achieving critique” (Graw, 2005: 41, 43). The latter concern indeed 
touches on a central problem that is inextricably linked with the activity 
of critique – as opposed to its mere assertion – and which has been 
widely discussed in the art field, not least of all since the publication of 
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism. How 
does critical activity relate to its effects? To what extent is it capable of 
keeping alive its differential deployment aimed at change beyond the 
respective self-assurance of a ‘critical distance’, in other words, feeding 
it into a social context and counteracting its own neutralization or the 
ways it is even inverted for uncritical purposes? 
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However, Graw does not let this concern leap any borders, but 
encloses it within the boundaries of the very field that art criticism 
routinely – institutionally – plows. For this reason, the questions remain 
obscured that would arise from the inversion of Graw’s suspicion about 
‘fixing’ art to its capability for critique: namely, whether the critique that 
is manifested in institutional critique practices is not underestimated 
when it is fixed to its character as art. In fact, in terms of canonization, 
this question can be traced even in the ‘first generation’ of institutional 
critique art practices, for it is an essential element of the critical impulses 
of these practices. It may be sufficient here to recall Robert Smithson’s 
essay ‘Cultural Confinement’ from 1972, which sees the conditions for 
neutralizing the explosiveness of critique specifically in its fixation to 
being art (and not in the reverse fixation), that is in the confinement of 
the critical to a predetermined framework of representation:  
Museums, like asylums and jails, have yards and cells – in other words, 
neutral rooms called galleries. A work of art when placed in a gallery 
loses its charge, and becomes a portable object or surface disengaged 
from the outside world. A vacant white room with lights is still a 
submission to the neutral […] The function of the warden-curator is to 
separate art from the rest of society. Next comes integration. Once the 
work of art is totally neutralized, ineffective, abstracted, safe, and 
politically lobotomized, it is ready to be consumed by society. 
(Smithson, 2001: 16) 
It would be too simple to reduce the scope of Smithson’s criticism to 
the museum-bound forms of representation and curatorship that it 
directly refers to. The operative structure that it describes, namely the 
‘political lobotomization’ of the potential charge of artistic works that 
follows from isolation and neutralizing reintegration, can also be 
observed often enough where art works in public space, intended as 
political interventions, only provoke meager debates about art or 
occasionally about cultural policies, instead of really triggering the 
intended political discussions. The ‘warden-curator’ as functionary of 
this operative structure is abetted, in turn, by a whole series of further 
functionaries, including, not least of all, the professional discourse 
producers of the art field. This also applies to the artists themselves, 
whom Smithson is already far from locating in a naively asserted outside 
of the institutional field of power per se, which is evident, for instance, 
in his polemic against post-minimalist art practices: 
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Also, I am not interested in art works that suggest process within the 
metaphysical limits of the neutral room. There is no freedom in that 
kind of behavioral game playing. The artist acting like a B. F. Skinner rat 
doing his tough little tricks is something to be avoided. Confined process 
is no process at all. It would be better to disclose the confinement 
rather than make illusions of freedom. (Smithson, 2001: 16) 
The institutional critique impulse originating with artists like Smithson 
not only ties into the desire for a positively productive ‘re-socialization’ 
of their own activities going beyond the boundaries of the art field, but 
also into the impulse to critically query one’s own role as an artist and 
the forms of artistic self-confinement. Adrian Piper succinctly 
formulated the task of self-criticism that becomes apparent in this latter 
impulse (and which can be expanded to other functionaries within the 
art field) no less polemically than Smithson in a text written in 1983: 
[T]here is no biological necessity about a socially conditioned 
disinclination to perform the difficult and often thankless task of 
political self-analysis. It is not as though artists are congenitally 
incapacitated by having right cerebral hemispheres the size of a 
watermelon and left cerebral hemispheres the size of a peanut. (Piper, 
2001: 50-1) 
That not only the sharpness and decisiveness of these kinds of 
statements, but especially the multiple layers of the critical gesture 
inherent to them are marginalized in the discussion today, in favor of 
routine canonizations and counter-canonizations, may have something 
to do with the fact that the reason for current debates on art institutions 
and other public institutions is the impact of neo-liberal policies on 
these institutions. And as in other areas as well, the extent of political 
defensiveness and a lack of orientation in light of rampaging neo-liberal 
reforms is expressed, not least of all, in the defense of instruments and 
institutions that might well have been the subject of a critical 
examination yesterday. Instead of targeting what can generally be 
identified as ‘art’ and classified in ‘currents’, against this background it 
would seem advisable not to fall back behind the institutional critique of 
historical political analyses of modern art and exhibition institutions – 
or ‘art’ as an institutional field – like Carol Duncan’s Civilizing Rituals 
(1995) for instance, or Tony Bennett’s The Birth of the Museum (1995). 
With Bennett’s historically precise reconstruction of the modern 
museum and exhibition complex in mind, for example, carried out 
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against the background of Foucault’s analyses of governmentality 
(Nowotny, 2003a; 2005), it would be better to begin by considering the 
overlapping of various governmentality arrangements in which 
institutional critique has to orient itself today, both within the art field 
and beyond it. Given the growing divergence between political economy 
and nation-state frameworks, this overlapping must be seen as 
inherently contradictory. 
Yet if every form of historiography must ultimately be regarded as 
an institutional practice itself and an ‘outside the institution’ cannot 
simply be presumed, but rather questions must be raised about the 
possibilities of a transformation of institutional practices, how can an 
alternative to canonization be imagined that is not a counter-
canonization? One possibility certainly consists in a political analysis of 
the respective constellation, in which institutional critique is articulated. 
This means assuming a perspective which takes into account the specific 
functionality of the art field within the concrete social-political context, 
ranging beyond the self-referential structures of this field, and which 
also includes a view to the changes, to which this functionality and thus 
the conditions of critique are subjected. Here I would like to propose a 
somewhat different approach, however, which does not contradict the 
first at all, but should rather be appended to it: an approach that 
envisions ‘critique’ less in keeping with the model of a judgement structure 
(roughly speaking, in other words, a subject that positions itself vis-à-vis 
the criticized conditions), but rather with the model of a practice 
(meaning a subject that is involved and involves itself in a specific way in the 
criticized conditions). 
Perhaps too little attention has previously been given to the fact that 
Foucault – where he talks about ‘suppressed knowledges’, the ‘local 
discursivities’ that are denigrated by the dominant discourse – describes 
these forms of knowledge as, among others, ‘differential knowledge’ 
(Foucault, 1999: 16). What does the notion of differentiality refer to 
here? On the one hand, certainly to the resistance of this knowledge, to 
the fact that “it owes its force to the sharpness with which it enters into 
opposition with everything around it”. On the other hand, however, it 
also refers to this knowledge being differential in itself (also self-
pluralizing for this reason), to the fact that it cannot be “transposed into 
unanimity” – even though the Foucauldian genealogy itself, as a tactic of 
its description, exposes it to a certain danger of uniformed coding and 
re-colonization (Foucault, 1999: 21). Not least of all, this knowledge is 
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differential because it does not allow itself, being resistive, to be subjected 
to any authorized discursive field, to any authorization by a dominant 
discourse, but instead recognizes the power effects found in the 
separation of knowledge into fields and in furnishing these fields with 
discursive authorities, yet without composing itself into a new totality of 
knowledge. Hence as plural knowledge it also does not ‘organize’ itself 
under a unified form, but rather in an open, non-dialectical game of 
concurrence. For precisely this reason, the Foucauldian genealogy can 
be concerned with “preparing a historical knowledge of struggles and 
introducing this knowledge into current tactics” (Foucault, 1999: 17).  
The struggles that Foucault was specifically thinking of in the mid-
1970s – and through which “for ten, fifteen years now [...] it has 
become possible to criticize things, institutions, practices, discourses to 
a tremendous and overflowing extent” (Foucault, 1999: 13) – were 
particularly those of anti-psychiatry, attacks on gender hierarchies and 
sexual morals, and on the legal and penal apparatus. Why should we not 
append the battles of institutional critique practices to this list (it is not a 
coincidence that Robert Smithson compares the ‘cells’ of the museums 
with those of ‘asylums and prisons’ in the passage quoted above...)? 
What could come into view through this kind of perspective is not so 
much – or at least not solely – the question of the respective critical 
assessment of art institutions, and certainly not of a canon, but rather an 
open field of a knowledge of action, a practical knowledge that rejects 
reintegration into the form of ends specific to art and in which the 
difference of institutional critique is actualized. We find it in the most 
diverse tactics of context politicization, self-masking, alienation, parody, 
the situation-specific refraction of themes, research, discursive and 
material context production, in self-institutionalization, in production 
that starts with social interaction, or even simply in a more or less 
developed renegade position. 
A historiography and investigation of institutional critique could be 
oriented to these practices, if the aim is to introduce this knowledge into 
current tactics. 
 
Notes 
1.  An example from – at least at first glance – outside the art field that 
indicates the background of these reflections (namely Walter Benjamin’s 
essay ‘On the Critique of Violence’): Pursuing the end of justice under the 
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form of law, in other words as a legal end, means nothing more than 
considering it (egally) capable of generalization, whereby the form of law is 
placed beyond dispute both at the level of the means (legal claims, laws, 
etc.) and at the level of the ends (e.g. the non-contradictory regulation of 
human affairs). 
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Notes on Institutional Critique 
Simon Sheikh 
The very term ‘institutional critique’ seems to indicate a direct 
connection between a method and an object: the method being the 
critique and the object the institution. In the first wave of institutional 
critique from the late 1960s and early 1970s – long since celebrated and 
relegated by art history – these terms could apparently be even more 
concretely and narrowly defined: the critical method was an artistic 
practice, and the institution in question was the art institution, mainly 
the art museum, but also galleries and collections. Institutional critique 
thus took on many forms, such as artistic works and interventions, 
critical writings or (art-)political activism. However, in the so-called 
second wave, from the 1980s, the institutional framework became 
somewhat expanded to include the artist’s role (the subject performing 
the critique) as institutionalized, as well as an investigation into other 
institutional spaces (and practices) besides the art space.1 Both waves are 
today themselves part of the art institution, in the form of art history 
and education as much as in the general de-materialized and post-
conceptual art practice of contemporary art. It shall not be my purpose 
here, however, to discuss or access the meaning of institutional critique 
as an art historical canon, or to engage in the writing of such a canon (I 
shall respectfully leave that endeavor for the Texte zur Kunst and October 
magazines of this world). Instead, though, I would like to point out a 
convergence between the two waves, that seems to have drastically 
changed in the current ‘return’ of institutional critique that may or may 
not constitute a third wave. In either of its historical emergences, 
institutional critique was a practice mainly, if not exclusively, conducted 
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by artists, and directed against the (art) institutions, as a critique of their 
ideological and representative social function(s). Art’s institutions, 
which may or may not contain the artists’ work, were seen, in the words 
of Robert Smithson, as spaces of ‘cultural confinement’ and 
circumscription, and thus as something to attack aesthetically, politically 
and theoretically. The institution was posed as a problem (for artists). In 
contrast, the current institutional-critical discussions seem 
predominantly propagated by curators and directors of the very same 
institutions, and they are usually opting for rather than against them. 
That is, they are not an effort to oppose or even destroy the institution, 
but rather to modify and solidify it. The institution is not only a 
problem, but also a solution! 
There has been a shift, then, in the placement of institutional 
critique, not only in historical time, but also in terms of the subjects 
who direct and perform the critique – it has moved from an outside to 
an inside. Interestingly, Benjamin Buchloh (1990) has described the 
historical moment of conceptual art as a movement from institutional 
critique and ‘the aesthetic of administration to the critique of 
institutions’, in a controversial essay entitled, tellingly, ‘Conceptual Art 
1962–1969: From the Aesthetics of Administration to the Critique of 
Institutions’. While Buchloh focuses on the emergence of 
conceptualism, his suggestive distinction is perhaps even more pertinent 
now that institutional critique is literally being performed by 
administrative aestheticians, i.e. museum directors, curators etc. 
(Buchloh, 1990). Taking her cue from Buchloh, Andrea Fraser goes a 
step further in her recent essay ‘From the Critique of Institutions to an 
Institution of Critique’, where she claims that a movement between an 
inside and an outside of the institution is no longer possible, since the 
structures of the institution have become totally internalized. “We are 
the institution”, Fraser (2005: 282) writes, and thus concludes that it is 
rather a question of creating critical institutions – what she terms ‘an 
institution of critique’, established through self-questioning and self-
reflection (Fraser, 2005). Fraser also writes that the institutions of art 
should not be seen as an autonomous field, separate from the rest of the 
world, the same way that ‘we’ are not separate from the institution. 
While I would certainly agree with any attempt to view art institutions as 
part of a larger ensemble of socio-economic and disciplinary spaces, I 
am nonetheless confused by the simultaneous attempt to integrate the 
art world into the current (politico-economic) world system and the 
Notes on Institutional Critique 
31 
upholding of a ‘we’ of the art world itself. Who exactly is this ‘we’? If 
the art world is seen as part of a generalized institutionalization of social 
subjects (that in turn internalizes the institutionalization), what and 
where are the demarcation lines for entry, for visibility and 
representation? If one of the criteria for institutions is given in the 
exclusions performed by them (as inherent in any collection), the 
question which subjects fall outside institutionalization, not due to a 
willful act or exodus as certain artistic movements thought and desired, 
but through the expulsions at the very center of institutions that allow 
them to institutionalize? Obviously, this would require a very expanded 
notion of institutional critique – one that lies somewhat outside the 
history of institutional critique as discussed here. 
So, to return to the object at hand, institutional critique as an art 
practice: what does it mean when the practice of institutional critique 
and analysis has shifted from artists to curators and critics, and when 
the institution has become internalized in artists and curators alike 
(through education, through art historical canon, through daily praxis)? 
Analyzed in terms of negative dialectics, this would seem to indicate the 
total co-optation of institutional critique by the institutions (and by 
implication and extension, the co-optation of resistance by power), and 
thus make institutional critique as a critical method completely obsolete. 
Institutional critique, as co-opted, would be like bacteria that may have 
temporarily weakened the patient – the institution – but only in order to 
strengthen the immune system of that patient in the long run. However, 
such a conclusion would hinge around notions of subjectivities, agencies 
and spatialities that institutional critique, arguably, tried to deconstruct. 
It would imply that the historical institutional critique was somehow 
‘original’ and ‘pure’, thus confirming the authenticity of the artist-
subjects performing it (as opposed to the current ‘institutional’ 
subjects), and consequently reaffirming one of the ideas that 
institutional critique set out to circumvent, namely the notion of 
authentic subjects per se (as represented by the artist, reified by the 
institution). If institutional critique was indeed a discourse of disclosure 
and demystification of how the artistic subject as well as object was 
staged and reified by the institution, then any narrative that (again) 
posits certain voices and subjects as authentic, as possible incarnations 
of certain politics and criticalities, must be said to be not only counter to 
the very project of institutional critique, but perhaps also the ultimate 
co-optation, or more accurately, hostile take-over of it. Institutional 
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critique is, after all, not primarily about the intentionalities and identities 
of subjects, but rather about the politics and inscriptions of institutions 
(and, thus, about how subjects are always already threaded through 
specific and specifiable institutional spaces). 
Rather, one must try to historicize the moments of institutional 
critique and look at how it has been successful, in terms of being 
integrated into the education of artists and curators, that is of what Julia 
Bryan-Wilson has termed ‘the curriculum of institutional critique’ 
(Bryan-Wilson, 2003). One can then see institutional critique not as a 
historical period and/or genre within art history, but rather as an 
analytical tool, a method of spatial and political criticism and articulation 
that can be applied not only to the art world, but to disciplinary spaces 
and institutions in general. An institutional critique of institutional 
critique, what can be termed ‘institutionalized critique’, has then to 
question the role of education, historicization and how institutional 
auto-critique not only leads to a questioning of the institution and what 
it institutes, but also becomes a mechanism of control within new 
modes of governmentality, precisely through its very act of 
internalization. And this is the expanded notion of institutional critique 
that I briefly mentioned above, and which could become the legacy of 
the historical movements as much as an orientation for what so-called 
‘critical art institutions’ claim to be. 
 
Notes 
1.  James Meyer (1993) has tried to establish a genealogy rather than a mere art 
history of institutional critique. 
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Criticism without Crisis: 
Crisis without Criticism 
Boris Buden 
Why do we talk today about institutional critique in the field of art? The 
answer is very simple: Because we (still) believe that art is intrinsically 
equipped with the power of criticism. Of course, we don’t simply mean 
art criticism here but something more than that, the ability of art to 
criticize the world and life beyond its own realm, and even, by doing 
that, to change both. This includes, however, some sort of self-criticism, 
or more precisely, the practice of critical self-reflexivity, which means 
that we also expect of art – or at least used to expect – to be critically 
aware of the conditions of its possibility, which usually means, the 
conditions of its production. 
These two notions – to be aware of the conditions of possibility and 
production – point at two major realms of modern criticism: the 
theoretical and the practical-political realm. It was Immanuel Kant who 
first posed the question about the conditions of possibility of our 
knowledge and who understood this question explicitly as an act of 
criticism. From that point on we may say that modern reflection is 
either critical – in this self-reflexive way – or it is not modern.  
But we are not going to follow this theoretical line of modern 
criticism here. We will concentrate instead on its practical and political 
meaning, which can be simply described as a will for radical change, in 
short, the demand for revolution, which is the ultimate form of practical 
and political criticism. The French Revolution was not only prepared 
through the bourgeois criticism of the absolutist state. It was nothing 
but this criticism in actu, its last word turned into political action. The 
idea of revolution as an ultimate act of criticism has found its most 
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radical expression in Marxist theoretical and political concepts. 
Remember that the young Karl Marx explicitly characterized his own 
revolutionary philosophy as “the ruthless critique of everything 
existing”. He meant this in the most radical sense as a criticism that 
‘operates’ in the very basement of social life, that is, in the realm of its 
material production and reproduction, something we understand today, 
perhaps oversimplifying, as the realm of economy. 
In this way criticism has become one of the essential qualities of 
modernity. For almost two centuries to be modern meant simply to be 
critical – in philosophy as much as in moral questions, in politics and 
social life as much as in art.  
But there is also another concept, which – as a sort of its 
complement – has long accompanied the idea and practice of modern 
criticism, and that is the concept of crisis. A belief that the two – crisis 
and criticism – have something in common, that there is an authentic 
relation, or better, an interaction between them, equally belongs to the 
modern experience. Therefore, an act of criticism almost necessarily 
implies the awareness of a crisis and vice versa; a diagnosis of crisis 
implies the necessity of criticism.  
Actually, criticism and crisis didn’t enter the historical scene at the 
same time. Criticism is the child of the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment. It was born and developed out of the separation 
between politics and morality, a separation that criticism has deepened 
and kept alive throughout the modern age. It was only through the 
process of criticism – the criticism of all forms of traditional knowledge, 
religious beliefs and aesthetic values, the criticism of existing juridical 
and political reality and finally the criticism of the mind itself – that the 
growing bourgeois class could impose its own interests and values as the 
highest instance of judgement and in that way develop the self-
confidence and self-conscience it needed for the decisive political 
struggles to come. In this context one shouldn’t underestimate the role 
of art and literary criticism especially in the development of the modern 
philosophy of history. It was precisely art and literary criticism that 
produced at that time among the intelligentsia the awareness of a 
contradiction between the ‘old’ and the ‘modern’ and in that way shaped 
a new understanding of time capable of differentiating the future from 
the past. But at the end of this period arises also the awareness of the 
approaching crisis: “We are approaching the state of crisis and the 
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century of revolutions”, writes Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1966: 252). 
Whereas for Enlightenment thinkers revolution was a synonym for an 
inevitable historical progress, which occurs necessarily as a kind of 
natural phenomenon, Rousseau by contrast understood it as the 
ultimate expression of crisis, which brings about the state of insecurity, 
dissolution, chaos, new contradictions, etc. In connection with the crisis 
– which it has prepared and initiated – criticism loses its original naïvety 
and its alleged innocence. From now on criticism and crisis go together 
shaping the modern age of civil wars and revolutions, which instead of 
bringing about the expected historical progress, cause chaotic 
dissolutions and obscure regressive processes, often completely beyond 
rational control. The interaction between criticism and crisis is one of 
the major qualities of what later was conceptualized as the ‘dialectics of 
enlightenment’.  
In the meantime the interplay of both notions became a sort of 
terminus technicus of modernist progress introducing a difference – and 
simultaneously a relation – between ‘old’ and ‘new’. To say that 
something has gone into crisis meant above all to say that it has become 
old; that is, that it has lost its right to exist and therefore should be 
replaced by something new. Criticism is nothing but the act of this 
judgement, which helps the old to die quickly and the new to be born 
easily.  
This also applies to the development of modern art, which also 
follows the dialectics of criticism and crisis of its forms. So we 
understand for instance realism as a critical reaction to the crisis of 
Romanticism, or the idea of abstract art as a critique of figurative art, 
which has exhausted its potential and therefore went into crisis. Also 
the tension between art and ‘prosaic reality’ was interpreted through the 
dialectics of crisis and criticism. So was modern art – especially in 
Romanticism – often understood as a criticism of ordinary life, of 
ordinariness as such, or in other words of a life that had lost its 
authenticity or its meaning – in short, a life that had also gone into some 
kind of crisis.  
Let us now go back to the question, whether this dialectics of 
criticism and crisis still makes some sense to us today. A few months 
ago in Austria I had an opportunity to pose this question directly. I 
moderated a discussion on the legacy of the artistic avant-garde today in 
the post-communist Eastern Europe. I hoped everybody would agree 
Boris Buden 
36 
when I said that the avant-garde is still the most radical case of 
modernist art criticism – both in terms of a criticism of traditional art of 
its time and in terms of a criticism of existing reality, precisely in the 
moment of its – widely recognized and acknowledged – crisis. After five 
hours of debate, the conclusion was that the critical experience of avant-
garde art is of no value at all today, at least not in Eastern Europe. 
The participants in the discussion were mostly younger artists from 
central and southern regions of Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Romania and also Turkey. Actually, only the 
representative of Turkey was prepared to take the topic seriously and 
believed that the critical stance of the avant-garde still makes some 
sense to us today. The most open and most radical in his refusal of the 
avant-garde question was the representative of the Czech Republic. He 
argued that the avant-garde experience is actually a problem of 
generations. For him, it is an older generation of artists and art 
historians that still sees some challenge in the avant-garde and is 
bothered by this question. The younger generation, he believes, is 
already beyond the problem of the political meaning of art, or relations 
between politics and aesthetics. He gave this example: the old 
generation still discusses vehemently whether or not we need to 
consider the political meaning of Leni Riefenstahl’s work. For the young 
generation, on the contrary, this simply doesn’t matter any more. They 
have so to speak a direct insight into her art without any political 
connotations. They see it as what it really is – a pure art in its pure 
aesthetic value and meaning. 
In fact I was not interested at all in this topic, since I know these 
people and their interests, so I didn’t actually expect them to be really 
interested in the avant-garde. However, there was another issue I found 
much more interesting there. The participants were actually all members 
of the so-called Transit-Project. This is a project that was launched a 
few years ago by an Austrian bank with the aim of supporting art in 
Eastern Europe. The participants were representatives of the project in 
their countries. Since I know that this particular bank has earned an 
enormous amount of money in Eastern Europe, I was curious whether 
they would have any opinion on that fact – that is, on the way they are 
paid for their artistic work, or on the role of art and art funding under 
these circumstances.  
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I was also motivated by an article that appeared around then in the 
Viennese daily Der Standard. It reported on the profits of Austrian banks 
and insurance companies in Eastern Europe. In it, one could read that 
the result of the so-called business activity of the Generali Holding 
Vienna (an insurance company) had tripled the year before. The annual 
net profit had doubled in the same year. One can only wonder how this 
had been possible. The answer was to be found in the subtitle of the 
same article: ‘The growth engine Eastern Europe’. It is due to the 
eastern expansion of the holding – and Austrian banks too – that they 
can make such profits. I hoped that the participants would somehow 
tackle this issue. To speak more openly, I wanted to provoke some sort 
of criticism. Unfortunately, it didn’t work. Nobody found the economic, 
material conditions of their art making worth mentioning. 
It seems that the critical legacy of the avant-garde in post-
communist Europe is finally dead. Moreover, it also seems that there is 
no authentic interest among young artists in institutional criticism, in 
what we have called above self-criticism: critical awareness of the 
conditions of the possibility of their art and the conditions of its 
production. 
The reason for this is obvious: our perception of avant-garde 
criticism is essentially framed by the historical experience of 
communism. This means that the experience of the avant-garde, as 
much as the experience of radical criticism, appears to us today only 
from our post-communist (post-totalitarian, or post-ideological) 
perspective. It appears as a phenomenon of our past, as a phenomenon, 
to use Francis Fukuyama’s (1992: xi) notion, of a lower level of 
humanity’s ideological evolution. In short it appears that, as a problem, 
it belongs to the concerns of an older generation, to use words of the 
Czech colleague, and thus by implication is sooner or later going to die 
out.  
But let me, at this point, pose an ‘impossible’ question: is 
communism really dead? As far as I know, it is not only still alive, but 
also proves, in some fields, its superiority over capitalism. Yes, I really 
mean today’s China. (Please don’t tell me that this is not the real 
communism. There has never been a real communism. I can remember 
very well that from the perspective of Yugoslavian communism – also 
often dismissed, due to the market economy, as not being an authentic, 
real one – the Soviet and whole East-block communism was defined as 
Boris Buden 
38 
a form of state-capitalism). Why don’t we then learn about radical 
criticism and self-criticism from Chinese communists who obviously 
seem to have been more successful than their Western comrades? But 
before we ask the highest theoretical authority of the Chinese 
communism about the true meaning of criticism and self-criticism, let 
me remind you of a historical fact: In the historical reality of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the idea of communist revolution 
itself became an institution – in the form of the communist movement 
and the Communist Party in its various national forms. As an 
institution, the communist movement also developed its own institution 
of criticism, the institution of so-called self-criticism, which played the 
extremely important function of informing the self-conscious subject of 
revolutionary action and later of a socialist community.  
For Chairman Mao, conscientious practice of self-criticism was one 
of the most important hallmarks distinguishing a Communist Party 
from all other political parties. Let me quote him: “As we say, dust will 
accumulate if a room is not cleaned regularly, our faces will get dirty if 
they are not washed regularly. Our comrades’ minds and our Party’s 
work may also collect dust, and also need sweeping and washing”. 
Therefore, self-criticism is for Mao “the only effective way to prevent all 
kinds of political dust and germs from contaminating the minds of our 
comrades and the body of our Party”. 
This sounds very funny to us today, like an infantile ideological fairy 
tale. But let me point to a crucial contradiction in Mao’s concept of self-
criticism: it has nothing to do whatsoever with the crisis of capitalism or 
with any sort of crisis. Although Mao describes communist self-criticism 
as the most effective weapon of Marxism-Leninism, he doesn’t justify it 
with the ideological principals of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, 
his definition of self-criticism seems to be completely non-ideological, 
simply a matter of trivial common sense: a clean face is better than a 
dirty one, a clean room better than one full of dust, germs are bad for 
health. 
Why this trivialization? And, what is even more important, what 
happened to the crisis, where has it gone, why has it suddenly 
disappeared? Why this particular form of communist criticism – a self-
criticism that is not related to any sort of crisis? In the guise of the 
communist political movement both the crisis of capitalism and its 
criticism have merged into one single institution in which there is no 
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possibility to differentiate between them. In other words, precisely in 
merging together they have become each other’s outside. For the 
communist movement the crisis of capitalism was suddenly out there, in 
the outside of its own institution. But for capitalism, too, the criticism 
of its crisis can now be perceived only as coming from its own outside. 
The result is that communists couldn’t see themselves as being part of 
the capitalist crisis and therefore, instead of resolving it, through their 
criticism, they have finally succeeded in making it stronger, more 
efficient, finally more sustainable or simply permanent. The problem 
was that communism and capitalism – or if you want, capitalism as crisis 
and its communist criticism – have never reached the point of a radical 
mutual exclusion, but on the contrary, were helping each other in 
moments of crises.  
Why should we forget that it was precisely American capital which 
helped Bolshevik Russia to recover from the destructions of the civil 
war? And why forget the role of art in this story? The Soviets, as it is 
well known, were exchanging some of the most precious and also most 
expensive art works, mostly French paintings from the nineteen century, 
for new industrial technology from the United States. In our liberal 
jargon we today would call it a perfect win-win situation. The one side 
could get rid of what it considered at that time meaningless and 
historically obsolete (i.e., bourgeois art). And the other side could 
expand its markets, push forward employment and consequently 
stabilize the social situation and pacify its working class (i.e., escape its 
crisis). It didn’t work, but not, as many believe today, because the 
Bolsheviks were primitives who couldn’t recognize the real value of the 
artworks they possessed. Far from it: they knew all about the market 
value of those artworks, and this according to the pure capitalist logic. 
They treated them exclusively as commodities. But this became possible 
only after these artworks were artistically devaluated, after they had lost 
their artistic value as a consequence of an authentic art-criticism. It was 
actually the avant-garde art that stated the crisis of traditional art and – 
within what we today understand as pure history of art – radically 
criticized all these French paintings and destroyed their artistic value. 
Moreover, it was now the artistic avant-garde itself that needed 
factories and working masses in order to articulate its artistic principles 
and produce its own artistic values. The avant-garde did not need 
museums and depots to collect its works and present them to an 
audience they didn’t care about and were actually disgusted with. And 
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who could provide the needed factories and working class? American 
industrial technology. Capitalism, in short. This is a wonderful example 
of how crisis and criticism of both capitalism and art can successfully 
work together, of course within an overall capitalist context, in order to 
produce – normality! 
Another example of how capitalism and communism can function 
in harmony is of course today’s China. To translate the reality into the 
dialectics of crisis and its criticism, it is precisely the rule of an 
institutionalized criticism of capitalism (i.e., the rule of the Chinese 
Communist Party) that today helps capitalism to survive its crises and 
persist. Not only by opening the world’s largest market to global 
corporate capital, but also by providing it with cheap and highly 
disciplined labour. This doesn’t happen, as so many believe, because 
today’s Chinese communists have betrayed the very principles of the 
communist idea, and because, ceasing to criticize capitalism, they have 
started to improve it. They have not betrayed Mao. On the contrary, 
they stick faithfully to his true legacy. 
Let me quote the Chairman once more. Discussing the necessity for 
self-criticism, he calls for personal sacrifice:  
As we Chinese Communists, who… never balk at any personal sacrifice 
and are ready at all times to give our lives for the cause, can we be 
reluctant to discard any idea, viewpoint, opinion or method which is not 
suited to the needs of the people? Can we be willing to allow political 
dust and germs to dirty our clean faces or eat into our healthy 
organisms? [C]an there be any personal interest… that we would not 
sacrifice or any error that we would not discard? 
And let’s remember that the famous Stalinist show trials would have 
never been possible without the institution of self-criticism and personal 
sacrifice. As is well known today, they were introduced at the beginning 
of the 1930s, precisely at the moment when collectivization started to 
produce catastrophic results, plunging Soviet society into deep crisis. It 
was self-criticism that then helped to project this crisis into an outside, 
to present it as an effect of the subversion from the outside, a work of 
imperialist spies and agents. It was therefore completely understandable 
that the institution had to be cleaned up from all those ‘germs and 
parasites’ which had eaten into the healthy organism of Soviet society. 
Criticism – in the guise of communist self-criticism – was used (or if 
you like misused), not to disclose the real crisis and its antagonisms and 
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intervene in it (which would have been a classical Marxist approach), 
but on the contrary to hide it and in this way to make it permanent, that 
is, to transform or translate crisis in some sort of normality. 
This is typical for today’s situation: neither are we able to experience 
our time as crisis nor do we try to become subjects through an act of 
criticism. In the period of classical modernism, crisis was always 
experienced as an actual possibility of a break and criticism as this break 
itself. Obviously, such an experience is no longer possible for us today. 
There is no experience whatsoever of an interaction between crisis and 
critique. One cannot simply ignore Giorgio Agamben’s warning, that 
one of the most important experiences of our times is the fact that we 
are unable to have any experience of it. The result is a permanent 
criticism that is blind to the crisis, and a permanent crisis that is deaf to 
criticism. In short, a perfect harmony! 
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Artistic Internationalism and Institutional 
Critique 
Jens Kastner 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
In 1970 a group called the Guerilla Art Collective Project placed military 
uniforms filled with meat and labeled ‘SHIP TO…’ in the main square 
in front of the university in San Diego. The action – at the same time a 
protest against the war in Vietnam and an art production (Breitwieser, 
2003: 16) – was carried out on the borderline between installation and 
sculpture, as well as between art and politics. The group member who 
initiated the project was Allan Sekula, a student of the social 
philosopher Herbert Marcuse. 
Marcuse was one of the most important advocates of social 
movements in the 1960s. His One-Dimensional Man (1964), influential for 
many students in Western Europe and North America during that 
period, saw in the protest movements new possibilities for the 
realization of alternative, non-alienated ways of living, an approach that 
later became conventional in research dealing with social movements. 
However, it was not only these possibilities that united the various 
upheavals since the mid-1960s and partly enabled the conjoining of very 
different concerns – feminist, anti-colonialist, anti-racist, anti-
authoritarian, anti-imperialist and anti-militarist. Similar in some ways to 
Dada fifty years earlier, in terms of what the actors had in common, 
1968 as an international or transnational upheaval, as ‘a world 
revolution’ (il manifesto), in which widespread artistic mobilization was 
also involved, was based primarily on negative internationalist 
motivations: the war against Vietnam conducted by the USA was the 
outstanding negatively uniting element. “The military intervention of the 
USA in the Vietnam conflict gave the protests of the various national 
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student avant-garde groups an international dimension, an idea that 
united them, and a common strategy” (Gilcher-Holtey, 2003: 49). Just as 
social criticism was linked at the political level in the urban centers 
through this negative bracket with liberation movements in developing 
countries, at the cultural level agitation by politicized students joined 
forces with artists expanding their methods. Countless artistic actions 
took place in the most diverse countries in the course of the protest 
movements, linking anti-war ideas with local social, cultural and political 
concerns, and especially joined them with the actions of the social 
movements. In his history of conceptual art Tony Godfrey (2005: 190) 
wonders about “how little the political situation was directly addressed 
by art” in light of the vehement student unrest, but he considers the 
importance of the Vietnam war in the development of art in the late 
1960s and early 1970s so great that he begins every chapter of his book 
by elaborating on it. 
My thesis is that the internationalist orientation functions both as 
the potential link between artistic and social movements and as a 
possible means for overcoming the structural obstacles between both. 
This conjunction is by no means to be taken for granted, nor is it 
generally the case. It is blocked, according to Pierre Bourdieu, by the 
complete difference and incompatibility of the respective fields. 
Although there exists a “structural affinity between literary avant-garde 
and the political avant-garde” (Bourdieu, 1996: 251), the reconciliation 
of the two “in a sort of summation of all revolutions – social, sexual, 
artistic” (Bourdieu, 1996: 387) repeatedly runs into the rifts or hurdles 
that exist between the two areas. It was not unusual for these hurdles to 
appear even in the context of 1968. They were evident, for example, in 
the repeatedly occurring, mutual vituperation between political activists 
and activist artists. In 1971 Henryk M. Broder, for instance, contended 
that the Vienna Actionist Otto Muehl was “no leftist, but an anal-
fascist”, whereas Muehl criticized the bourgeois mentality of all 
revolutionaries, who “put on their comfy slippers” again when they are 
finished revolting (Raunig, 2007: 290). The controversies surrounding 
Muehl and the other actors from Vienna Actionism were ultimately so 
heated because the art scene in Austria had a certain dominance within 
the situation in 1968, which was generally marked, according to Robert 
Foltin (2004: 74) by “a lack of theory and by a low degree of 
militancy.”1 
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The thesis that social and artistic movements come together and/or 
mutually permeate one another in artistic internationalism also 
contradicts two narrow readings of Bourdieu, which have been 
formulated in discussions about institutional critique. Andrea Fraser’s 
reading (2005), for example, which picks up from Bourdieu, regards the 
art field as being so closed that everything done outside it can have no 
effects at all towards the inside – and vice versa. In the essay that opens 
this volume, Gerald Raunig rightly criticizes Fraser’s position, and 
Stefan Nowotny in his text on ‘anti-canonization’ criticizes a similar 
position on the part of Isabelle Graw. Nowotny maintains that in 
Graw’s essay ‘Beyond Institutional Critique’ is a “flagrant example of 
fixing institutional critique art practices to art” (this volume). However, 
Graw’s position also stands for a second curtailment of Bourdieu’s art 
field theory. In light of the sales-oriented clientele of a New York art 
fair, completely uninterested in content, she wrote in a Tageszeitung 
article in 2004 that “under these circumstances... the notion of art as an 
autonomous special sphere... can no longer be maintained” (Graw, 
2005: 15). However, since the autonomization of the art field, the 
economy of symbolic goods, which Bourdieu speaks of, does not take 
place between the poles of total commercialization and ‘pure 
production’.2 Hence the existence and expansion of influential art fairs 
does not at all contradict the autonomy of the field.3 Objections must 
therefore be raised against both of these constrictions: talking about the 
autonomy of the art field means neither asserting a social area incapable 
of achieving effects towards the outside, nor that a terrain exists here, 
which is untouched by economic, social and other influences. Instead, it 
is a matter of pointing out specific functionalities that differ from those 
in other social fields.4 
The artist, photographer and art theoretician Allan Sekula also 
formulated the protest against the Vietnam War in another action, one 
that was photographically documented. In this six-part photo series an 
activist, barefooted and equipped with a Vietnamese peasant’s straw hat 
and plastic machine gun, crawls through the wealthy suburbs of a large 
US city. The title of the 1972 action, Two, three, many ... (terrorism), directly 
refers to Ernesto Che Guevara’s anti-imperialist foco theory. In this 
context Guevara called for the creation of ‘two, three, many’ Vietnams 
to expand the so-called people’s war against imperialism by creating 
multiple revolutionary hot spots. Sekula thus puts Che Guevara’s 
internationalist appeal into an artistic form, indicating the justification 
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for the appeal on the one hand, but on the other also representing a 
symbolic alternative to the non-artistic implementation of guerrilla 
concepts in the major urban centers. The foco theory was not only one of 
the foundations for the development of the ‘urban guerrilla concept’ by 
the Red Army Fraction (RAF) in 1971. Following a first wave of 
guerrilla movements limited to Latin America, a ‘second wave’ (Kaller-
Dietrich and Mayer, undated) arose in Western cities based on the 
practices of the Tupamaros, the leftist urban guerrillas in Uruguay. The 
Weather Underground in the USA and other radical leftist groups in 
various western countries also referred directly or indirectly to this 
dictum from Che Guevara as they went underground (Jacobs, 1997). 
The collage series Bringing the War Home (1967 – 1972) by the US 
artist and art theoretician Martha Rosler5 is also to be seen in the 
context of foco theory. The collages show various motifs from the 
Vietnam War mounted in pictures from contemporary US American 
brochures for furnishings. By calling everyday furnishings into question 
as the furnishings of everyday life, Rosler builds here on an effect 
similar to that of the Berlin group Kommune 1 with their flyer about a 
fire in a Brussels department store in 1967. In this flyer, Kommune 1 
satirically calls the fire an advertising gag for the USA, invoking the 
‘crackling Viet Nam feeling (of being there and burning too)’, that 
everyone should be able to share (Enzensberger, 2004). This satire 
strategy also serves the idea of making injustice in developing countries 
directly comprehensible to people in major cities, making it palpable, in 
fact ‘bringing the war home’. 
If institutional critique is taken not merely as a label for works by the 
four or five protagonists that are always named (Michael Asher, Marcel 
Broodthaers, Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, John Knight), but rather, as 
Hito Steyerl sees it in her essay in this volume, as ‘a new social 
movement within the art field’, then this would certainly include Martha 
Rosler and Allan Sekula. Questioning one’s own role within the art 
system, linking this with concrete socio-political themes such as the 
criticism of US foreign policy and the criticism of the ideology of the 
idyllic private sphere of the family, suggests a version of institutional 
critique that goes beyond the constraints of art institutions like galleries 
and museums. It also covers more than Isabelle Graw (2005: 50) 
includes with the differentiated, expanded concept of institution, of 
corporate culture and celebrity culture. It is more to be understood as a 
criticism of the institutions of capitalist society altogether, in the sense 
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of Marcuse’s utopian idea that the aim is to work towards a society in 
which people are no longer enslaved by institutions. To this extent, 
Steyerl’s analysis also needs to be expanded: institutional critique should 
not only be understood as a movement within the art field, but also as 
one that would hardly be imaginable without the social movements 
outside the art field. 
Artistic internationalism – in other words a certain orientation of the 
subject matter of artistic work that nevertheless first develops in the 
confrontation with the viewers – proves to be the link between art 
movement and social movement. With regard to this functional link, 
works like those described above are to be defended against both their 
proponents and their opponents. 
One of these opponents, for example, is Jacques Rancière (2006), 
who lists Rosler’s aforementioned work as an example of art that too 
strongly disambiguates the relation between illusion and reality. In 
works like Bringing the War Home, according to Rancière, “the sense of 
fiction is lost” (Rancière, 2006: 91), which should, however, be central 
to the real politics of art. Rancière (2006: 87) argues for a “politics of art 
that is proper to the aesthetic regime of art” and which precedes the 
political action of the artist.6 He maintains that the confrontation 
between two heterogeneous elements, as demonstrated in Rosler’s 
collages, is characteristic of critical art. However, it tends to turn itself 
into a mere inventory of things. In turn, this taking inventory leads to 
the exact opposite of what was intended: the politics of art is reduced to 
“welfare and ethical imprecision” (Rancière, 2006: 96), or it dissolves 
into “the indeterminacy[...] that is called ethics today” (Rancière, 2006: 
99). According to Rancière, art is political neither because of its message 
nor in the way that it represents social structures, ethnic and sexual 
identity or political struggles. “Art is primarily political in creating a 
space-time sensorium, in certain modes of being together or apart, of 
defining being inside or outside, opposite to or in the middle of” 
(Rancière, 2006: 77). 
Yet Rosler and Sekula’s works are by no means situated exclusively 
in the tradition of explicitly political agitation art like that of John 
Heartfield or Diego Rivera. However, even their works – denigrated by 
Rancière as ‘directly’ political art – could prove to be suitable for 
creating a sensorium, if, for example, the indeterminate specification of 
being together and apart, etc. is interpreted as a relationship, as it exists 
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and is thematized in the relationship between work and viewer. For only 
very few ‘political’ works are limited solely to conveying messages and 
representing social/political conflicts. Michelangelo Pistoletto, for 
instance, in his mirror painting (Vietnam, 1962/1965) linked the art 
historical issue of the work-viewer relationship with political 
explicitness. Two persons, painted on tissue paper and cut out along 
their contours, are glued to a reflecting metal panel, a woman in a red 
trench coat and a man in a black suit with a tie, each of them holding a 
stick with a demo banner attached to the upper ends, on which the 
letters ‘...NAM’ can be read. Looking at this life-sized picture, viewers 
are immediately drawn into the depiction of the scene, obviously an 
anti-Vietnam War demonstration. Here Pistoletto positions the viewers 
both opposite the picture as such and also in front of a political 
statement, directly involving them in both. According to Tony Godfrey 
(2005: 114), this artistic stance, which places the viewer in a direct 
relationship to the image, is “a crucial characteristic of Conceptual Art.” 
In the case of Sekula’s Two, three, many ... (terrorism) and Rosler’s 
Bringing the War Home, this kind of context is established through the 
internationalism of 1968. This internationalism involves more of a 
political stance than a (for example, Trotskyist) program, an awareness 
of the ways in which social battles in different regions of the world are 
mutually conditioned. Due not least of all to the anti-colonial liberation 
movements, with the student movements of the 1960s an anti-
authoritarian internationalism – in contrast to the proletarian 
internationalism of the early twentieth century – gained “more 
significance theoretically as well[...] In fact, this was one of its central 
components. Internationalism and ‘68’ formed a unit and must 
therefore also be treated as such” (Hierlmeier, 2002: 23). This 
internationalist perspective was realized in the social movements in this 
way perhaps even more than in the art field, within which it was 
criticized as obscuring western hegemony.7 
The artistic internationalism is all the more to be emphasized also in 
response to proponents of Rosler’s Bringing the War Home, such as 
Beatrice von Bismarck (2006). Martha Rosler continued her series in 
2004 under the same title, but instead of motifs from the Vietnam War 
she used motifs from the US invasion of Iraq. Although there is no 
dismissing that Rosler’s Iraq series is a ‘self-quotation’, as Bismarck 
(2006: 239) puts it, a comparable point of reference in terms of subject 
matter is certainly the rhetoric of freedom used by the US government 
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both then and now. Nor is the observation false that the more garish 
choice of colors in comparison with the original series enhances the 
impression of uncanniness, understood in Freud’s sense as a return of 
the repressed. “Especially in Rosler’s photographic collages, in which 
the images of war break into the familiar homeyness, the home sweet 
home, as what is only seemingly alien, this return of the repressed finds 
a striking visual form” (Bismarck, 2006: 240). 
Yet one crucial criterion still remains unmentioned in this account, 
specifically the integration of artistic work in the strategies and practices 
of the social movements. Although the US invasion of Iraq was 
accompanied by worldwide protests, this movement has for the most 
part long since ceased to operate in the context of a Guevara-like anti-
imperialism. The tactic of ‘bringing the war home’ in any way was 
completely absent. And there is a reason for this: filling this slogan with 
emancipatory significance seems to be entirely unthinkable for social 
movements at a time when al-Qaida-style Islamic terror has struck 
Western capitals on many levels, on the one hand, and on the other is 
installed as a scenario of general threat. The war, or a war, has long 
since ‘come home’, has arrived in the Western urban centers, into which 
it first had to be brought in the 1960s and 1970s, although its effects are 
not those intended by movement actors in the 1960s. On the contrary, 
instead of enlightenment, awareness, empathy, emancipatory 
radicalization, an institutional and psychological insulation is taking 
place. The boom in security technologies and policies had already 
signaled the end of the urban guerrillas in the 1970s. Failing to reflect 
on this end and merely attempting to pick up from where it stopped 
thirty years earlier must give rise to perplexity in the case of an artist like 
Rosler. For she herself had emphasized how relatively “the measures of 
aesthetic coherence are applied to photographic practice” (Rosler, 1999: 
122), and lamented a contemporary tendency to detach art works from 
their context. Although a link is made in the continuation of the series 
to an ethical issue, and the standpoint of the viewer in relation to the 
depicted situation is questioned, the political context of the 
emancipatory social movement and its strategies remains omitted – both 
in the work and in the criticism formulated by Bismarck. 
With respect to the first phase of institutional critique, Sabeth 
Buchmann (2006) states that, in terms of the call for cultural and social 
relevance, it diverged from the historical avant-garde in that a different 
way of dealing with these issues was cultivated: the “radius of action was 
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and is no longer society”, according to Buchmann (2006: 22), “but 
rather specific public, institutional and/or media fields.” 
Neither the depreciation of the aesthetic value of artistic works like 
Two, three, many ... (terrorism) or Bringing the War Home nor their political 
de-contextualization does justice to their specific criticism. The works 
discussed here do indeed thematize central issues that are immanent to 
the art field, which are linked to the questions and concerns of social 
movements – with the normative turn, so to speak, of being embroiled 
in the production of the social world: if I am part of the historical 
process, then – according to one of the central ideas of foco theory, 
which has been criticized as being voluntaristic – it ultimately only 
depends on my determination (and that of a few others) to reverse the 
conditions. Both Rancière and Bismarck are building on a false focus: 
Rancière with his criticism of the unambiguousness that he claims exists 
in the confrontation with social conditions and destroys or does not 
enable the alleged ‘politics of aesthetics’; and Bismarck (and even Rosler 
herself with her continuation) by overlooking this tie with the social 
context. It would be better to build instead on the hinge function 
between artistic issues and political forms of social movements. Tying 
into the art historical question of the relationship between artist, work 
and viewer would make it possible to draw from what Bourdieu called 
the ‘space of possibilities’, which “defines and delimits the universe of 
both what is thinkable and what is unthinkable” (Bourdieu, 2001: 373). 
In this sense, the development of artistic internationalism that is based 
on and rooted in the battles of the social movements and their practices 
of solidarity represents a potential expansion of this space. 
 
Notes 
1.  On the connection between Vienna Actionism and the student movement, 
see Foltin (2004: 58) and Raunig (2007: 187-202). 
2.  Nina Tessa Zahner (2005) has analyzed the emergence of a third field, a 
‘sub-field of expanded production’ in the context of the Pop Art of the 
1960s. This conjoins elements from both poles in the figure of the artist as 
entrepreneur. The lasting transformations of the field that go back to these 
developments would have to be discussed separately. 
3.  The ‘autonomy of the art field’ that Bourdieu speaks of is thus not to be 
confused with the ‘autonomy of the art work’ that is asserted by modernist 
art theory. Bourdieu’s whole theory ultimately aims to unmask the 
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‘autonomy of the art work’ as an ideology. Both Graw’s slightly disgusted 
statement about the dominance of money on the one hand and Zahner’s 
(2005: 290) recognition of Pop Art on the other, which credits Warhol for, 
among other things, “having pointed out the ideological content of the art 
that claims to be autonomous”, are based on this misunderstanding. 
4.  Bourdieu (2003: 141) speaks of a “space with two dimensions and two 
forms of struggle and history”: between the ‘pure’ and the ‘commercial’ pole 
there is the question of the legitimacy and the status of art; at another level 
the recognition of the works and the conflicts between young/new and 
old/established artists is at stake. 
5.  The first pictures of the series were published about 1970 as contributions 
to a magazine called Goodbuy to all that (No. 10), placed next to an article by 
the ‘Angela Davis Committee in Defense of Women Prisoners’. 
6.  Rancière also decisively rejects the social conditions of judgments of taste 
and their integration in the symbolic struggles of a society that Bourdieu 
developed in Distinction (1982). He describes Bourdieu’s demystification of 
the pure aesthetic gaze as a “cheap alliance between scientific and political 
progressive thinking”, yet he has nothing to counter this with but the 
assertion of a singular “form of freedom and indifference[...], which joined 
aesthetics with the identification of what art is at all” (Rancière, 2006: 79). It 
would be interesting to discuss whether this is the reason why Rancière, as 
Christian Höller (2006: 180) stresses, is to be regarded “currently in the 
context of left-wing cultural circles as ‘most wanted’.” 
7.  For example, Rasheed Araeen’s (1997: 100) criticism in 1978: “The myth of 
the internationalism of western art must be destroyed now[...] Western art 
expresses exclusively the characteristics of the west[...] Western art is not 
international. It is only a transatlantic art. It only reflects the culture of 
Europe and North America. The current ‘internationalism’ of western art is 
no more than a function of the political and economic power of the west, 
which imposes its values on other people. In an international context it 
would therefore be more appropriate to speak of an imperialistic art.” 
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Extradisciplinary Investigations: 
Towards a New Critique of Institutions 
Brian Holmes 
What is the logic, the need or the desire that pushes more and more 
artists to work outside the limits of their own discipline, defined by the 
notions of free reflexivity and pure aesthetics, incarnated by the gallery-
magazine-museum-collection circuit, and haunted by the memory of the 
normative genres, painting and sculpture?  
Pop art, conceptual art, body art, performance and video each 
marked a rupture of the disciplinary frame, already in the 1960s and 70s. 
But one could argue that these dramatized outbursts merely imported 
themes, media or expressive techniques back into what Yves Klein had 
termed the ‘specialized’ ambiance of the gallery or the museum, 
qualified by the primacy of the aesthetic and managed by the 
functionaries of art. Exactly such arguments were launched by Robert 
Smithson in 1972 in his text on cultural confinement (Smithson, 1996), 
then restated by Brian O’Doherty in his theses on the ideology of the 
white cube (O’Doherty, 1986). They still have a lot of validity. Yet now 
we are confronted with a new series of outbursts, under such names as 
net.art, bio art, visual geography, space art and database art – to which 
one could add an archi-art, or art of architecture, which curiously 
enough has never been baptized as such, as well as a machine art that 
reaches all the way back to 1920s constructivism, or even a ‘finance art’ 
whose birth was announced in the Casa Encendida of Madrid just last 
summer. 
The heterogeneous character of the list immediately suggests its 
application to all the domains where theory and practice meet. In the 
artistic forms that result, one will always find remains of the old 
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modernist tropism whereby art designates itself first of all, drawing the 
attention back to its own operations of expression, representation, 
metaphorization or deconstruction. Independently of whatever ‘subject’ 
it treats, art tends to make this self-reflexivity its distinctive or 
identifying trait, even its raison d’être, in a gesture whose philosophical 
legitimacy was established by Immanuel Kant. But in the kind of work I 
want to discuss, there is something more at stake. 
We can approach it through the word that the Nettime project used 
to define its collective ambitions. For the artists, theorists, media 
activists and programmers who inhabited that mailing list – one of the 
important vectors of net.art in the late 1990s – it was a matter of 
proposing an ‘immanent critique’ of the Internet, that is, of the techno-
scientific infrastructure then in the course of construction. This critique 
was to be carried out inside the network itself, using its languages and its 
technical tools and focusing on its characteristic objects, with the goal 
of influencing or even of directly shaping its development – but without 
refusing the possibilities of distribution outside this circuit.1 What’s 
sketched out is a two-way movement, which consists in occupying a 
field with a potential for shaking up society (telematics) and then 
radiating outward from that specialized domain, with the explicitly 
formulated aim of effecting change in the discipline of art (considered 
too formalist and narcissistic to escape its own charmed circle), in the 
discipline of cultural critique (considered too academic and historicist to 
confront the current transformations) and even in the ‘discipline’ – if 
you can call it that – of leftist activism (considered too doctrinaire, too 
ideological to seize the occasions of the present). 
At work here is a new tropism and a new sort of reflexivity, 
involving artists as well as theorists and activists in a passage beyond the 
limits traditionally assigned to their practice. The word tropism conveys 
the desire or need to turn towards something else, towards an exterior 
field or discipline; while the notion of reflexivity now indicates a critical 
return to the departure point, an attempt to transform the initial 
discipline, to end its isolation, to open up new possibilities of 
expression, analysis, cooperation and commitment. This back-and-forth 
movement, or rather, this transformative spiral, is the operative 
principle of what I will be calling extradisciplinary investigations. 
The concept was forged in an attempt to go beyond a kind of 
double aimlessness that affects contemporary signifying practices, even 
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a double drift, but without the revolutionary qualities that the 
Situationists were looking for. I’m thinking first of the inflation of 
interdisciplinary discourses on the academic and cultural circuits: a 
virtuoso combinatory system that feeds the symbolic mill of cognitive 
capital, acting as a kind of supplement to the endless pinwheels of 
finance itself (the curator Hans-Ulrich Obrist is a specialist of these 
combinatories). Second is the state of indiscipline that is an unsought 
effect of the anti-authoritarian revolts of the 1960s, where the subject 
simply gives into the aesthetic solicitations of the market (in the neo-
Pop vein, indiscipline means endlessly repeating and remixing the flux 
of prefabricated commercial images). Though they aren’t the same, 
interdisciplinarity and indiscipline have become the two most common 
excuses for the neutralization of significant inquiry (Holmes, 2001). But 
there is no reason to accept them. 
The extradisciplinary ambition is to carry out rigorous investigations 
on terrains as far away from art as finance, biotech, geography, 
urbanism, psychiatry, the electromagnetic spectrum, etc., to bring forth 
on those terrains the ‘free play of the faculties’ and the intersubjective 
experimentation that are characteristic of modern art, but also to try to 
identify, inside those same domains, the spectacular or instrumental uses 
so often made of the subversive liberty of aesthetic play – as the 
architect Eyal Weizman does in exemplary fashion, when he investigates 
the appropriation by the Israeli and US military of what were initially 
conceived as subversive architectural strategies. Weizman challenges the 
military on its own terrain, with his maps of security infrastructures in 
Israel; but what he brings back are elements for a critical examination of 
what used to be his exclusive discipline (Weizman, 2007). This complex 
movement, which never neglects the existence of the different 
disciplines, but never lets itself be trapped by them either, can provide a 
new departure point for what used to be called institutional critique. 
Histories in the Present 
What has been established, retrospectively, as the ‘first generation’ of 
institutional critique includes figures like Michael Asher, Robert 
Smithson, Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke and Marcel Broodthaers. They 
examined the conditioning of their own activity by the ideological and 
economic frames of the museum, with the goal of breaking out. As 
Stefan Nowotny and Jens Kastner show in their essays in this section of 
this volume, these artists had a strong relation to the anti-institutional 
Brian Holmes 
56 
revolts of the 1960s and 70s, and to the accompanying philosophical 
critiques. The best way to take their specific focus on the museum is not 
as a self-assigned limit or a fetishization of the institution, but instead as 
part of a materialist praxis, lucidly aware of its context, but with wider 
transformatory intentions. To find out where their story leads, however, 
we have to look at the writing of Benjamin Buchloh and see how he 
framed the emergence of institutional critique. 
In a text entitled ‘Conceptual Art 1962-1969’, Buchloh (1990) quotes 
two key propositions by Lawrence Weiner. The first is A Square Removed 
from a Rug in Use, and the second, A 36”x 36” Removal to the Lathing or 
Support Wall of Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall (both 1968). In each it is a 
matter of taking the most self-referential and tautological form possible 
– the square, whose sides each repeat and reiterate the others – and 
inserting it in an environment marked by the determinisms of the social 
world. As Buchloh writes:  
Both interventions – while maintaining their structural and 
morphological links with formal traditions by respecting classical 
geometry… – inscribe themselves in the support surfaces of the 
institutions and/or the home which that tradition had always 
disavowed… On the one hand, it dissipates the expectation of 
encountering the work of art only in a ‘specialized’ or ‘qualified’ 
location… On the other, neither one of these surfaces could ever be 
considered to be independent from their institutional location, since the 
physical inscription into each particular surface inevitably generates 
contextual readings. (Buchloh, 1990) 
Weiner’s propositions are clearly a version of immanent critique, 
operating flush with the discursive and material structures of the art 
institutions; but they are cast as a purely logical deduction from minimal 
and conceptual premises. They just as clearly prefigure the symbolic 
activism of Gordon Matta-Clark’s ‘anarchitecture’ works, like Splitting 
(1973) or Window Blow-Out (1976), which confronted the gallery space 
with urban inequality and racial discrimination. From that departure 
point, a history of artistic critique could have led to contemporary forms 
of activism and technopolitical research, via the mobilization of artists 
around the AIDS epidemic in late 1980s. But the most widespread 
versions of 1960s and 70s cultural history never took that turn. 
According to the subtitle of Buchloh’s famous text, the teleological 
movement of late-modernist art in the 1970s was heading ‘from the 
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aesthetics of administration to the critique of institutions’. This would 
mean a strictly Frankfurtian vision of the museum as an idealizing 
Enlightenment institution, damaged by both the bureaucratic state and 
the market spectacle. 
Other histories could be written. At stake is the tense double-bind 
between the desire to transform the specialized ‘cell’ (as Brian 
O’Doherty described the modernist gallery) into a mobile potential of 
living knowledge that can reach out into the world, and the counter-
realization that everything about this specialized aesthetic space is a trap, 
that it has been instituted as a form of enclosure. That tension produced 
the incisive interventions of Michal Asher, the sledgehammer 
denunciations of Hans Haacke, the paradoxical displacements of Robert 
Smithson, or the melancholic humor and poetic fantasy of Marcel 
Broodthaers, whose hidden mainspring was a youthful engagement with 
revolutionary surrealism. The first thing is never to reduce the diversity 
and complexity of artists who never voluntarily joined into a movement. 
Another reduction comes from the obsessive focus on a specific site of 
presentation, the museum, whether it is mourned as a fading relic of the 
‘bourgeois public sphere’, or exalted with a fetishizing discourse of ‘site 
specificity’. These two pitfalls lay in wait for the discourse of 
institutional critique, when it took explicit form in the United States in 
the late 1980s and early 90s. 
It was the period of the so-called ‘second generation’. Among the 
names most often cited are Renee Green, Christian Philipp Müller, Fred 
Wilson and Andrea Fraser. They pursued the systematic exploration of 
museological representation, examining its links to economic power and 
its epistemological roots in a colonial science that treats the Other like 
an object to be shown in a vitrine. But they added a subjectivizing turn, 
unimaginable without the influence of feminism and postcolonial 
historiography, which allowed them to recast external power hierarchies 
as ambivalences within the self, opening up a conflicted sensibility to 
the coexistence of multiple modes and vectors of representation. There 
is a compelling negotiation here, particularly in the work of Renee 
Green, between specialized discourse analysis and embodied 
experimentation with the human sensorium. Yet most of this work was 
also carried out in the form of meta-reflections on the limits of the 
artistic practices themselves (mock museum displays or scripted video 
performances), staged within institutions that were ever-more blatantly 
corporate – to the point where it became increasingly hard to shield the 
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critical investigations from their own accusations, and their own often 
devastating conclusions. 
This situation of a critical process taking itself for its object recently 
led Andrea Fraser to consider the artistic institution as an unsurpassable, 
all-defining frame, sustained through its own inwardly directed critique 
(Fraser, 2005). Bourdieu’s deterministic analysis of the closure of the 
socio-professional fields, mingled with a deep confusion between 
Weber’s iron cage and Foucault’s desire ‘to get free of oneself’, is 
internalized here in a governmentality of failure, where the subject can 
do no more than contemplate his or her own psychic prison, with a few 
aesthetic luxuries in compensation. Unfortunately, it all adds very little 
to Broodthaers’ lucid testament (1987), formulated on a single page in 
1975. For Broodthaers, the only alternative to a guilty conscience was 
self-imposed blindness – not exactly a solution! Yet Fraser accepts it, by 
posing her argument as an attempt to “defend the very institution for 
which the institution of the avant-garde’s ‘self-criticism’ had created the 
potential: the institution of critique” (Fraser, 2005: 282). 
Without any antagonistic or even agonistic relation to the status quo, 
and above all, without any aim to change it, what’s defended becomes 
little more than a masochistic variation on the self-serving ‘institutional 
theory of art’ promoted by Arthur Danto, George Dickie and their 
followers (a theory of mutual and circular recognition among members 
of an object-oriented milieu, misleadingly called a ‘world’). The loop is 
looped, and what had been a large-scale, complex, searching and 
transformational project of 1960s and 70s art seems to reach a dead 
end, with institutional consequences of complacency, immobility, loss of 
autonomy, capitulation before various forms of instrumentalization. 
Phase Change 
The end may be logical, but some desire to go much further. The first 
thing is to redefine the means, the media and the aims of a possible 
third phase of institutional critique. The notion of transversality, 
developed by the practitioners of institutional analysis, helps to theorize 
the assemblages that link actors and resources from the art circuit to 
projects and experiments that don’t exhaust themselves inside it, but 
rather, extend elsewhere (Guattari, 2003). These projects can no longer 
be unambiguously defined as art. They are based instead on a circulation 
between disciplines, often involving the real critical reserve of marginal 
or counter-cultural positions – social movements, political associations, 
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squats, autonomous universities – which can’t be reduced to an all-
embracing institution. 
The projects tend to be collective, even if they also tend to flee the 
difficulties that collectivity involves, by operating as networks. Their 
inventors, who came of age in the universe of cognitive capitalism, are 
drawn toward complex social functions which they seize upon in all 
their technical detail, and in full awareness that the second nature of the 
world is now shaped by technology and organizational form. In almost 
every case it is a political engagement that gives them the desire to 
pursue their exacting investigations beyond the limits of an artistic or 
academic discipline. But their analytic processes are at the same time 
expressive, and for them, every complex machine is awash in affect and 
subjectivity. It is when these subjective and analytic sides mesh closely 
together, in the new productive and political contexts of 
communicational labor (and not just in meta-reflections staged uniquely 
for the museum), that one can speak of a ‘third phase’ of institutional 
critique – or better, of a ‘phase change’ in what was formerly known as 
the public sphere, a change which has extensively transformed the 
contexts and modes of cultural and intellectual production in the 
twenty-first century. 
An issue of Multitudes, co-edited with the Transform web-journal, 
gives examples of this approach.2 The aim is to sketch the problematic 
field of an exploratory practice that is not new, but is definitely rising in 
urgency. Rather than offering a curatorial recipe, we wanted to cast new 
light on the old problems of the closure of specialized disciplines, the 
intellectual and affective paralysis to which it gives rise, and the 
alienation of any capacity for democratic decision-making that inevitably 
follows, particularly in a highly complex technological society. The 
forms of expression, public intervention and critical reflexivity that have 
been developed in response to such conditions can be characterized as 
extradisciplinary – but without fetishizing the word at the expense of 
the horizon it seeks to indicate. 
On considering the work, and particularly the articles dealing with 
technopolitical issues, some will probably wonder if it might not have 
been interesting to evoke the name of Bruno Latour. His ambition is 
that of ‘making things public’, or more precisely, elucidating the specific 
encounters between complex technical objects and specific processes of 
decision-making (whether these are de jure or de facto political). For that, 
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he says, one must proceed in the form of ‘proofs’, established as 
rigorously as possible, but at the same time necessarily ‘messy’, like the 
things of the world themselves (Latour and Weibel, 2005). 
There is something interesting in Latour’s proving machine (even if 
it does tend, unmistakably, toward the academic productivism of 
‘interdisciplinarity’). A concern for how things are shaped in the present, 
and a desire for constructive interference in the processes and decisions 
that shape them, is characteristic of those who no longer dream of an 
absolute outside and a total, year-zero revolution. However, it’s enough 
to consider the artists whom we invited to the Multitudes issue, in order 
to see the differences. Hard as one may try, the 1750 km Baku-Tiblisi-
Ceyhan pipeline cannot be reduced to the ‘proof’ of anything, even if 
Ursula Biemann did compress it into the ten distinct sections of the 
Black Sea Files.3 Traversing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey before it 
debouches in the Mediterranean, the pipeline forms the object of 
political decisions even while it sprawls beyond reason and imagination, 
engaging the whole planet in the geopolitical and ecological uncertainty 
of the present.  
Similarly, the Paneuropean transport and communication corridors 
running through the former Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, filmed by 
the participants of the Timescapes group initiated by Angela 
Melitopoulos, result from the one of the most complex infrastructure-
planning processes of our epoch, carried out at the transnational and 
transcontinental levels. Yet these precisely designed economic projects 
are at once inextricable from the conflicted memories of their historical 
precedents, and immediately delivered over to the multiplicity of their 
uses, which include the staging of massive, self-organized protests in 
conscious resistance to the manipulation of daily life by the corridor-
planning process. Human beings do not necessarily want to be the living 
‘proof’ of an economic thesis, carried out from above with powerful 
and sophisticated instruments – including media devices that distort 
their images and their most intimate affects. An anonymous protester’s 
insistent sign, brandished in the face of the TV cameras at the 
demonstrations surrounding the 2003 EU summit in Thessalonica, says 
it all: ANY SIMILARITY TO ACTUAL PERSONS OR EVENTS IS 
UNINTENTIONAL.4 
Art history has emerged into the present, and the critique of the 
conditions of representation has spilled out onto the streets. But in the 
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same movement, the streets have taken up their place in our critiques. 
In the philosophical essays that we included in the Multitudes project, 
institution and constitution always rhyme with destitution.5 The specific focus 
on extradisciplinary artistic practices does not mean radical politics has 
been forgotten, far from it. Today more than ever, any constructive 
investigation has to raise the standards of resistance. 
 
Notes 
1.  See the introduction to the anthology ReadMe! (Bosma, 1999). One of the 
best examples of immanent critique is the project ‘Name Space’ by Paul 
Garrin, which aimed to rework the domain name system (DNS), which 
constitutes the web as a navigable space (Bosma, 1999: 224-9). 
2.  See ‘Extradisciplinaire’, online at http://transform.eipcp.net/transversal/ 
0507. 
3.  The video installation Black Sea Files by Ursula Biemann, done in the context 
of the Transcultural Geographies project, has been exhibited with the other 
works of that project at Kunst-Werke in Berlin, December 2005 – February 
2006, then at Tapies Foundation in Barcelona, March – May 2007; 
published in Franke (2005). 
4.  The video installation Corridor X by Angela Melitopoulos, with the work of 
the other members of Timescapes, has been exhibited and published in 
Franke (2005). 
5.  See Stefan Nowotny’s essay on destitution in the last section of this volume, 
as well as Pechriggl (2007). 
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Louise Lawler’s Rude Museum* 
Rosalyn Deutsche 
On the brink of World War II, Virginia Woolf advised women to 
remember, learn from and use derision, of which they had long been 
objects (Woolf, 1938: 6). Three Guineas, Woolf’s classic essay of ethico-
political thought, counts derision among the great ‘un-paid teachers’ of 
women, educating them about the behavior and motives of human 
beings, that is, about psychology, a field that Woolf, unlike many leftist 
critics today, did not separate from that of the political.1 Before writing 
the essay, Woolf had received requests for contributions from three 
organizations, each promoting a different cause: women’s education, the 
advancement of women in the professions, and the prevention of war. 
At least that is the book’s conceit. She responded by linking the three 
movements, making clear that for her the goal of feminism was not just 
equality for women but a better, less war-like, society. Since, she argued, 
the professions as currently practiced encourage qualities that lead to 
war – grandiosity, vanity, egoism, patriotism, possessiveness, 
combativeness – women must not simply become educated 
professionals but do so differently: “How can we enter the professions 
and yet remain civilized human beings; human beings, that is, who wish 
to prevent war” (Woolf, 1938: 75)? Women can help, she suggested, by 
refusing to be deferential to the esteemed professions and instead 
considering it their duty to express the opinion that professional 
customs and rituals are contemptible. And what better way to 
accomplish this task than through humor, which, as Mignon Nixon 
notes, following Freud, discharges psychic energy, has pleasurable 
effects, and “promotes the defiance of deference”? (Nixon, 2005: 67). 
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Woolf’s humor was of the type that Freud called ‘tendentious’. It served 
the purpose of criticizing authority and, like hostile jokes, exploited 
“something ridiculous in our enemy” (Freud, 1960: 123-5). Here is a 
sample from her observations on professional dress: 
How many, how splendid, how extremely ornate they are – the clothes 
worn by the educated man in his public capacity! Now you dress in 
violet; a jeweled crucifix swings on your breast; now your shoulders are 
covered with lace; now furred with ermine; now slung with many linked 
chains set with precious stones. Now you wear wigs on your heads; 
rows of graduated curls descend to your necks. Now your hats are boat-
shaped, or cocked; now they mount in cones of black fur. (Woolf, 1938: 
19) 
Woolf derided men’s professional trappings because of the hierarchical 
distinctions of rank and the will to power they signified: “Every button, 
rosette and stripe seems to have some symbolical meaning. Some have 
the right to wear plain buttons only; others rosettes; some may wear a 
single stripe; others three, four or five. And each curl or stripe is sewn 
on at precisely the right distance apart – it may be one inch for one 
man, one inch and a quarter for another” (Woolf, 1938: 19). 
Distinctions of dress, like adding titles before or letters after names, 
were designed to show superiority and to arouse competition and 
jealousy. Therefore the professional fashion system encouraged “a 
disposition towards war” (Woolf, 1938: 19). 
Today, some critics find Woolf’s hope that women, by virtue of 
their earlier exclusion, might change the professions outdated, irrelevant 
to a historical period in which women have to a considerable extent 
entered public life. Yet latent in Woolf’s plea – what necessitates it – is, 
I think, the thoroughly timely recognition that the opposite is just as 
likely to occur: women can identify with the masculinist position. “It 
would be perfectly possible for a woman to occupy the role of a 
representative man”, as Homi Bhabha puts it, explaining why he uses 
the term masculinism not to designate the power of actual male persons 
but to denote a position of power authorized by the claim that one 
comprehends and represents the social totality (Bhabha, 1992: 242). 
Masculinism understood in this sense is a relationship that can be 
sustained only by declaring war on otherness, by subjugating that which 
cannot be fully known. Woolf believed that cultural institutions cultivate 
the triumphalist relationship. Alert, like her anti-fascist contemporary 
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Walter Benjamin, to the barbarism underlying every ‘document of 
civilization’ (Benjamin, 1969: 256), she approached such documents 
warily. No venerated institution was safe from her derision. She even 
listed the British Royal Academy of Art, the institution that safeguarded 
standards of professional competence in art, among the great 
‘battlegrounds’, whose members, she said, “seem to be as bloodthirsty 
as the profession of arms itself” (Woolf, 1938: 63). 
Woolf was referring to combative behavior between the male 
academicians, but the Academy inflicted another kind of violence, one 
that can be discerned in Johann Zoffany’s portrait of the academicians, 
Life Class at the Royal Academy (1772), a painting that has been an icon of 
feminist art history since Linda Nochlin used it to illustrate her 
landmark essay, ‘Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?’ 
(Nochlin, 1971).2 Nochlin treats Zoffany’s conversation piece as a 
document of sexism, a work that shows an aspect of historical 
discrimination against women in the arts. Zoffany presented the 
academicians gathered around a nude male model at a time when 
women were excluded from access to the male nude and therefore from 
history painting, the most prestigious genre in the Academy’s hierarchy. 
He solved the problem of including the Academy’s two female founding 
members, Angelica Kauffmann and Mary Moser, by portraying them as 
painted portraits hanging on the wall. Directly facing the nude model, lit 
by a chandelier, stands Sir Joshua Reynolds, president of the Academy 
and author of the Discourses on Art, which he addressed as lectures to the 
‘Gentlemen’ of the Royal Academy between 1769 and 1790. But, 
according to the critic Naomi Schor, ‘Reynolds’ does not just name a 
historical person; it is also “the proper name for the idealist aesthetics 
he promotes” (Schor, 1987: 17). The classical busts and figures strewn 
around Zoffany’s life class allude to this aesthetic. Schor concludes that 
Reynolds’ classical discourse, in which genius consists of the ability to 
comprehend a unity – what Reynolds enthusiastically called ‘A 
WHOLE’ – and in which the feminine is associated with the detail, 
which endangers masculine wholeness, cannot be separated from the 
discourse of misogyny (Schor, 1987: 5). 
Idealist approaches to art are hardly limited to eighteenth-century 
classicism; they have remained alive for centuries in the widespread 
notion that the work of art is a complete, autonomous entity that 
elevates viewers above the contingencies of material life. Zoffany’s 
Academicians, then, is not just a period piece that documents women’s 
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historical exclusion from art education. It also records the 
transformation of the female figure from artist to image, from viewing 
subject to visual object, to what feminists two hundred years later 
theorized as a signifier of ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ (Mulvey, 1989: 14-26). 
That is, it documents the representational economy that Freud called 
fetishism, a perversion originating in the phallocentric attempt to 
triumph over the female body and its supposed threat to wholeness. 
Zoffany unwittingly shows us that the aesthetic institution is a 
masculinist battleground – an authoritarian rather than democratically 
agonistic realm – in a somewhat different sense than Woolf had in 
mind. 
So far I have argued that Woolf’s feminist challenge to cultural 
institutions is not gender-exclusive. Just as women can identify with 
masculine positions, men, who historically have occupied actual 
positions of power, can dis-identify with them. That is, there can be a 
non-phallic masculinity. Still, it is interesting to note that when, in the 
1970s and 80s, a group of mostly female artists, including Louise 
Lawler, entered art institutions in order to explore them as, precisely, 
battlegrounds, they did so differently than the first wave of institution-
critical artists.3 For whereas Marcel Broodthaers, Hans Haacke, Daniel 
Buren, and Michael Asher had drawn attention to the presence of 
economic and political power in the seemingly pure and neutral space of 
the museum and to the way the museum embodies dominant ideology 
and so exercises discursive power, and whereas works like Broodthaer’s 
Décor: A Conquest (1975) and Haacke’s MoMA Poll (1970) had, in 
different ways, specifically connected museums to war, the second wave 
– such diverse artists as Lawler, Victor Burgin, Andrea Fraser, Judith 
Barry, Silvia Kolbowski, Barbara Kruger, Sherrie Levine, Fred Wilson, 
and Mary Kelly, among others – at once extended and questioned the 
critique. Art historians have proposed a number of ways to distinguish 
between the work of the so-called first ‘generation’ of institutional 
critics and the second, postmodern generation, Lawler in particular: the 
second questions the authority of its own voice rather than simply 
challenging the authoritarian voice of museums, corporations, and 
governments (Foster, et al., 2004: 624); Lawler locates institutional 
power in a “systematized set of presentational procedures, whereas 
Asher, Buren, Haacke, and Broodthears situated power in a centralized 
building or elite” (Fraser, 1985: 123); Lawler explores not only the 
contextual production of meaning but, in deconstructive fashion, the 
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boundlessness of context (Linker, 1986: 99). Still another difference is 
that, unlike the first generation, feminist postmodernists were 
influenced by psychoanalysis and recognized to varying degrees the 
political importance of articulating relationships between psychical and 
social realms. Following in Woolf’s footsteps, they approached 
institutions of aesthetic display not only as producers of bourgeois 
ideology but as spaces where dangerous, masculinist fantasies are 
solidified.  
Lawler may not have been an exponent of psychoanalytic feminism, 
but many of her photographs lead us into the heart of such ‘solid 
wishes’. And they do so with what Birgit Pelzer aptly calls a ‘dose of 
derision’ (Pelzer, 2004: 32). Literary theorist Kenneth Gross uses the 
term ‘solid wishes’ in The Dream of the Moving Statue, a book about 
relationships between figural statues and fantasy, about statues as 
fantasies. “Works of sculpture”, writes Gross, are “solid wishes, or 
vehicles of a wish for things that are solid” (Gross, 1992: 198). It seems 
fitting, then, that some of the works in which Lawler most astutely 
exposes the art institution’s fantasy life are a group of photographs, 
taken in the late 1970s and early 80s, that depict figural sculpture, and, 
in particular, classical and neoclassical statues, in museum settings. Statue 
before Painting, ‘Perseus with the Head of Medusa’ by Canova (1982) is 
exemplary. It served as the introductory image in Lawler’s first 
published portfolio of the photographs she calls ‘arrangements of 
pictures’. The black-and-white portfolio, itself an arrangement of 
pictures, appeared in the Fall 1983 issue of the journal October. Lawler’s 
‘arrangements’ depict art objects in their contexts of display, calling 
attention to the presentational apparatus of specific arts institutions and, 
at the same time, to ‘art as institution’, a phrase coined by Peter Bürger 
to refer to a more dispersed aesthetic apparatus: “The concept ‘art as an 
institution’… refers to the productive and distributive apparatus and 
also to ideas about art that prevail at a given time and that determine the 
reception of works” (Bürger, 1984: 22). In such works as Statue before 
Painting, Lawler puts existing museological arrangements of artworks on 
display and makes visible the elements of the presentational apparatus, 
which, though authoritative, generally lie on the margins of the 
museum-goer’s visual and cognitive field – architecture, labels, vitrines, 
pedestals, guards, installation shots, catalogues, security systems, and so 
on. Lawler appropriates the museum’s arrangements and re-arranges 
them in a manner that recalls Freud’s approach to dream interpretation, 
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an approach that re-arranges the space of the dream, bringing its 
peripheral elements, its details, into focus (and vice versa) in order to 
analyze the dream-work that distorts the wish at the dream’s core. While 
it is tempting to see Lawler’s arrangements, with their fragmented 
objects, exaggerated details, and enigmatic juxtapositions, as dream 
scenarios, they might more accurately be regarded as analyses of the 
museum’s ‘dreams’, of the desire embodied in its arrangements.  
Lawler shot Statue before Painting, ‘Perseus with the Head of Medusa’, by 
Canova in New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, from the vantage 
point of the museum’s Great Hall Balcony, where Antonio Canova’s 
marble statue was then located. The statue occupied a position on the 
neoclassical museum building’s processional axis, which begins at the 
steps leading to the main entrance, continues through the Great Hall 
and central staircase – both are overlooked by the balcony – and 
culminates at the arched entrance to the galleries of European paintings. 
Perseus stood across from the entrance, beneath an echoing arch on the 
balcony. The museum’s official guidebook describes it as a second, 
more refined version of a sculpture that, when first executed and 
exhibited in Canova’s studio between 1770 and 1800, “was acclaimed as 
the last word in the continuing purification of the Neoclassical style” 
(Howard, 1994: 265). Like ‘Reynolds’, ‘Canova’, too, is a proper name 
for idealist aesthetics, whose patriarchal relations of sexual difference, 
observed in Zoffany’s Life Class, are concretized in the roughly 
contemporaneous Perseus. Seen in Lawler’s photograph from a low, 
oblique angle and radically cropped so that it is cut by the upper edge of 
the photograph, Canova’s statue, its phallus, and its pedestal – 
architectural equivalent of the phallus – occupy the forefront of the 
viewer’s vision. At the same time, pushed to the right edge of the image, 
the statue is dislodged from its central position, disrupting the 
Museum’s symmetrical arrangement. Behind Perseus, beyond the 
balcony’s balustrade, the staircase, flanked by colonnades of Corinthian 
columns, rises from the Great Hall below and leads to the double arches 
through which visitors, after ascending the stairs, enter the collection of 
paintings. Framed by the arches hangs Giovanni Battista Tiepolo’s The 
Triumph of Marius (1729), the opening exhibit in the anteroom to the 
Museum’s history of Western painting. Its upper portion is sliced by the 
lower edge of the sign inscribed with the word ‘paintings’, a mutilation 
that corresponds to that of the Perseus statue, which Lawler brings into 
visual alignment with the Tiepolo. In a second correspondence, the 
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colossal painting dwarfs its spectators, who look up at it in an attitude 
that rhymes with our own angle of vision of statue and phallus in 
Lawler’s photograph. Lawler accentuates this point of view, placing her 
viewers in a position that mimics not only that of the depicted viewers 
of Tiepolo but that of a small child catching sight of its parents’ genitals. 
She thus suggests, perhaps unwittingly, that the psychic life of the 
museum bears a relation to infantile fantasies. The juxtaposition of the 
spectators’ stance in front of the Tiepolo and Lawler’s upward glance at 
Perseus literalizes both the deference with which art as institution treats 
works of art and the veneration with which classical antiquity regarded 
the phallus, defined as the figurative representation of the male organ. 
Drawing attention to the way the museum’s arrangement includes a 
prescribed position for viewers, one that enforces a certain mode of 
spectatorship, Lawler simultaneously, as we shall see, makes Perseus the 
butt of derision and consequently re-positions her audience, inviting 
them to defy deference.  
First, however, note one more similarity between the Tiepolo and 
the Canova, this one on the level of thematic content: each depicts a 
violent conquest in which a male protagonist establishes his authority by 
mastering difference – racial and sexual, respectively. Each glorifies war. 
In the Museum’s words, The Triumph of Marius “shows the Roman 
general Gaius Marius in the victor’s chariot while the conquered African 
king Jugurtha walks before him, bound in chains… The Latin 
inscription on the cartouche at the top translates, ‘The Roman people 
behold Jugurtha laden with chains’” (Howard, 1994: 186). For his part, 
Canova portrays the classical hero Perseus holding aloft the head of 
Medusa, which he has just severed. Medusa, of course, is the female 
monster of classical mythology, who had snakes instead of hair and 
whose look turned men to stone.  
At the time, Medusa’s head had considerable currency among 
psychoanalytic feminists working in the visual arts, largely because in 
1922 Freud had written a short essay about it and because in 1973, in an 
equally short text, ‘You Don’t Know What Is Happening, Do You Mr. 
Jones?’, precursor to her famous ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema’, Laura Mulvey had used Freud’s interpretation as the basis of a 
theory of phallocentric investments in looking at images (Freud, 1968; 
and Mulvey, 1989: 6-13 and 14-26). Additionally, Medusa had become a 
symbol of feminist subversion of phallocentric mastery in such writing 
as Hélène Cixous’s ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ of 1975 (Cixous, 1981: 
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245-64). Freud, as is well known, analyzed Medusa’s head as a fetish: an 
object – visual, in this case – of masculine fixation that originates in fear 
of the female body, which is (mis)perceived as castrated, as missing the 
penis and, more importantly, the phallus, signifier of the presence that 
makes the subject whole. For Freud, Medusa’s horrifying, decapitated 
head, surrounded by hair, symbolizes the female genitals and therefore 
the horror of castration. At the same time, it serves as a ‘token of 
triumph’ over castration anxiety, an object that disavows and conquers 
the threat of sexual difference. Visually, it contains multiple penis 
replacements in the form of Medusa’s snake-hair, and on the narrative 
level, it turns men to stone, thus stiffening them and reassuring them of 
the presence of the penis. Mulvey argued that just as Medusa’s head is 
an image not of a woman but, rather, of the threatened masculine 
subject restored to wholeness, so in a culture ordered by phallocentric 
categorizations of human beings, in which the feminine is equated with 
absence and loss, images of women have served, in various ways, as self-
images of men, or, more importantly, of the narcissistic masculine ego. 
The feminist discourse about fetishism was concerned with the nature 
of masculine subjectivity, especially as it is reinforced by vision.  
When October published Lawler’s ‘Arrangement of Pictures’, it mis-
captioned Statue before Painting, calling it Statue before a Painting. The 
editorial ‘correction’ – the insertion of the indefinite article a – stemmed 
from a failure to get the title’s joke, to understand that it is a joke. For 
the real title mimics the phrase ladies before gentlemen, which is part of and 
here stands for an idealizing patriarchal discourse that supposedly places 
women on pedestals. In conjunction with the photograph, the title links 
patriarchal ideals and idealist aesthetics, which the neoclassical statue 
represents, suggesting that there is an alignment of sexual and aesthetic 
hierarchies in the museum. The image reverses the order of genders in 
the original phrase, for here it is a male statue – a phallic figure – that 
stands before a painting and occupies a pedestal. But the reversal only 
reveals the true gender relations behind idealizing arrangements, 
showing that in the patriarchal visual field “the true exhibit is always the 
phallus”, as Mulvey puts it (Mulvey, 1989: 13). 
To an extent, Lawler retrieves the artistic practice, prevalent among 
certain sculptors in the mid-1950s to late 60s, of what Mignon Nixon, in 
her superb study of Louise Bourgeois, calls ‘posing the phallus’. This 
practice, Nixon (2005: 66, 236) argues, targeted the phallus with humor, 
which has the political effect of undermining it as a patriarchal symbol, 
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and inverts the seriousness of fetishism.4 Yet Lawler’s work differs from 
that of the earlier artists since, instead of sculpting a phallus, she uses 
her customary techniques of appropriation and montage – of “making 
meaning by juxtaposition and alignment” (Lawler, 2000) – to pose a 
found phallus, one of the many ‘readymade’ phalluses that proliferate in 
art museums, like snakes on Medusa’s head. Posing the phallus in the 
context of an institution-critical work, in which Perseus takes up a 
position as guardian of the Museum’s painting collection, Statue before 
Painting exhibits the role played by art as institution in reproducing 
sexual norms and maintaining the patriarchal overvaluation of the 
phallus.5 For one thing, the photograph comments on the historical 
exclusion of female artists from the museum and, for another, it alludes 
to the male-dominated revival of traditional painting that was 
legitimated by art institutions in the 1970s and 1980s. But Lawler’s 
photograph plays a bigger joke on the Metropolitan. It hints that what 
underlies, what precedes or comes before the museum’s aesthetic 
arrangements is the desire solidified in both the form and subject matter 
of Canova’s statue of Perseus. The idealized, neoclassical sculpture, 
substitute for an ideal body, materializes the phallocentric fantasy of the 
self, a self that in its dream of autonomy disavows its constitutive 
exclusion of and relation to others. In fact, Jacques Lacan, writing about 
the mirror stage as the matrix of narcissistic ego-formation, described 
the mirror image – external reflection of an idealized self – as “the statue 
in which man projects himself” (Lacan, 1977: 1-7). And the iconography 
of Perseus and Medusa foregrounds, as does the story told in Tiepolo’s 
painting, the subordination and conquest of otherness – the warlike 
disposition – necessary to maintain the narcissistic fiction. The phallic 
statue metonymically alludes to the triumphalist subject positioned by 
the museum’s idealist aesthetic. 
Statue before Painting deprives Perseus of his token of triumph; 
Medusa’s head is pushed outside the frame, Perseus is decapitated, and 
it would seem that Medusa, herself a kind of sculptor, has turned him to 
stone. Of course, this also fulfills his wish, soothing as well as testifying 
to his castration anxiety. Still, the most striking feature of the 
photograph is its attack on the integrity of the male body. The 
photographic cut challenges the sculpture’s closure, exposing it to its 
outside. According to Christian Metz, the cut, which produces “the off-
frame effect in photography”, is a figure of castration because “it marks 
the place of an irreversible absence, a place from which the look has 
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been diverted forever” (Metz, 1999: 217). Lawler’s cut directs the 
diverted look to three objects that remain in the frame and that, as 
fetishes, represent attempts to establish integrity and disavow 
vulnerability – pedestal, phallus, and museum label, an element that 
visually echoes the phallus and no doubt bears the artist’s proper name, 
the ‘Name-of-the-Father’, Lacan’s name for the patriarchal order of 
sexual difference.6 Precisely by giving prominence to these elements, 
Lawler takes away their authority,7 as she does that of the grand 
staircase, itself an elevating structure that symbolically lifts visitors, just 
as the pedestal lifts the work of art, above the contingencies of everyday 
social life, encouraging them to take up the self-regarding position that 
Georges Bataille described in his definition of the museum as, precisely, 
a mirror: 
It is not just that the museums of the world as a whole today represent a 
colossal accumulation of riches but, more important, that all those who 
visit these museums represent without a doubt the most grandiose 
spectacle of a humanity liberated from material concerns and devoted to 
contemplation. We need to recognize that the galleries and the objects 
of art form only the container, the content of which is constituted by 
the visitors….The museum is the colossal mirror in which man finally 
contemplates himself in every respect, finds himself literally admirable, 
and abandons himself to the ecstasy expressed in all the art magazines. 
(Bataille, 1971: 239) 
Statue before Painting reveals and refuses the museum’s positioning of the 
spectator, and it does so with supreme economy. Like a really good 
tendentious joke that, according to Freud, allows the teller and the 
recipient or, in our case, artist and viewer, to enjoy the pleasure of being 
impolite to “the great, the dignified and the mighty” (Freud, 1960: 125). 
Indeed, Lawler calls one of her later arrangements of pictures, really an 
arrangement of statues, The Rude Museum (1987). ‘Rude’ refers to the 
photograph’s subject matter – a museum devoted to the work of 
nineteenth-century French sculptor François Rude – but it can also be 
read as a pun that alludes to the barbaric fantasies fostered in art 
institutions and, more, to the acts of impropriety with which Lawler 
herself, in this and other photographs, re-arranges museums and, as I 
have argued, exposes their fantasies. That is, it alludes to Lawler’s own 
rude museums.  
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The actual Rude Museum, located in the transept of St. Etienne 
church in Dijon, consists of casts of works by Rude, a great patriot and 
admirer of the antique, though given in his sculpture to romantic 
gestures. Dominating the upper portion of Lawler’s photograph is a 
plaster cast of Rude’s most famous work, the high stone relief on the 
Arc de Triomphe in Paris, Departure of the Volunteers in 1792, popularly 
known as La Marseillaise (1833-36). Near the center of the relief, which 
is severed by the frame of Lawler’s picture so that the enormous figure 
of an especially militaristic Liberty hovering above cannot be seen, is a 
classically inspired male nude marching off to war. Like Canova’s 
Perseus, Rude’s soldier is beheaded by Lawler’s cropping of the 
photograph, a cut that foreshadows the fate of later victims of the 
French Revolution. In the foreground, its foreshortened backside 
turned to the viewer, crouches a large hippopotamus sculpted by 
François Pompon (1855-1933). Stretching up its head and opening its 
mouth, it gawks at the hero’s exposed phallus. The hippo could be 
regarded as yet another target of Lawler’s humor, but I prefer to think 
of it as her ally, a repoussoir element that not only pushes back the 
principle scene but functions, by virtue of its comical deference (and 
open jaws), as a formidable threat to the phallic figure – as a rude viewer 
in the Rude Museum, like Lawler and those willing to listen to her 
tendentious joke.  
For derisive impropriety, also made possible with the help of wild 
animals, nothing surpasses Birdcalls (1972/1981), an audiotape on which 
Lawler squeals, squawks, chirps, twitters, croaks, squeaks, and 
occasionally warbles the names – primarily the surnames – of twenty-
eight contemporary male artists, from Vito Acconci to Lawrence 
Weiner.8 Recorded by Terry Wilson, the tape sounds as though different 
species of birds are calling out to one another in some natural setting, 
say, a forest or garden. In 1984, Andrea Miller-Keller, a curator at the 
Wadsworth Atheneum, one venue where the work has been played, 
nicknamed it Patriarchal Roll Call.9 
When Lawler made the tape she was unaware of the precise 
difference between the two types of sound signals made by birds: calls 
and songs. For the title, she selected ‘calls’ because she thought that 
‘song’ connoted pleasure for the bird whereas ‘call’ seemed more 
strident.10 Her choice turned out to be highly accurate, in keeping with 
the intention and execution of the work, since it is typically male birds 
that burst into songs, which are complex patterns of notes used to 
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attract mates or establish territory. Calls, by contrast, consist of one or 
more short, repeated notes that convey messages about specific 
situations. If, for instance, a predator enters the immediate 
environment, birds give distress, alarm, and rally calls to signal the 
presence of a threat and to coordinate group activity against it (Kress, 
1991: 80). Similarly, Lawler’s Birdcalls originated in an act of self-defense. 
“In the early 1970s”, she tells Douglas Crimp,  
my friend Martha Kite and I were helping some artists on one of the 
Hudson River pier projects. The women involved were doing tons of 
work, but the work being shown was only by male artists. Walking 
home at night in New York, one way to feel safe is to pretend you’re 
crazy or at least be really loud. Martha and I called ourselves the ‘due 
chanteusies’, and we’d sing off-key and make other noises. Willoughby 
Sharp was the impresario of the project, so we’d make a ‘Willoughby 
Willoughby’ sound, trying to sound like birds. This developed into a 
series of bird calls based on artists’ names. So, in fact, it was 
antagonistic. (Lawler, 2000) 
The birdcalls started out as a humorous anti-predator response to the 
presence of two dangers in Kite and Lawler’s habitat: physical attack in 
the streets of the city and discrimination in the alternative art world. 
Drawing a perhaps inadvertent parallel with real birds, Lawler describes 
the first birdcalls as ‘instinctual’ (Lawler, 2000). Interestingly, however, 
bird calls, including alarm calls, are not just involuntary, impulsive 
emotional displays but systems of communication that can be controlled 
(Marler and Evans, 1995: 138). Their frequency is affected by the 
presence or absence of companions, a phenomenon that ornithologists 
call the ‘audience effect’. Some bird sounds are learned (Nottebohn, 
2005: 146); some sentinel birds even give ‘false alarms’. The birds’ 
capacity for control and subversion accords with Lawler’s tactics in 
Birdcalls, for while she situates herself in nature, which patriarchal 
systems of representation and sexual difference have traditionally 
opposed to culture and associated with the feminine, she treats it not as 
a place of confinement but, rather, of retreat and concealment, a refuge 
where she can escape Mulvey’s ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ and what Michel 
Foucault called the ‘trap’ or ‘cage’ of visibility (Foucault, 1979: 200). 
Occupying the place prescribed for women (and in this regard it should 
be noted that bird is slang for a young woman), but only in jest – literally 
playing nature – she appropriates it as a base from which to make forays, 
using sound as ammunition, into the territory of culture and to 
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introduce tension into its hierarchical, gendered dichotomies, destroying 
their seeming naturalness. Heard but not seen, she challenges the proper 
name, the narcissistic ego, the Name-of-the-Father, and therefore the 
art world’s relations of sexual difference, commenting on the fact that at 
the time she made Birdcalls “artists with name recognition were 
predominantly male” (Lawler, 2000). 
Lawler produced the first publicly presented tape of Birdcalls in 1981, 
when, as Crimp has pointed out, the upcoming Documenta 7 (1982) was 
an object of much art-world discussion (Crimp, 1993: 238). Rudi Fuchs, 
the international exhibition’s director, planned to reaffirm the 
phallocentric, aestheticist notion of the work of art as a complete 
totality transcending its conditions of existence, and he therefore gave 
pride of place to neo-expressionism, a male-dominated trend of the 
1970s and 1980s, which to a considerable extent represented a 
regression to aestheticism.11 In preparatory versions of Birdcalls, Lawler 
had included only minimalist, post-minimalist, conceptual, and pop 
artists. Now, she added neo-expressionist painters Sandro Chia, 
Francesco Clemente, Enzo Cucchi, Anselm Kiefer, and Julian Schnabel, 
targeting the new upsurge in masculine name-recognition with feminist 
name-calling.  
Birdcalls is an anomaly in Lawler’s production, her only sound piece, 
unless one counts the two versions of A Movie Will Be Shown Without the 
Picture (1979 and 1983). Yet its derisive tactics are quintessential Lawler. 
When she plays Birdcalls during presentations of her work, Lawler 
simultaneously projects an arrangement of slides. Some bear the names 
of the artists who are being called. These are interspersed with slides of 
both her own and the male artists’ works. Following the title slide, the 
first, introductory image is always Statue before Painting, ‘Perseus with the 
Head of Medusa’, by Canova, and this arrangement indicates that there is a 
commonality between tape and photograph. Both, for example, use 
mimicry. In 1982, Lawler wanted to produce a record of Birdcalls and 
planned to decorate the jacket with a photograph of a parrot – that 
excellent mimic – looking suspiciously over its shoulder and set against 
a brilliant red background.12 The record was never made, but, 
subsequently, Lawler used the parrot photograph in other contexts, 
titling it Portrait (1982). Given its initial connection to Birdcalls, it might 
be regarded as a self-portrait, in camouflage. Except that Lawler’s 
mimicry is far from mechanical. It is, rather, one of the skills she has 
honed to warn audiences away from the danger of ‘a position of passive 
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agreement’13 with the art institution’s grandiose fantasies, whose war-
like effects, as Virginia Woolf knew, are no laughing matter.14 
 
Notes 
*  First published in Louise Lawler, Twice Untitled and Other Pictures (looking 
back), Wexner Center for the Arts and MIT Press, 2006. 
1.  As Silvia Kolbowski asks about the rejection of psychoanalysis in current 
criticism: “Is psychoanalysis too feminine? i.e. too ‘weak’ to serve political 
analysis?” (2005: 18). 
2.  Zoffany’s painting is alternatively titled Academicians of the Royal Academy. 
3.  It could also be argued that Lawler entered the artistic profession differently 
insofar as she has been reticent “about taking on the conventional role of 
the artist”. See Lawler (2000). 
4.  Nixon’s thesis differs from mine insofar as, using Melanie Klein, she argues 
that Bourgeois, Jasper Johns, Yayoi Kusama and Eva Hesse posed the 
phallus as, specifically, a part-object – a literal body part. 
5.  Nixon (2005: 71) suggests that Bourgeois did something similar when, in 
1982, she posed with her sculpture Fillette (1968) for a portrait produced by 
Robert Mapplethorpe for her retrospective exhibition at the Museum of 
Modern Art.  
6.  To the list of fetishes that Lawler highlights, we could add Perseus’s feet in 
the winged sandals that Athena and Hermes lent him to aid in the conquest 
of Medusa. Recall that Freud speculated that the foot fetish originates in the 
fact that the woman’s feet are the last thing the child sees before he catches 
sight of her genitals. The foot fetish represents the male subject’s denial of 
the traumatic sight. 
7.  Lawler (2000) has used the phrase ‘Prominence given, authority taken’, 
which is the title of an important interview she did with Douglas Crimp. 
The phrase can be read as a description of the way the museum positions 
the artists, or, conversely, of Lawler’s resistance to that positioning. 
8.  The twenty-artists are Vito Acconci, Carl Andre, Richard Artschwager, John 
Baldessari, Robert Barry, Joseph Beuys, Daniel Buren, Sandro Chia, 
Francesco Clemente, Enzo Cucchi, Gilbert & George, Dan Graham, Hans 
Haacke, Neil Jenney, Donald Judd, Anselm Kiefer, Joseph Kosuth, Sol 
Lewitt, Richard Long, Gordon Matta-Clark, Mario Merz, Sigmar Polke, 
Gerhard Richter, Ed Ruscha, Julian Schnabel, Cy Twombly, Andy Warhol, 
and Lawrence Weiner. 
9.  This information comes from an email from the artist, 22 April 2005. 
10.  From a conversation with Lawler, 26 February 2005. 
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11.  Lawler was not invited to participate in Documenta 7, but Jenny Holzer and 
the alternative gallery Fashion Moda asked her to contribute to their 
collaborative work: a trailer stationed at the entrance to the show, which 
would sell objects and souvenirs. For an account of the stationary that 
Lawler ended up selling at Fashion Moda’s installation, see Crimp (1993). 
12.  Lawler wanted to sell the record at Jenny Holzer and Fashion Moda’s trailer, 
which was installed at the entrance to Documenta 7. 
13.  From an artist’s brochure distributed at ‘Projects: Louise Lawler’, Enough, 
New York, The Museum of Modern Art, September 19-November 10, 
1987. 
14.  A recent photographic work by Lawler repeats the warning, which has 
become especially urgent at a time when the Bush administration has 
banned media images of coffins returning from the Iraq War and has 
treated certain, particularly Arab, deaths as un-grievable. Lawler’s image, 
depicting the detached wings of a classical statue of Nike, goddess of 
victory, is titled Grieving Mothers. 
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Toward a Critical Art Theory 
Gene Ray 
Critical theory rejects the given world and looks beyond it. In reflection 
on art, too, we need to distinguish between uncritical, or affirmative, 
theory and a critical theory that rejects the given art and looks beyond it. 
Critical art theory cannot limit itself to the reception and interpretation 
of art, as that now exists under capitalism. Because it will recognize that 
art as it is currently institutionalized and practiced – business as usual in 
the current ‘art world’ – is in the deepest and most unavoidable sense 
‘art under capitalism’, art under the domination of capitalism, critical art 
theory will rather be oriented toward a clear break or rupture with the 
art that capitalism has brought to dominance. 
Critical art theory’s first task is to understand how the given art 
supports the given order. It must expose and analyze art’s actual social 
functions under capitalism. What is it doing, this whole sphere of activity 
called art? Any critical theory of art must begin by grasping that the 
activity of art in its current forms is contradictory. The ‘art world’ is the 
site of an enormous mobilization of creativity and inventiveness, 
channelled into the production, reception, and circulation of artworks. 
The art institutions practice various kinds of direction over this 
production as a whole, but this direction is not usually directly coercive. 
Certainly the art market exerts pressures of selection that no artist can 
ignore, if she or he hopes to make a career. But individual artists are 
relatively free to make the art they choose, according to their own 
conceptions. It may not sell or make them famous, but they are free to 
do their thing. Art, then, has not relinquished its historical claim to 
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autonomy within capitalist society, and today the operations of this 
relative autonomy remain empirically observable. 
On the other hand, a critical theorist is bound to see that art as 
whole is a stabilizing factor in social life. The existence of an art 
seemingly produced freely and in great abundance is a credit to the 
given order. As a luxurious surplus, art remains a jewel in power’s 
crown, and the richer, more splendid and exuberant art is, the more it 
affirms the social status quo. The material reality of capitalist society 
may be a war of all against all, but in art the utopian impulses that are 
blocked from actualization in everyday life find an orderly social outlet. 
The art institutions organize a great variety of activities and agents into a 
complex systemic unity; the capitalist art system functions as a sub-
system of the capitalist world system. Without doubt, some of these 
activities and artistic products are openly critical and politically 
committed. But taken as a whole, the art system is affirmative (Marcuse, 
1968), in the sense that it converts the totality of art works and artistic 
practices – the sum of what flows through these circuits of production 
and reception – into ‘symbolic legitimation’ (to borrow Pierre 
Bourdieu’s apt expression for it) of class society (Bourdieu, 1993: 128). 
It does so by simultaneously encouraging art’s autonomous impulses and 
politically neutralizing what those impulses produce. Art simulates 
experiences of freedom, reconciliation, joy, solidarity and uninhibited 
communication and expression that are blocked in class society. Art is a 
form of compensation for the injustices, repressions and self-
repressions, and impoverishments of experience that characterize 
everyday life under capitalist modernity. As compensation, art captures and 
renders harmless rebellious energies and dissipates pressures for change. 
In this way art is an ideological support for the social status quo and 
contributes to the reproduction of class society. 
Frankfurt Modernism 
The Frankfurt theorists pioneered and elaborated this dialectical 
understanding of art. Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno – working in close relation to others, including Walter 
Benjamin, Ernst Bloch and Siegfried Kracauer, and certainly stimulated 
by the different Marxist approaches of Bertolt Brecht and Georg Lukács 
– have shown us how art under capitalism can, at the very same time, be 
both relatively autonomous and instrumentalized into a support for 
existing society. Every work of art, in Adorno’s famous formulation, is 
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both autonomous and fait social (Adorno, 1997: 5). Every artwork is 
autonomous insofar as it asserts itself as an end-in-itself and pursues the 
logic of its own development without regard to the dominant logic of 
society; but every work is also a ‘social fact’ in that it is a cipher that 
manifests and confirms the reality of society, understood as the total 
nexus of social relations and processes. In the autonomous aspect of 
art’s ‘double character’, the Frankfurt theorists saw an equivalent to the 
intransigence of critical theory. Free autonomous creation is a form of 
that reach for an un-alienated humanity described luminously by the 
young Karl Marx. As such, it always contains a force of resistance to the 
powers that be, albeit a very fragile one.  
Their attempts to rescue and protect this autonomous aspect led the 
Frankfurt theorists to an absolute investment in the forms of artistic 
modernism. For them, and above all for Adorno, the modernist artwork 
or opus was a sensuous manifestation of truth as a social process 
straining toward human emancipation. The modernist work – and to be 
sure, what is meant here are the masterworks, the zenith of advanced 
formal experimentation – is an “enactment of antagonisms”, an 
unreconciled synthesis of “un-unifiable, non-identical elements that 
grind away at each other” (Adorno, 1997: 176). A force-field of 
elements that are both artistic and social, the artwork indirectly or even 
unconsciously reproduces the conflicts, blockages and revolutionary 
aspirations of alienated everyday life. They saw this practice of 
autonomy threatened from two directions. First, from the increasing 
encroachments of capitalist rationality into the sphere of culture – 
processes to which Horkheimer and Adorno famously gave the name 
‘culture industry’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002). Second, from 
political instrumentalization by the Communist Parties and other 
established powers claiming to be anti-capitalist. 
It was in response to his perceptions of this second threat that 
Adorno issued his notorious condemnation of politicized art (Adorno, 
1992). Ostensibly responding to Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1948 call for a 
littérature engagée, Adorno’s position in fact had already been formed by 
the interwar context: the liquidation of the artistic avant-gardes in the 
USSR under Stalin and the Comintern’s adoption of socialist realism as 
the official and only acceptable form of anti-capitalist art. Art that 
subordinates itself to the direction of a Party was for Adorno a betrayal 
of art’s force of resistance. He took the position that art cannot 
instrumentalize itself on the basis of political commitments without 
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undermining the autonomy on which it depends and thereby undoing 
itself as art. Autonomous (modernist) art is political, but only indirectly 
and only by restricting itself to the practice of its proper autonomy. In 
short, art must bear its contradiction and not attempt to overcome it. As 
the culture industry expanded and consolidated its hold over everyday 
consciousness and, indeed, as struggles of national liberation and urban 
uprisings politicized campuses over the course of the 1960s, Adorno 
responded by hardening his position.  
There can be little doubt that the given artistic autonomy is 
threatened by the two tendencies Adorno pointed to. But there is little 
doubt either that his conception of the problem forecloses its possible 
solution. Culture industry and official socialist realism were not the only 
alternatives to the production of autonomist artworks. But Adorno in 
effect couldn’t see these other alternatives because he had no category 
for them. The most convincing of these alternatives constituted itself by 
terminating its ties of dependency on the art institutions, abandoning 
the production of traditional art objects, and relocating its practices to 
the streets and public spaces. The formation of the Situationist 
International (SI) in 1957 was an announcement that this alternative had 
reached a basic theoretical and practical coherence. Adorno remained 
blind to it as he continued to polish the Aesthetic Theory until his death in 
1969. So did his heir, Peter Bürger, who would publish Theory of the 
Avant-Garde in 1974.  
An English translation of Bürger’s book appeared in 1984. Since 
then, it has functioned mainly as a theoretical support for modernist 
positions within Anglophone (i.e., globalized) art and cultural discourse. 
It still tends to be cited by those happy to counter-sign any possible 
death certificate of the avant-gardes, and by those dismissive of 
attempts to develop practices in opposition to dominant institutions. In 
the present context, as the essays in the first section of this volume 
make clear, we would only need to read Andrea Fraser (2005) to see 
how Bürger is still brought in as an authority purportedly demonstrating 
the futility, infantilism and bad faith of all practices aimed directly 
against or seeking radically to break with established institutional power. 
For Fraser, Bürger, together with Pierre Bourdieu, becomes a resource 
for the justification of an ostensibly more mature and effective position 
within the institutions. However, even when it is called ‘criticality’, 
resignation remains resignation. It is not my purpose here to engage 
with specific readings of Bürger or even to represent fairly the 
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development of Bürger’s own positions since 1974. What follows is a 
critique of the arguments advanced in Theory of the Avant-Garde, since it is 
this text, in its English edition, that is operative today in support of a 
resigned and melancholic modernism. And in this regard, it is crucial to 
see Adorno standing behind Bürger. While in other respects, Adorno 
remains a key critical thinker for me, his rigid investments in artistic 
modernism are a political problem and, as such, are to be critically 
resisted. 
Toward a Different Autonomy 
With both Adorno and Bürger, the problem can be traced to a 
theoretically unjustified overinvestment in the work-form of modernist 
art. Bürger basically rewrites the history of the artistic avant-gardes as 
the development of the work-as-force-field so dear to Adorno. For 
Adorno, the avant-garde is modernist art, identity pure and simple. 
Bürger makes an important advance beyond this identification by 
grasping that the ‘historical’ avant-gardes had repudiated artistic 
autonomy in their efforts to re-link art and life – and that their 
specificity is to be located in this repudiation. But although Bürger 
works hard to differentiate his analysis from Adorno’s, he returns to the 
fold, so to speak, by judging this avant-garde attack on the institution of 
autonomous art to be failure, a ‘false supersession’ (falsche Aufhebung) of 
art into life.  
The avant-garde intended the supersession (Aufhebung) of autonomous 
art by leading art over into a practice of life (Lebenspraxis). This has not 
taken place and presumably cannot take place within bourgeois society 
unless it be in the form of a false supersession (falschen Aufhebung) of 
autonomous art. (Bürger, 1984: 53-4, trans. modified) 
The only successful result was an unintended one: after the historical 
avant-gardes, according to Bürger, a transformation takes place in the 
work-form of art. The organic, harmonized work of traditional art gives 
way to the (non-organic, allegorical) work-form in which disarticulated 
elements are held together in a fragmentary unity that refuses the 
semblance of reconciliation: 
Paradoxically, the avant-gardiste intention to destroy art as an institution 
is thus realized in the work of art itself. The intention to revolutionize 
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life by returning art to its praxis turns into a revolutionizing of art. 
(Bürger, 1984: 72) 
In other words, art cannot repudiate its autonomy, but it can go on 
endlessly repudiating its own traditions, so long as it does so in the form 
of modernist works. This pronouncement of failure and ‘false 
supersession’ is far too hasty. I will return to this point later. Here I 
want to question this investment in the institutionalized autonomy of art 
by contrasting it to the autonomy constituted through a conscious break 
with institutionalized art.  
The Situationist alternative to art under capitalism was a more 
advanced and theoretically conscious breakout than the often partial and 
hesitant revolts of the early avant-gardes. Founded in 1957 but 
continuing in many respects the project of the Lettrist International (LI) 
from which many of its founding members came, the SI was a Paris-
based network of mostly-European national ‘sections’ active until its 
self-dissolution in 1972. Formally combining the LI group around core 
members Guy Debord, Michèle Bernstein and Gil Wolman and the 
Imaginist Bauhaus around Asger Jorn, Constant and Giuseppe Pino-
Gallizio, and soon assimilating the Munich-based Spur group around 
Hans-Peter Zimmer, Heimrad Prem and Dieter Kunzelmann, the SI 
undertook a radical collective critique of post-war commodity capitalism 
and the art system flourishing around a restored modernism. Drawing 
the practical conclusions, they transformed the SI within four years 
from a grouping of artists into a revolutionary organization of cultural 
guerrillas. The SI’s critical process of progressive detachment from the 
art institutions culminated in an internal prohibition on the pursuit of an 
art career by any of its members. Situationist practice was radically 
politicized, but is not reducible to a simple or total instrumentalization. 
We can agree with Adorno that artists who paint what the Party says to 
paint have given up their autonomy; as apologists for the Central 
Committee’s monopoly on autonomy, they are no more than 
instruments for producing compromised works. But the SI was a group 
founded on the principle of autonomy – an autonomy not restricted as 
privilege or specialization, but one that is radicalized through a 
revolutionary process openly aiming to extend autonomy to all. The SI 
did not recognize any Party or other absolute authority on questions 
pertaining to the aims and forms of revolutionary social struggle. Their 
autonomy was critically to study reality and the theories that would 
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explain it, draw their own conclusions and act accordingly. In its own 
group process, the SI accepted nothing less than a continuous 
demonstration of autonomy by its members, who were expected to 
contribute as full participants in a collective practice. This process didn’t 
always unfold smoothly (what process does?). But the much-criticized 
exclusions carried out by the group by and large reflect the painful 
attainment of theoretical coherence and are hardly proof of a lack of 
autonomy. ‘Instrumentalization’ is the wrong category for a conscious 
and freely self-generating (i.e., autonomous) practice.  
Moreover, the Situationists were even more hostile than Adorno to 
official Communist parties and would-be vanguards. Their experiments 
in collective autonomy were far removed – and openly critical of – the 
servility of party militants. Alienation can’t be overcome, as they put it, 
“by means of alienated forms of struggle” (Debord, 1994: 89). Their 
critical processing of revolutionary theory and practice was plainly much 
deeper than Adorno’s – and was lived, as it must be, as a real urgency. 
They carried out an autonomous appropriation of critical theory, 
developed in a close dialectic with their own radical cultural practices 
and innovations. As a result, true enough, they ceased to produce 
modernist artworks. But they never claimed to have gone on with 
modernism; they claimed rather to have surpassed this dominant 
conception of art (Debord, 1994: 129-47). My point is that Situationist 
practice – however you categorize or evaluate it – was certainly no less 
autonomous than the institutionalized production of modernist 
artworks favored by Adorno. If anything, it was far more autonomous 
and intransigently critical. In comparison to Situationist practice, which 
continues to function as a real factor of resistance and emancipation, 
Adorno’s claims for Franz Kafka and Samuel Beckett seem laughably 
inflated. 
On the Supersession of Art 
Situationist art theory, then, does not suffer from the categorical and 
conceptual impasses that led Frankfurt art theory to draw the wagons 
around the modernist artwork. For the Situationists, art oriented toward 
radical social change could no longer be about the production of objects 
for exhibition and passive spectatorship. Given the decomposition of 
contemporary culture – and in passing let’s at least note that there is 
much overlap in the analyses of culture industry and the theory of 
spectacular society – attempts to maintain or rejuvenate modernism are 
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a losing and illusory enterprise. With regard to the content and meaning 
of early avant-garde practice, the critical art theory developed by the SI 
in the late 1950s and early 60s and concisely summarized by Guy 
Debord in The Society of the Spectacle in 1967 is basically consistent with 
Bürger’s later theorization. But the two theories diverge irreconcilably in 
their interpretation of the consequences. 
The rise of capitalism – the tendency to reduce everything and 
everyone to commodity status and exchange value – was the material 
condition for the relative autonomy of culture; the bourgeois revolution 
was the political last act of a material process that had pulverized 
traditional bases of authority and released art from its old function of 
ritual unification. For the Situationists, as art became conscious of itself 
as a distinct sphere of activity in the new order, it logically began to 
press for the autonomy of its sphere. But self-consciousness also 
brought awareness of the impotence of this autonomy as a form of 
social separation and insights into its new functions in support of 
bourgeois power. The avant-gardes of the early twentieth century 
responded with a practical demand that separation be abolished and 
autonomy be generalized through revolution. This far Bürger is in 
agreement. But for him, the defeat of the revolutionary attempt to 
abolish capitalism makes the avant-garde breakout a failure that must be 
re-inscribed in the work-form of art, while for the Situationists this 
defeat is only one moment in a struggle that continues. For the SI, the 
logic of art – necessarily first for and then against autonomous separation 
– remains unchanged, and art can make its peace with separation only 
by deceiving itself. Resigned returns to institutionalized art and to the 
empty, repetitive formalist experiments of work-based modernism can 
only represent a process of decomposition: the “end of the history of 
culture” (Debord, 1994: 131). 
In political terms, there are at this point just two irreconcilable 
options: either to be enlisted in culture’s affirmative function – “to 
justify a society with no justification” (Debord, 1994: 138) – or to press 
forward with the revolutionary process. The institutions will organize 
the prolongation of art “as a dead thing for spectacular contemplation” 
(Debord, 1994: 131-2, trans. modified). The radical alternative is the 
supersession (dépassement; that is, Aufhebung) of art. The first aligns itself 
with the defense of class power; the second, with the radical critique of 
society. Surpassing art means removing it from institutional 
management and transforming it into a practice for expanding life here 
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and now, for overcoming passivity and separation, in short for 
‘revolutionizing everyday life’. There are of course possibilities for 
modest critical practices within the art institutions, but these can always 
be managed and kept within tolerable limits. Maximum pressure on the 
given develops from a refusal of the art system as a whole, openly linked 
to a refusal of the social totality. The history of the real avant-gardes, 
then, is not the history of artistic modernism, but the attainment of 
consciousness about the stakes and the need for this overcoming 
The main defect of Bürger’s theorization can be located in his 
historical judgment on the early avant-gardes, because this judgment 
becomes a categorical foreclosure or blindness. For Bürger, the 
conclusion that the early avant-gardes failed in their attempts to 
supersede art follows necessarily from the obvious fact that the 
institution of art continues. There can be no dialectical overcoming 
without the negating moment of an abolition: 
[I]t is a historical fact that the avant-garde movements did not put an 
end to the production of works of art, and that the social institution that 
is art proved resistant to the avant-gardiste attack. (Bürger, 1984: 56-7) 
Art is not abolished; therefore, no supersession. This leads Bürger to 
declare that the early avant-gardes are now to be seen as ‘historical’. 
Henceforth, attempts to repeat the project of overcoming art can only 
be repetitions of failure; such attempts by the ‘neo-avant-garde’, as Bürger 
now names it, only serve to consolidate the institutionalization of the 
historical avant-gardes as art: 
In a changed context, the resumption of avant-gardiste intentions with 
the means of avant-gardism can no longer even have the limited 
effectiveness the historical avant-gardes achieved.... To formulate more 
pointedly: the neo-avant-garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and 
thus negates genuinely avant-garde intentions. (Bürger, 1984: 58). 
Marcel Duchamp’s gesture of signing a urinal or bottle drier was a failed 
attack on the category of individual production, but repetitions of this 
gesture merely institutionalized the ready-made as a legitimate art object 
(Bürger, 1984: 52-7). 
The problem here is that Bürger restricts his analysis to artworks and 
to gestures that conform to this category. That he comes close to 
perceiving that this may be a problem is hinted in those places where he 
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uses the term ‘manifestation’ (Manifestation) to refer to avant-garde 
practice: 
Instead of speaking of the avant-gardiste work (Werk), we will speak of 
avant-gardiste manifestation (Manifestation). A Dadaist manifestation 
does not have work character but is nonetheless an authentic 
manifestation of the artistic avant-garde. (Bürger, 1984: 50) 
But soon it is clear that all forms of practice will in the end either be 
reduced to that category or else not recognized at all: “The efforts to 
supersede art become artistic manifestations (Veranstaltungen) that, 
independently of their producers’ intentions, take on the character of 
works” (Bürger, 1984: 58). Bürger’s limited examples show that what he 
has in mind by ‘manifestation’ are gestures that already fit the work-
form, such as Duchamp’s ready-mades or Surrealist automatic poems – 
or at most provocations performed before an audience at organized 
artistic events (Veranstaltungen). 
Happenings and Situations 
Bürger is aware of the ‘happening’ form developed by Allan Kaprow 
and his collaborators beginning in 1958. But he classes happenings as 
no more than a neo-avant-garde repetition of Dadaist manifestations, 
evidence that repeating historical provocations no longer has protest 
value. He concludes that art today  
can either resign itself to its autonomy status or organize events 
(Veranstaltungen) to break through that status; however, it cannot simply 
deny its autonomy status or suppose it has the possibility of direct 
effectiveness without at the same time betraying art’s claim to truth 
(Wahrheitsanspruch). (Bürger, 1984: 57, translation modified) 
Art’s ‘claim to truth’, however, turns out to be a normative description 
of autonomy status itself. Following Adorno, Bürger accepts that it is 
only art’s limited exemption from the instrumental reason dominating 
everyday life that enables it to recognize and articulate the truth – ‘truth’ 
here being understood not as a correspondence between reality and its 
representation but as an implicit critico-utopian evaluation of reality. 
Truth is not conformity to the given, but is rather the negative force of 
resistance generated by the mere existence of artworks that, obeying no 
logic but their own, refuse integration. Bürger’s argument here merely 
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endorses Adorno’s. What it really says is: art can’t give up its autonomy 
status without ceasing to be art. And the implication is that if art does 
manage to directly produce political and social effects, it thereby ceases 
to be art and is no longer his – Bürger’s – concern. 
But Bürger cannot escape the problem in this way. He has already 
argued that the aim to produce direct effects (i.e., the transformation of 
art into a practice of life, a Lebenspraxis) is precisely what constitutes the 
avant-garde. So he cannot now give his theorization of the avant-garde 
permission to ignore the avant-gardes when they do attain their aim. He 
also attempts to elude the same problem with a variation on the 
argument. Pulp fiction – in other words, the non-autonomous products 
of the culture industry – are what you get when you aim at a 
supersession of art into life (Bürger, 1984: 54). By 1974, there were 
serious counterexamples for Bürger’s argument; the SI even went so far 
as to spell everything out for him in its own books and theorizations. In 
this case the blindness is devastating, for the gap between contemporary 
avant-garde practice and the theory that purports to explain why it is no 
longer possible invalidates Bürger’s work. 
This would be the case only if the SI accomplished successful 
supersessions of art without collapsing into culture industry. The 
collapse hypothesis is easily dispensed with, since the SI did not indulge 
in commodity production. But putting Bürger’s theory to the test at 
least helps us to see that any evaluation of Situationist supersessions 
must take into account the fact that the SI cut its ties to the art 
institutions and repudiated the work-form of modernist art. For the 
same cannot be said of Bürger’s ‘neo-avant-garde’. Bürger’s examples – 
he briefly discusses Andy Warhol and reproduces images of works by 
Warhol and Daniel Spoerri (Bürger, 1984: 62, 58) – are artists who 
submit artworks to the institutions for reception. Even the case of Kaprow, 
who is not named but can be inferred from Bürger’s use of the term 
‘happening’, doesn’t disturb this commitment to the institutions. 
Kaprow wanted to investigate or blur the borders between art and life, 
but he did so under the gaze, as it were, of the institutions, to which he 
remained dependent. It is in this sense that every happening does 
indeed, as Bürger claims, take on the character of a work. At most, the 
happening-form achieved an expansion of the dominant concept of art, 
but not its negation. Ditto, in this respect, for the case of Fluxus. The 
subsequent appearance of the new medium or genre of ‘performance 
art’ confirms the institutional acceptance (and neutralizing assimilation) 
Gene Ray 
90 
of this direction. (In my terms, the result of a successful capture or 
assimilation of a rebellious form of practice is another expansion of the 
category of institutionalized modernist art.) 
The differences between the happening and the situation are 
decisive here. As an experimental event that never seriously put its 
autonomy status in question, the happening staged interactions or 
exchanges of roles between artist and audience – but in safe, more or 
less controlled conditions, and ultimately for institutional reception. 
Only when, as in the Living Theater in exile and also perhaps in Jean-
Jacques Lebel’s notorious ‘Festivals of Free Expression’ in the mid-
1960s, happening-like events sacrificed the element of institutional 
reception (and its implicit appeal for institutional approval) did they 
become something more threatening to the institution of art. On the 
other hand, the staging of personal risk or even physical danger through 
the elimination of the conventions that put limits on audience 
participation, as in Yoko Ono’s Cut Pieces of 1964-5 or Marina 
Abramovic’s Rhythm 0 (1974), are extremes of performance art that are 
indeed subject to the dialectic of repetition and the recuperation of 
protest pointed to by Bürger. 
In contrast, a situation – a constructed moment of de-alienated life 
that activates the social question – does not depend on the dominant 
conception of art or its institutions to generate its meaning and effects. 
The Situationists themselves, who continued to criticize contemporary 
art in the pages of their journal, in 1963 published an incisive discussion 
of the happening-form and differentiated it from the practice of the SI: 
The happening is an isolated attempt to construct a situation on the basis 
of poverty (material poverty, poverty of human contact, poverty inherited 
from the artistic spectacle, poverty of the specific philosophy driven to 
‘ideologize’ the reality of these moments). The situations that the SI has 
defined, on the other hand, can only be constructed on the basis of 
material and spiritual richness. Which is another way of saying that an 
outline for the construction of situations must be the game, the serious 
game, of the revolutionary avant-garde, and cannot exist for those who 
resign themselves on certain points to political passivity, metaphysical 
despair, or even the pure and experienced absence of artistic creativity. 
(Situationist International, 2002: 147) 
Situations activate a revolutionary process, then, but do so by 
developing social and political efficacy within the found context of 
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material everyday life, rather than through a displacement of everyday 
elements and encounters into the context of institutionalized art. In this 
sense, situations are indeed ‘direct’ by Bürger’s criteria. The so-called 
‘Strasbourg Scandal’ of 1966 is an example of a successful situation that 
contributed directly to a process of radicalization culminating, in May 
and June of 1968, in a wildcat general strike of nine million workers 
throughout France. There moreover is little danger of mistaking or 
perversely misrecognizing this kind of event with an artwork or 
happening. The conclusion seems inescapable that the SI renewed – and 
not merely repeated to no effect – the avant-garde project of 
overcoming art by turning it into a revolutionary practice of life. 
It follows that what Bürger has named the ‘neo-avant-garde’ in order 
to dismiss it is not avant-garde at all. Those who, like the SI, renewed 
the avant-garde project were categorically excluded from the analysis. 
When the repudiation of institutionalized art and the work-form are 
given their due weight as criteria, then it becomes clear that the avant-
garde project of radicalizing artistic autonomy by generalizing it into a 
social principle is a logic inherent or latent in the capitalist art system. It 
will be valid to activate this logic – and to actualize it by developing it in 
the form of practices – just as long as the capitalist art system continues 
to be organized around an operative principle of relative autonomy. It 
will be valid, that is, for artistic agents to reconstitute the avant-garde 
project through a politicized break with the dominant institutionalized 
art. True, actualizations of the avant-garde logic cannot be mere 
repetitions. Each time, they must invent practical forms grounded in 
and appropriate to the contemporary social reality that is their context. 
But because this logic amounts to a radical and irreparable break with 
institutionalized art, there is little risk that such a protest will be 
reabsorbed through yet another expansion of the dominant concept of 
art. The SI showed that art could be surpassed in this way in the very 
period in which, according to Bürger, only impotent repetitions are 
possible. 
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Anthropology and Theory of Institutions 
Paolo Virno 
(Translated by Alberto Toscano) 
The Animal Open to the World 
There is no dispassionate inquiry on human nature that does not carry 
along with it, as a sort of clandestine passenger, at least the sketch of a 
theory of political institutions. The evaluation of species-specific instinct 
and drives, the analysis of a mind characterized through and through by 
the faculty of language, the recognition of the thorny relation between 
the single human animal and his fellows: all of this always harbors a 
judgment on the legitimacy of the Ministry of the Interior. And vice 
versa: there is no theory of political institutions worthy of the name 
which does not adopt, as its badly hidden presupposition, some 
representation or other of the traits that mark out Homo sapiens from the 
other animal species. To mention a high-school example, little is 
understood of Hobbes’s Leviathan if one disregards his On Man. 
Let us avoid any misunderstandings: it would be unrealistic, even 
farcical, to believe that a model of the just society could be deducible 
from certain bio-anthropological invariants. Every political program is 
rooted in an unprecedented socio-historical context (religious civil wars 
in Hobbes’s case, a productive process directly based on the power of 
verbal thought in our own), confronting a unique constellation of 
passions and interests. Nevertheless, collective action is really 
contingent precisely because, while it seizes hold of the most volatile 
reality, it takes charge, in unpredictable and changing ways, of what is 
not contingent, which is to say of bio-anthropological invariants 
themselves. The reference to human nature does not dull, but rather 
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accentuates to the highest degree, the particular and unrepeatable 
character of a political decision, the obligation to act in due time (tempo 
debito), the perception that yesterday was perhaps too early and 
tomorrow will be too late. 
The link between anthropological reflection and the theory of 
institutions was formulated pithily by Carl Schmitt in the seventh 
chapter of his Concept of the Political: 
One could test all theories of state and political ideas according to their 
anthropology and thereby classify these as to whether they consciously 
or unconsciously presuppose man to be by nature evil or by nature 
good. The distinction is to be taken here in a rather summary fashion 
and not in any specifically moral or ethical sense. The problematic or 
unproblematic conception of man is decisive for the presupposition of 
every further political consideration, the answer to the question whether 
man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless creature [....] 
Ingenuous anarchism reveals that the belief in the natural goodness of 
man is closely tied to the radical denial of state and government. One 
follows from the other, and both foment each other [....] The radicalism 
vis-à-vis state and government grows in proportion to the radical belief 
in the goodness of man’s nature [....] What remains is the remarkable 
and, for many, disquieting diagnosis that all genuine political theories 
presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means unproblematic but a 
dangerous and dynamic being. (Schmitt, 1996: 58–61) 
Were man a meek animal destined to agreement and mutual recognition, 
there would be no need at all for disciplinary and coercive institutions. 
The critique of the State – developed with varying intensity by liberals, 
anarchists and communists – is fuelled, according to Schmitt, by the 
prejudicial idea of the ‘natural goodness’ of our species. An authoritative 
(autorevole) example of this tendency is represented today by the 
libertarian political stance of Noam Chomsky: he advocates with 
admirable tenacity the dissolution of centralized apparatuses of power, 
ascribing to them the mortification of the congenital creativity of verbal 
language, the species-specific prerequisite that could guarantee for 
humanity a self-government devoid of established [consolidate] 
hierarchies. However, if – as everything leads one to believe – Homo 
sapiens is a dangerous, unstable and (self-)destructive animal, the 
formation of a ‘unified political body’ that would exercise, in Schmitt’s 
terms, an unconditional ‘monopoly over political decision’ seems 
inevitable in order to hold him back. 
Anthropology and Theory of Institutions 
97 
It is not wise to turn up one’s philosophically sophisticated nose 
when faced with the crass alternative between ‘man good by nature’ and 
‘man bad by nature’. First of all, because Schmitt himself is well aware 
of such crassness: he expressly uses this shorthand to evoke the bio-
anthropological background which, indifferent as it is to naïve moral 
qualifications, provokes instead no shortage of theoretical conundrums. 
But it is not wise to turn up one’s nose especially for another reason. It 
is precisely that seeming crassness that allows us to state, without 
beating about the bush (senza giochi di parole), the historical-naturalist 
hypothesis that, by unsettling the conceptual schema outlined by 
Schmitt, becomes truly interesting. It is the following: the risky 
instability of the human animal – so-called evil, in brief – does not in 
any sense imply the formation and perpetuation of that ‘supreme 
empire’ which is state sovereignty. On the contrary. ‘Radicalism hostile 
to the state’ and to the capitalist mode of production, far from 
presupposing the innate meekness of our species, can find its genuine 
basis in the full recognition of the ‘problematic’ character of the human 
animal – which is to say its indefinite and potential (in other words, also 
dangerous) character. The critique of the ‘monopoly over political 
decision’, and generally of institutions whose rules function as 
compulsions to repeat, must rest precisely on the acknowledgment that 
man is ‘bad by nature’. 
The Excess of Drives and the Modality of the Possible 
What does the ‘evil’ with which, according to Schmitt, every theory of 
institutions that demonstrates a smidgen of realism regarding human 
nature consist in? He refers, albeit in passing, to the theses of the most 
democratic among the founding members of philosophical 
anthropology, Helmut Plessner. I will limit myself to recalling a few key 
ideas of philosophical anthropology considered as a whole, leaving aside 
any distinctions (which are in other respects significant) between the 
different authors. 
Man is ‘problematic’, according to Plessner and then Gehlen, 
because he is deprived of a definite environment, corresponding point 
by point to his psychosomatic configuration and the organization 
(corredo) of his drives. If the animal embedded in an environment reacts 
with innate assuredness to external stimuli, man, environmentally 
disoriented as he is, has to wrestle with a flood of suggestions devoid of 
a precise biological finality. Our species is characterized by its ‘openness 
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to the world’ – if we understand by ‘world’ a vital context which is 
always unpredictable and partially undetermined. The overabundance of 
stimuli unconnected to any definite operative task elicits an enduring 
uncertainty and a disorientation which can never be entirely dispelled: in 
Plessner’s terms, the animal ‘open to the world’ always maintains a non-
adherence, or a ‘detachment’, with regard to the states of affairs and 
events he encounters. Openness to the world, with the rather high 
degree of undifferentiated potentiality it implies, is correlated, in terms 
of phylogeny, with low instinctual specialization, as well as with 
neoteny, which is to say the permanence of infantile characteristic even 
in adult subjects. 
These rather generic indications are sufficient, however, to qualify 
the ‘dangerousness’ of Homo sapiens, which, according to Schmitt, is 
called upon by the modern theory of state sovereignty (and which, 
according to Freud, can only be attenuated by a normative order entirely 
comparable to the compulsion to repeat). The overabundance of stimuli 
which are not biologically finalized and the consequent variability in 
behaviors are accompanied by a congenital fragility in the inhibitory 
mechanisms: the animal ‘open to the world’ displays a virtually limitless 
intra-species aggressiveness, whose triggering causes are never reducible 
to a definite list (habitational density of a territory, sexual selection, etc.), 
since they are themselves infinitely variable (Lorenz, 2005: 297-336). 
Struggles for prestige alone, and even the notion of ‘honor’, have a very 
close relationship with the structure of drives of an environmentally 
dislocated living being, one which is, for this very reason, essentially 
potential in character. The lack of a univocal habitat makes culture into 
‘man’s first nature’ (Gehlen, 1985: 109). However, it is precisely culture 
which, as an innate biological dispositif, displays a fundamental 
ambivalence: it blunts danger, but, in other respects, it multiplies and 
diversifies the occasions of risk; it “defends man from his very nature”, 
sparing him the experience of his “own terrifying plasticity and 
indeterminateness” (Gehlen, 1985: 97), but, being itself the principal 
manifestation of this very plasticity and indeterminacy, it simultaneously 
favors the full unfolding of the nature from which it was supposed to 
protect us. 
So-called ‘evil’ can also be described by calling attention to some 
salient prerogatives of verbal language. Problematic – that is to say 
unstable and dangerous – is the animal whose life is characterized by 
Negation, by the modality of the possible, by infinite regress. These 
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three structures encapsulate the emotive situation of an environmentally 
disoriented animal. Negation is inseparable from a certain degree of 
‘detachment’ from one’s vital context, sometimes even from the 
provisional suspension of sensory stimulus. The modality of the 
possible coincides with a biologically non-finalized excess of drives, as 
well as with the non-specialized character of the human animal. Infinite 
regress expresses the ‘opening to the world’ as chronic incompleteness, 
or even, but it amounts to the same thing, as the futile quest for that 
proportionality between drives and behaviors which is instead the 
prerogative of a circumscribed environment. The logical basis of 
metaphysics simultaneously (a un tempo) outlines a theory of the 
passions. Pain, empathy, desire, fear, aggressiveness: these affects, which 
we share with many other animal species, are reconfigured from top to 
bottom by negation, by the modality of the possible, by infinite regress. 
Then there are those affects which, far from being reconfigured, are 
even provoked by these linguistic structures: boredom, for example, is 
nothing but the emotional correlate of infinite regress, of the petrified 
movement that seems to remove a limit only to reconfirm it over and 
over again; or like anxiety (i.e., an indefinite apprehension, which is not 
bound to a specific state of affairs) is the emotive aspect of the modality 
of the possible. As for negation, it is precisely to it that we owe the 
eventuality of a failure of mutual recognition among co-specifics. The 
perceptual evidence ‘this is a man’ loses its irrefutability once it is 
subjected to the work of the ‘no’: anthropophagy and Auschwitz are 
there to prove it. Placed at the borders of social interaction, the 
possibility of non-recognition also has repercussions at its centre and 
permeates its entire fabric. Language, far from attenuating intra-specific 
aggressiveness (as Habermas and a number of contented philosophers 
assure us), radicalizes them beyond measure. 
Ambivalence 
The dangerousness of our species is coextensive with its capacity to 
accomplish innovative actions, that is actions that are capable of 
modifying established habits and norms. Whether we’re talking about 
the excess of drives or linguistic negation, of a ‘detachment’ from one’s 
vital context or of the modality of the possible, it is entirely obvious that 
what we are pointing to are not just the premises of subjugation and 
torture, but the prerequisites that permit the invention of factory 
councils or other democratic institutions based on that topically political 
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passion which is friendship without familiarity. Both ‘virtue’ and ‘evil’ 
presuppose a deficit of instinctive orientation and feed on the 
uncertainty experience in the faced of ‘that which can be differently 
than it is’. The bio-linguistic preconditions of so-called ‘evil’ are the 
same as the ones that subtend ‘virtue’. Just think of negation again: it is 
capable of rupturing, or bracketing, the empathy among co-specifics 
guaranteed by the cerebral mechanism of mirror neurons (Gallese, 
2003), making it possible to state something like ‘this is not a man’ in 
the presence of a Jew or an Arab. We must add, however, that the 
possibility of a reciprocal mis-recognition is kept at bay (precisely in a 
virtuous way) by the same faculty of negating any semantic content that 
made it possible in the first place. The public sphere – woven of 
persuasive discourses, political conflicts, pacts, collective projects – is 
nothing but a second negation with which the first one, that is, the 
syntagm ‘non-man’ is always stifled again. In other words, the public 
sphere consists in a negation of the negation: ‘not non-man’. The patent 
identity between the species-specific resources enjoyed by virtuous 
innovation and the ones which nourish homicidal hostility does not 
authorizes us, even for a moment, to mitigate ‘evil’, to consider it as a 
peripheral nuisance, or worse, as the indispensable impetus behind 
‘good’. On the contrary: the only truly radical, which is to say inexorable 
and lacerating, evil is precisely and solely the evil that shares the same 
root as the good life. 
The complete co-extensiveness between threat and shelter allows us 
to place the problem of political institutions on a firmer basis. This, for 
at least two reasons. Above all, because it introduces the suspicion that 
the apparent shelter (state sovereignty, for instance) constitutes, in some 
cases, the most intense manifestation of the threat (intra-specific 
aggressiveness). Furthermore, because it suggest a methodological 
criterion of some relevance: institutions truly protect us if, and only if, 
they enjoy the same background conditions which, in other respects, do 
not cease to fuel the threat; if, and only if, they draw apotropaic 
resources from the ‘openness to the world’ and from the faculty of 
negating, from neoteny and from the modality of the possible; if, and 
only if, the exhibit at each and every moment their belonging to the 
category of ‘that which can be different than it is’. 
Wishing to defuse the little dialectic scheme, according to which the 
(self-)destructive drives of the linguistic animal would be destined to 
empower and perfect always and evermore the synthesis represented by 
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the state, contemporary critical thought – from Chomsky to French 
post-structuralism – has deemed it convenient to expel from its horizon, 
together with dialectics, the very memory of those (self-)destructive 
drives. In so doing, contemporary critical thought risks corroborating 
Schmitt’s diagnosis that radicalism hostile to the State grows in 
proportion to the faith in the radical goodness of human nature. 
Everything suggests that we are dealing with a dead end. Rather than 
abrogating the negative if only to avoid the dialectical grindstone, it is 
necessary to develop a non-dialectical understanding of the negative. 
With this end in mind, three keywords show their usefulness: 
ambivalence, oscillation, the disturbing. Ambivalence: friendship 
without familiarity, the authentic nub of a political community, can 
always turn into the familiarity loaded with enmity that fuels massacres 
between factions, gangs, tribes. There is no pacifying third term, which 
is to day a dialectical synthesis or superior point of equilibrium: each 
polarity refers back to the other; or rather, it already contains it within 
itself, it already lets us glimpse the other in its own fabric. Oscillation: 
the mutual recognition among co-specifics is marked by a ceaseless 
back-and-forth that goes from partial achievement to incipient failure. 
Disturbing: what is frightening is never the unfamiliar, but only that 
with which we have the greatest acquaintance (the excess of drives, the 
infrastructure of verbal language) and which, in varying circumstances, 
has even exercised or could exercise a protective function. 
Murmurs in the Desert 
The relation between the redoubtable aspects of human nature and 
political institutions is without doubt a meta-historical question. In 
order to confront it, it is not much use evoking the kaleidoscope of 
cultural differences. However, as always happens, a meta-historical 
question gains in visibility and weight only within a concrete socio-
historic conjuncture. The invariant, that is the congenital (self-) 
destructiveness of the animal who thinks with words is thematized as 
the ‘argument’ of a ‘function’ which is entirely made up of contingent 
crises and conflicts. In other words: the problem of intra-specific 
aggressiveness jumps to the foreground once the modern centralized 
state experiences a noteworthy decline, albeit one which is marked by 
convulsive restorative impulses and disquieting metamorphoses. It is in 
the midst of this decline, and because of it, that the problem of 
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institutions, of their regulative and stabilizing role, makes itself felt in all 
its bio-anthropological scope. 
It is Schmitt himself who acknowledges, with patent bitterness, the 
collapse of state sovereignty. The erosion of the ‘monopoly over 
political decision’ derives as much from the nature of the current 
productive process (based on abstract knowledge and linguistic 
communication), as from the social struggles of the sixties and 
seventies, and from the subsequent proliferation of forms of life 
refractory to a ‘preliminary pact of obedience’. It is not important here 
to dwell on these causes or to rehearse other possible ones. What matter 
instead are the question marks that hover over the new situation. What 
political institutions can there be outside of the state apparatus? How is 
the instability and dangerousness of the human animal to be held in 
check, where we can no longer count on a ‘compulsion to repeat’ in the 
application of the rules which are in effect at any given time? In what 
way can the excess of drives and the openness to the world act as a 
political antidote to the poisons they themselves secrete? 
These questions refer back to the thorniest episode in the Jewish 
exodus: the ‘murmurs’ in the desert, that is a sequence of singularly 
bitter internecine struggles. Rather than submitting to the pharaoh or 
rising up against his rule, the Jews took advantage of the principle of the 
tertium datur, seizing a further and unprecedented possibility: to abandon 
the ‘house of slavery and iniquitous labor’. So they venture into a no 
man’s land, where they experience unheard-of forms of self-
government. But the bond of solidarity grows weak: the longing for the 
old oppression grows, the respect for one’s comrades in the flight 
suddenly turns into hatred, violence and idolatry run rampant. Schisms, 
hostility, slander, polymorphous aggression: this is how, on the slopes 
of the Sinai, there appears. The narrative of the exodus is perhaps the 
most authoritative theological-political model for the overcoming of the 
State. This is because it projects the possibility of undermining the 
pharaoh’s monopoly of decision by means of a resourceful subtraction; 
but also because, by drawing attention to the ‘murmurs’ it rules out the 
idea that this subtraction is based on the natural meekness of the human 
animal. The exodus refutes Schmitt: a Republic that is no longer a state 
enjoys a very close and open relationship with the innate destructiveness 
of our species. 
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Natural-historical Institutions 
Not only does ‘radicalism hostile to the State’ not hesitate in recognizing 
the (self-)destructive drives of the living being endowed with speech, 
but it takes them so seriously that it deems unrealistic, or even intensely 
harmful, the antidote envisaged by the theories of sovereignty. I would 
like to elaborate some further conjectures on the form and functioning 
of political bodies that, though they closely tackle the fearsome aspects 
of human nature, nevertheless appear incompatible with the ‘monopoly 
over political decision’. 
I will try to develop these conjectures without alluding to what could 
be, but focusing my gaze on what is always already there. In other 
words, I will neglect for the time being the need to invent political 
categories worthy of current social transformations, in order to fix my 
attention on two macroscopic anthropological – or rather 
anthropogenetic – realities which constitute, to all intents and purposes, 
institutions: language and ritual. They are precisely the institutions that 
display with the greatest clarity all the prerequisites that my sequence of 
questions has just enumerated: acknowledgment of the impossibility of 
exiting the state of nature, back-and-forth between regularity and rules, 
reciprocal commutability between matters of principle and matters of 
fact, an intimate acquaintance with ambivalence and oscillation. These 
two natural-historical institutions, of which I will say the bare minimum, 
are not, however, political institutions. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude 
the possibility of finding in our tradition one or more conceptual 
devices that represent the properly political equivalent of language or 
ritual. In our tradition: even here, as you can see, I am not invoking 
what will come, but what has been. Concerning ritual, let me propose 
the following hypothesis: the manner in which it confronts and 
mitigates always anew the dangerous instability of the human animal has 
a correlate in the theological-political category of katechon. This Greek 
word, employed by the apostle Paul in the second letter to the 
Thessalonians and then repeatedly recovered by conservative doctrines 
means ‘that which restrains’, a force that always yet again defers the 
ultimate destruction. Now, it seems to me that concept of katechon, as 
the political aspect of ritual practices, is more than useful in order to 
define the nature and tasks of institutions that no longer belong to the 
state. Far from being an intrinsic cog in the theory of sovereignty, as 
Schmitt and company claim, the idea of a force that restrains so-called 
‘evil’, without however ever being capable of expunging it (since its 
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expunction would correspond to the end of the world, or better, to the 
atrophy of the ‘openness to the world’), is instead well suited to the anti-
monopolistic politics of exodus. 
Language 
Language has a pre-individual and supra-personal life. It concerns the 
individual human animal only to the extent that the latter belongs to a 
‘mass of speaking beings’. Precisely as freedom or power, it exists solely 
in the relation between the members of a community. Bifocal sight, the 
autonomous possession of every isolated man, can further be 
considered, rightly, a shared endowment of the species. Not so for 
language: in its case it is the sharing that creates the endowment; it is the 
between of inter-psychic relations which then determines, as if by 
resonance, an intra-psychic asset. Natural-historical language testifies to 
the priority of the ‘we’ over the ‘I’, of the collective mind over the 
individual mind. That is why, as Saussure does not tire of repeating, 
language is an institution. It is for this reason, in fact, that it is a ‘pure 
institution’, the matrix and yardstick for all the others. 
Such a judgment would not be fully justified, however, if language, 
beside being supra-personal, did not also exercise an integrative and 
protective function. For every authentic institution stabilizes and 
repairs. But what lack does natural-historical language need to fill? And 
what risk must it protect us from? Both the lack and the risk have a 
precise name: the faculty of language. This faculty – that is the biological 
disposition to speak of each single individual – is a simple potentiality 
that remains devoid of actual reality, all too similar to an aphasic state. 
Language – as a social fact or pure institution – compensates for 
individual infancy, that is, for that condition in which one does not 
speak though one possess the capacity to do so. It protects us from the 
first and gravest danger to which the neotenous animal is exposed: a 
power that remains such, devoid of corresponding acts. The difference 
between the faculty of language and historically determinate laws – a 
difference which, far from being elided, persists into adulthood, making 
itself felt every time a statement is produced – confers an institutional 
tonality to the natural life of our species. It is precisely this difference 
that implies an extremely close link between biology and politics, 
between zoon logon ekon and zoon politikon. 
Language is the institution that makes possible all the other 
institutions: fashion, marriage, law, the State – the list goes on. But the 
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matrix is radically distinct from its by-products. According to Saussure, 
the functioning of language cannot be compared to that of the law or 
the State. The undeniable analogies reveal themselves to be deceptive. 
The transformation over time of the civil code has nothing in common 
with the mutation of consonants or the alteration in certain lexical 
values. The gap that separates the ‘pure institution’ from the socio-
political apparatuses with which we are familiar is perhaps quite 
instructive for an investigation such as ours. If we wish to employ the 
terminology used hitherto, we could say that only language is an 
effectively worldly institutions, which is to say such as to reflect in its 
very way of being the overabundance of biologically non-finalized 
stimuli, not to mention the chronic ‘detachment’ of the human animal 
vis-à-vis its own vital context. 
Language is both the most natural and the most historical of human 
institutions. More natural: unlike fashion or the State, it is founded on a 
‘special organ prepared by nature’, that is on that innate biological 
disposition represented by the language faculty. More historical: while 
marriage and the law are suited to certain natural facts (sexual desire and 
the raising of offspring, for the former; symmetry of exchanges and the 
ratio between harm and penalty, for the latter), language is never 
constrained by an objective domain, but concerns instead the entire 
experience of the animal open to the world, and therefore the possible 
as much as the real, the unknown to the same extent as the customary. 
Fashion is not localizable in an area of the brain, yet it must always 
respect the proportions of the human body. On the contrary, language 
depends on certain generic conditions, but enjoys an unlimited field of 
application (since it is itself capable of always expanding it anew). 
Language mirrors the typically human lack of a circumscribed and 
predictable environment; but it is precisely its unlimited variability, in 
other words its independence from factual circumstances and natural 
data, which offers a perspicuous protection vis-à-vis the risks that are 
connected to that lack. 
The pure institution, which is simultaneously the most natural and 
the most historical of institutions, is also however an insubstantial 
institution. Saussure’s idée fixe is well known: language contains no 
positive reality, endowed with autonomous consistency, but only 
differences and differences among differences. Each term is defined 
only by its ‘non-coincidence with the rest’, which is to say by its 
opposition or heterogeneity with respect to all the other terms. The 
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value of a linguistic element consists in its not being: x is something 
only and precisely because it is not y, not z, not w, and so on. The 
speaking being’s capacity to negate some worldly state of affairs, 
sometimes even to the point of deactivating perceptual proof, is limited 
to the reprise and exteriorization of the ‘complex of eternally negative 
relationships’ which has always characterized the interior life of 
language. Negation, which is to say what language does, must be 
understood above all as something that language is. The pure institution 
does not represent any given force or reality, but may signify them all 
thanks to the negative-differential relationship entertained by its 
components. It is not the spokesperson or trace of anything, and it is 
precisely in this way that it shows its inseparability from ‘a being 
founded primarily on detachment’. 
Is it conceivable that a political institution – in the most rigorous 
acceptation of this adjective – borrows its own form and functioning 
from language? Is it plausible for there to be a Republic that protects 
and stabilizes the human animal in the same way that language performs 
its protective and stabilizing role vis-à-vis the language faculty, which is 
to say neoteny? Can there be an insubstantial Republic, based on 
differences and differences among differences, a non-representative 
Republic? I cannot answer these questions. Like anyone else, I too am 
suspicious of beguiling allusions and speculative short-circuits. Having 
said that, I think that the current crisis of State sovereignty makes such 
questions legitimate, stripping them of any vain or complacent air. The 
idea that the self-government of the multitude may conform itself 
directly to the linguistic character of man, to the disturbing ambivalence 
that marks him, should at the very least remain an open problem. 
Ritual 
Ritual registers and confronts all sorts of crises: the uncertainty that 
paralyses action, the terror of the unknown, the intensification of 
aggressive drives at the heart of the community. In the most significant 
cases, the crisis that ritual is preoccupied with does not concern 
however this or that determinate behavior, but rather involves the very 
conditions of possibility of experience: the unity of self-consciousness 
and the openness to the world. Ernesto De Martino refers to the crucial 
occasions in which the I crumbles and the world seems about to end as 
‘crises of presence’. In these circumstances, the partial reversibility of 
the anthropogenetic process is starkly manifest. In other words, the 
Anthropology and Theory of Institutions 
107 
possession of those fundamental prerequisites that make a human 
animal into a human animal becomes insecure. Ritual fulfils a 
therapeutic function not because it erects a barrier against the ‘crisis of 
presence’ but, on the contrary, because it retraces all its steps and 
attempts to invert the polarity of each and every one of them. Ritual 
praxis bears out the extreme danger, dilates uncertainty and chaos, 
returns to the primal scene of hominization. Only thus, after all, can it 
perform a symbolic repetition of anthropogenesis, ultimately reaffirming 
the unity of the I and the openness to the world. According to De 
Martino, psycho-pathological collapse and the catastrophe of associated 
life are held back by ‘cultural apocalypses’, that is by collective rituals 
that mimic destruction in order to ward it off (rintuzzarla). Cultural 
apocalypses are institutions based on ambivalence and oscillation. This 
is the ambivalence of critical situations, in which only loss offers a 
chance of deliverance, and there is no shelter save for that which danger 
itself delineates. And it is the oscillation between something familiar that 
becomes disturbing and something disturbing which once again emits 
familiarity. 
The crisis of presence follows two opposite and symmetrical paths. 
It can consist of a painful ‘semantic defect’, but also, inversely, of the 
uncontrollable inflationary vortex provoked by a “semantic excess 
which cannot be resolved into determinate meanings” (De Martino, 
1977: 89). The semantic defect is inseparable from a reduction of 
human discourse to a finite series of monochord signals. The I is 
reabsorbed into a chaotic world whose parts, far from still constituting 
discrete units, merge into an unstable and enveloping continuum. In the 
first case we are dealing with acts without power; in the second, with 
power without acts: these are the specular ways in which the regression 
of the anthropogenetic process manifests itself, in other words, to adopt 
De Martino’s terminology, as the risk of the ‘end of the world’. 
The cultural apocalypse is the ritual counterpart of the state of 
exception. It too implies the suspension of ordinary laws, letting certain 
traits of human nature emerge (the crisis and repetition of the same 
anthropogenetic process) in a particular historical conjuncture. Like the 
state of exception, the cultural apocalypse too delineates a domain in 
which it is impossible to discern with confidence the grammatical level 
from the empirical one, the general rule from the individual application, 
matters of principle from matters of fact. The cultural apocalypse, just 
like the state of exception, makes it so that every normative proposition 
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shows that it is both an instrument of testing and a reality to be tested, a 
unit of measure and a measurable phenomenon. The state of exception 
has today become the enduring condition of associated life. It is no 
longer a circumscribed interval – inaugurated and closed by the 
sovereign – but a permanent tonality of action and discourse. This also 
goes for the ritual. The cultural apocalypse is not confined to a special 
space and time, but now concerns all the aspects of contemporary 
experience. The reason for this is simple. The institutional task of ritual 
lies in containing the extreme dangers that menace the openness to the 
world of the linguistic animal. Well, in an era in which the openness to 
the world is no longer veiled or dulled by social pseudo-environments, 
but can even be said to represent a fundamental technical resource, this 
task must be carried out without any pause (senza soluzione di continuità). 
The oscillation between the loss of presence and its restoration 
characterizes every moment of social praxis. The ambivalence between 
the symptoms of crisis and the symbols of deliverance pervades the 
average everyday. 
It remains to ask whether cultural apocalypse, that is the natural-
historical institution that holds back radical evil through oscillation and 
ambivalence, possesses a strictly political correlate. Whether ritual, 
besides spreading through all the interstices of profane time, may also 
give us some hints regarding the possible functioning of a Republic no 
longer linked to the state. My reply to these questions is affirmative. As 
I already suggested, I think that the ancient concept of katechon, of a 
‘force that restrains’, constitutes the plausible political equivalent of 
cultural apocalypses; and that this concept, like that of cultural 
apocalypse, is by no means inexorably tied to the vicissitudes of State 
sovereignty. 
Katechon 
In his second letter to the Thessalonians, the apostle Paul speaks of a 
force that restrains the dominance of iniquity in the world, always 
deferring the triumph of the Antichrist anew. To restrain, to defer: these 
terms have nothing in common with ‘expunging’ or ‘defeating’, or even 
with ‘circumscribing’. What restrains cannot keep its distance from what 
it restrains, but remains in proximity to it, and even cannot fail to mix 
with it. The katechon does not vanquish evil, but limits it and parries its 
strikes each and every time. It does not save from destruction, but 
rather holds it back, and in order to hold it back, it conforms to the 
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innumerable occasions in which it may manifest itself. It resists the 
pressure of chaos by adhering to it, just like the concave adheres to the 
convex. The border line between the katechon and the Antichrist does 
not belong exclusively to either of the two adversaries: analogously to 
the ritual device described by Ernesto de Martino, this line is both the 
symptom of the crisis and the symbol of deliverance, the expression of 
iniquity and a physiognomic trait of virtue. Or better, it is the one only 
because it is the other. 
In mediaeval and modern political thought, the katechon was initially 
identified with the temporal power of the Church, then with the 
centripetal institutions of the sovereign State, which, by imposing a 
preliminary pact of obedience, aimed to offset the disintegration of the 
social body. This is what Carl Schmitt writes in his Nomos of the Earth. 
This is certainly not the place for a detailed discussion of the 
conservative and state-worshipping use of the notion of katechon. Let a 
single observation suffice for the moment: Schmitt and his family album 
(Hobbes, De Maistre, Donoso Cortès) evoke a ‘force that restrains’ to 
indicate generically the stabilizing and protective role that befalls 
political institutions faced with the dangerousness of the disoriented and 
neotenous animal. Such a role is fundamental but does not represent a 
discriminating element: it may be claimed, in principle, by the most 
diverse types of political institution (to be clear: from an anarchist 
commune to a military dictatorship), as well as by innumerable non-
political institutions (beginning with language and ritual). Grasped in its 
generic sense, the katechon is a ubiquitous and pervasive property, 
perhaps even a bio-anthropological invariant. The salient point in 
Schmitt and authors close to him is not at all in he reference to a ‘force 
that restrains’, but its unequivocal attribution to state sovereignty. The 
question of the katechon is freed from these associations once the 
necessity of an institutional protection is stipulated, while at the same 
time rejecting the idea that the State and its associated ‘monopoly over 
the political decision’ can guarantee it (given that it is precisely they 
which constitute the utmost danger). Since dissimilar, or even 
diametrically opposed ways of containing the risky instability of the 
linguistic animal are in competition, it seems legitimate not only to 
disentangle the idea of katechon from the ‘supreme empire’ of the State, 
but also to juxtapose the two. All of this does not hold, of course, for 
those who critique the State while trusting in the innate meekness of our 
species. For them, a ‘force that restrains’ is always deserving of 
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contempt; for them, the appropriation of the katechon by authoritarian 
political thought is therefore entirely legitimate, or rather 
unimpeachable. But I’d rather disregard such stances. 
If we equate the concept of katechon with the apotropaic function 
involved in any political (and non-political) institution, we are led to 
conclude that it surpasses and exceeds that of State sovereignty: 
between the two concepts there lies an insurmountable gap, the same 
gap that separates the genus from the species, the phrase ‘linguistic 
animal’ from the phrase ‘university professor’. If we turn our attention 
instead to the truly peculiar aspects of the katechon, which is to say to 
what makes it a proper name, it is not difficult to recognize its radical 
heterogeneity with respect to the form of protection envisaged by State 
sovereignty (whose crux, as we know, is the exit from the state of nature 
and the preliminary pact of obedience). Let us follow this second path. 
In order to grasp the characteristic features of the katechon as a political 
institution, those aspects that relate it to cultural apocalypses and 
oppose it to the modern central State, we need to pause for a moment 
on its theological make-up. 
The katechon is marked by an internal antinomy. It hold back the 
Antichrist, radical evil, polymorphous aggressiveness. But in the second 
book of the Apocalypse the triumph of the Antichrist constitutes the 
necessary premise for the second coming of the Messiah, the parousia 
which will accord eternal salvation to creatures by putting an end to the 
world. This is the double bind to which the katechon is subject: if it 
restrains evil, the final defeat of evil is hindered; if aggressiveness is 
limited, the ultimate annihilation of aggressiveness is forestalled. Of 
course, blunting ever anew the dangerousness of the species Homo 
sapiens means avoiding its lethal expression, but it also, and perhaps 
above all, means prohibiting its definitive expunction: that expunction, 
to be clear, that the theories of sovereignty seek by means of the stark 
caesura between state of nature and civil state. From a logical point of 
view, the antinomy that lurks in the institution-katechon is perhaps 
comparable to the paradoxical injunction “I command you to be 
spontaneous”: if I am spontaneous, I am not, since I am obeying an 
order; if I obey the order, I am not really obeying, because I am being 
spontaneous. From a political point of view, the same antinomy 
becomes remarkably productive, inasmuch as it delineates a model of 
institutional protection according to which the (self-)destructive drives 
linked to the openness to the world can only be confronted thanks to 
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the same bio-linguistic conditions (neoteny, negation, the modality of 
the possible, and so on) which constitute the foundations and guarantee 
of that very openness. 
Let us reiterate once more the crucial point. By hindering the 
triumph of the Antichrist, the katechon simultaneously hinders the 
redemption at the hand of the Messiah. To restrain iniquity entails 
renouncing the restitution of innocence. The katechon – a radically anti-
eschatological theologico-political concept – is opposed to the ‘end of 
the world’, or better, to the atrophy of the openness to the world, to the 
various ways in which the crisis of presence can manifest itself. Both 
evil triumphant and the total victory over evil imply that end, which is 
to say this atrophy. The katechon is a protection against the lethal 
instability that emanates from the Antichrist, but equally from the 
messianic state of equilibrium; it protects from terrifying chaos as well 
as from redemptive entropy. Not only does the katechon oscillate 
between the negative and the positive, without ever expunging the 
negative, it preserves oscillation as such, its persistence.  
In strictly political terms, the katechon is a republican institution 
designed to forestall two catastrophic possibilities which can undermine 
the very root of social interaction: the case in which the regularity of 
species-specific behaviors becomes prominent, albeit devoid of any 
determinate rule whatsoever (semantic excess); and the diametrically 
opposed case in which a set of rules is in force which, having been 
sundered from regularity, require an automatic and uniform application 
(semantic deficit). Thus, the katechon is the republican institution that 
holds back the risks implicit in the instability of ‘a being primarily 
founded on detachment’, though it simultaneously counters the rather 
menacing ways in which the modern State has sought out a protection 
from those very risks. Not unlike the ‘irregular institutions’ (leagues, 
councils, assemblies) that characterize the political existence of the 
multitude according the Hobbes, the katechon is doubly tied to 
circumstances and occasions. It does not exercise a centralizing 
synthesis with regard to concrete forms of life, powers and local 
conflicts, but instead carries out a contingent and very precise task. The 
katechon is the institution best suited to the permanent state of 
exception, to the partial lack of distinction (or reciprocal commutability) 
between matters of principle and matters of fact that characterize it. In 
other words, it is the institution best suited to the state of exception 
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once the latter, far from still being a prerogative of the sovereign, signals 
instead the action and discourse of the multitude. 
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What is Critique? 
Suspension and Re-Composition in Textual 
and Social Machines* 
Gerald Raunig 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
Critique does not have the premises of a thinking that conclusively 
explains: and this is what is to be done now. It must be an instrument 
for those who fight, resist, and who no longer want what is. It must be 
used in processes of conflict, confrontation and resistance attempts. It 
must not be the law of the law. It is not a stage in a program. It is a 
challenge to the status quo. (Michel Foucault, ‘Roundtable, 20 May 
1978’) 
In the manifold assemblages of concepts of resistance, an impression of 
confusion is not unusual; neither is arbitrariness in terms of a 
meaningful differentiation of these concepts. When Michel Foucault 
presents an entire battery of concepts of resistance in his 
governmentality lecture and weighs them – refusal, revolt, disobedience, 
resistiveness, desertion, dissidence, dissent, and, finally, counter-conduct 
– then the following question arises in relation to critique: Is there a 
specific place of critique in this assemblage of concepts, and if there is, 
then where? This is the question, the problem that I want to address in 
the course of this essay, beginning with Foucault and tying my own idea 
of this specific place of critique into his. 
First of all, I would like to avoid a misunderstanding that might 
possibly arise about the title of the conference1 that is the occasion for 
this text. ‘The Art of Critique’ is not in any way a reference to art in the 
narrower sense, nor to art criticism, even though the efforts undertaken 
by our institute do move in the neighboring zones of art production and 
art theory. The conference title was, first of all, a set piece of a 
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quotation from ‘What is Critique?’ – the lecture that Michel Foucault 
held in late May 1971, which is also the leitmotiv of my text. The term 
‘art’ here is closely related to the Greek word techne, which is why 
Foucault calls critique in his lecture not only an ‘art’ and a ‘virtue’, but 
also a ‘technique’. This is not simply an idiosyncrasy of Foucault’s, but 
rather a tradition that reaches back to the first uses of the term critique. 
The term first appears with Plato, in Politicos (The Statesman), in the 
combination kritiké techne (Polit. 260b), in other words the art, the craft 
of distinguishing, which is then translated in Latin as ars iudicandi. Calling 
critique both ‘technique’ and ‘art’ is found throughout the centuries and 
in various European languages. 
Yet which practice makes up this technique of critique? Contrary to 
the commonplace use of the term, in Judith Butler’s essay – inspired by 
Foucault’s lecture and also entitled ‘What is Critique?’ – she refers to 
critique as “a practice that suspends judgment” (Butler, 2002). So 
instead of judging or condemning, critique specifically suspends 
judgment. Contrary to the notion of a purely critical position, a 
privileged place, upon which – and from which – the overview and 
authority of judgment arise, it is initially a matter of suspending 
judgment. In fact, this was already noted by the eternal head of the 
court of critique, Immanuel Kant, who wrote: “critical method suspends 
judgment.” Nevertheless, he also continued with the explanation that 
this suspension of judgment has only one aim: “critical method 
suspends judgment, in order to reach [judgment]” (Kant, n.d.: 459). 
Butler, on the other hand, concurs with Foucault that critique goes 
beyond suspending judgment, that critique specifically does not return 
to judgment in this suspension of judgment, but instead opens up a new 
practice. This double figure of suspension and re-invention corresponds 
to the development of the two components of my own text. 
 1. Critique suspends judgment. 
 2. At the same time, critique also means re-composition, invention. 
Foucault’s ‘What is Critique?’ The Necessity of New Reversals of 
the Movement from the Critical Attitude to the Project of Critique 
In my lecture at the opening of the Transform project in Linz in the Fall 
of 2005 (reprinted as chapter 1 in this volume), I focused primarily on 
the famous starting point of Foucault’s lecture, which names critique as 
the attitude, the art, the will not to be governed like that, not in this way, 
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not at this price, not by them (Foucault, 1997a). Judith Butler calls 
Foucault’s starting point here the ‘signature of a critical attitude’ (Butler, 
2002), and it is in fact inscribed in most practices of critique as a figure 
that derives its force of resistance primarily from the will to shift the 
relationship of power and resistance. 
Foucault develops the figure of critique as an art of not being 
governed like that, consistently parallel to the expansion of the pastoral 
‘economy of the souls’, into an art of governing people: the critical 
attitude is simultaneously ‘partner and adversary of the arts of 
governing’, which expanded explosively in the late Middle Ages. And 
while Foucault posits this unexpectedly early start of the genealogy of 
critique, in his lecture he picks up virtually all of the important threads 
of critique in European Modernism: he starts with the emergence of the 
critica sacra, the new bible criticism during the transition from the late 
Middle Ages to Modernity as the most important component of the 
modern foundation of critique. He ascribes to Kant’s endeavor of 
critique the main moment of questioning knowledge about its own 
limits and dead ends, and he calls this the ‘Kantian channel’ (Foucault, 
1997a: 63). With the term ‘critical attitude’ Foucault ties into the 
revolutionary, leftist Hegelian texts of the nineteenth century, and finally 
even takes a position of “fellowship with the Frankfurt School” 
(Foucault, 1997a: 44) – especially in relation to their “critique of 
positivism, objectivism, rationalization, of techne and technicalization” 
(1997a: 38) – whose critical theory embodied the last major boom of the 
concept of critique. 
As my starting point for Transform was the thesis at the beginning 
of Foucault’s lecture, that of critique as the art of not being governed 
like that, now at the close of our project I would like to start from the 
end of Foucault’s lecture. There he poses a question that is difficult to 
understand. Following the familiar opening passage and longer 
epistemological passages in the middle section, he states his sympathy 
for certain aspects of the Enlightenment contrary to a form of critique 
that he increasingly begins to doubt in the course of his text. His 
question is, specifically, is it not necessary to reverse the path from the 
critical attitude to the question of critique, from the endeavor of the 
Enlightenment to the project of critique? The movement of the reversal 
is first of all to be examined in its heterogenesis, as a historical 
dissemination of Enlightenment, on the one hand, and the Kantian 
‘project of critique’ on the other. It must be noted, however, that the 
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reversal of the process cannot simply lead back to the pathos of 
Enlightenment, it also includes the leftist critique of the Enlightenment 
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but understands the critical 
attitude as Enlightenment-critical ‘enlightenment’ in a different 
genealogy as the ‘project of critique’. 
Whereas critique and Enlightenment (Aufklärung in German) seem 
to be inextricably interwoven in a more general understanding, Foucault 
gradually unfolds both terms in the course of his lecture, finally 
polarizing them with a reserved polemic reference to Kant and his 
concept of critique: he writes that “this question of the Aufklärung, since 
Kant, because of Kant and presumably because of this separation he 
introduced between Aufklärung and critique, was essentially raised in 
terms of knowledge (connaissance)” (Foucault, 1997a: 48). In other words, 
a separation of Enlightenment and critique first took place with Kant, 
then the “movement responsible for reassessing the Aufklärung 
endeavor within the critical project” (Foucault, 1997a: 61). In this 
‘critical project’2 now comprising both Enlightenment and critique, 
Foucault sees a procedure develop that focuses exclusively on testing 
the legitimacy of historical modes of knowledge.3 Foucault, on the other 
hand, takes up and assails the question of how power and knowledge 
are interwoven.4 
The problem of the Kantian position is that “Kant set forth 
critique’s primordial responsibility, to know knowledge” (Foucault, 
1997a: 36). Here a radical critique of knowledge is separated from every 
critical political activity. Instead of this form of critique understood as 
being necessarily limited, Foucault is interested in a practical critique 
that continuously transgresses the limit of knowledge that is not to be 
grasped as a ‘law of laws’.5 Whereas Kant is concerned with critique as 
knowing knowledge, therefore also and above all knowing the limits of 
knowledge, Foucault wants the critical attitude to be understood as a 
transgression of precisely these limits. 
I read the direction of Foucault’s demand for a reversal primarily as 
an attack on fixations and restrictions of the concept of critique to the 
critique of knowledge, as an attack on the extreme academicizing and 
narrowing of the Kantian concept of critique, which made it impossible 
in the early nineteenth century, at least in the German-speaking region, 
to use the concept of critique in political contexts. And what is perhaps 
even more important: I also read Foucault’s suggestion that it is a matter 
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of reversing the path from the critical attitude to the project of critique 
into a new productive repetition of leftist Hegelian discourses, which 
attempted a reversal of this kind around the mid-nineteenth century. 
The highpoint of this development in opposition to Kant’s concept of 
critique – which is also posited, not least of all, dichotomously against 
revolutionary violence – is Marx’ famous dictum from his Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: “Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace 
the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by 
material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has 
gripped the masses” (Marx, 1975: 251). Or less oratorically: what Marx 
and Engels called ‘practical critical action’ is already quite close to the 
Foucauldian concept of the ‘critical attitude’ in this emphasis on turning 
away from Kant’s purely epistemological critical project. And since 
Marx, it is possible (again) to understand critique as ‘practical’ alongside 
revolutionary violence, and to grasp these two activities not as mutually 
exclusive, but rather as complementary components of social struggles. 
And this was also possible before Kant. The intention of my essay is 
to insist on this complementarity. Critique and Revolution, critical 
discursivity and social struggles, the machines of textual criticism and 
the machines of social resistance do not have to be understood as 
mutually exclusive. When the relationship to text suspends the law of 
the law, then new social machines emerge. If a new social composition 
emerges in resistance, then a re-composition of the texts also results; the 
social organization form of an assemblage joins together with a new 
concatenation of conceptual and textual components. In fact, in my 
examples this social re-composition overlaps to a certain degree with re-
constructive textual critique. To support this thesis, in the following I 
would like to investigate both components of machinic 
complementarity, the text machine and the social machine.6 Instead of 
constructing and fixing the distance between two identical poles with 
terms such as ‘scholarly text production’ and ‘people’s revolt’, I want to 
focus on the zones of proximity between these two machines, especially 
on the modes in which they impel the suspension of judgment and the 
practice of re-composition. 
Critique as Discursive and Textual Machine 
In the beginning of the modern history of the concept of critique, there 
is textual criticism, and it consists primarily of the suspension of 
judgment that was practiced by the clergy as a Medieval monopoly on 
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interpreting the bible. The growing objections to the Christian principle 
of tradition and its privileging of the Fathers of the Church and the 
clergy as monopolists of exegesis took the scriptures away from the 
clergy as sole mediators.7 In the high and late Middle Ages, when the art 
of governing was largely a spiritual practice closely linked to the 
doctrine of the scriptures, this was exactly the point where governing, 
guiding people was attacked, resistance ran, not least of all, through the 
search for a different relationship to scripture: “Not wanting to be 
governed was a certain way of refusing, challenging, limiting (say it as 
you like) ecclesiastical rule” (Foucault, 1997a: 29). 
Foucault speaks here of a dimorphism, in which the clergy is on the 
one side and the laity on the other, an extreme development that 
represents “one of the starting points of pastoral counter-conduct” 
(Foucault, 2004a: 294). The monopoly on performing the sacraments, 
the practice of obligatory confession as a permanent tribunal, the 
inversion of asceticism into obedience, and not least of all the 
jurisdiction over the interpretation of the sacred scriptures, these are the 
central components of the pastorate. Counter to all of these 
components, however, there was also a pastoral counter-conduct in the 
form of short-circuiting, subverting and over-affirming the respective 
clerical coercion or monopoly. In the case of the scriptural monopoly 
this meant the repulsion of the pastor in the field of scriptures 
(Foucault, 2004a: 309). Critique as suspension of judgment meant here 
the suspension of the ‘pastoral relay’, suspension of the mediation of the 
scriptures through the clergy, suspension of teaching, and thus the self-
empowerment of the readers.8 
Following the late Medieval practice of resistance against the clerical 
scriptures monopoly, the concept of critique from antiquity was 
reanimated in the late fifteenth century.9 Roughly a hundred years later, 
the term entered into English and French from Latin. A hundred years 
after that, the word Kritik appeared for the first time in German, 
specifically in Gottlieb Stolle’s Concise Introduction to the History of Practical 
Learning. Here the early scientific systems theorist and historian Stolle 
(1673-1744) wrote a condensed definition of critique, summarizing its 
conceptual development in the last centuries and definitively closing, in 
a sense, the conceptual development from late Medieval resistance 
against the clerical scriptures monopoly. In this genealogy, Stolle’s 
definition emphasizes the specific significance of text critique and 
provides a concise representation of the object of this critique: 
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Critique commonly means an art of understanding the old authors, or 
making them understandable, of distinguishing what they wrote from 
what has been imputed to them or falsified, and improving or replacing 
what is spoiled. (Stolle, 1736: 117) 
I would like to use this probably first appearance of critique in German 
to take a closer look at the dense definition proposed here. The source 
is a ‘Historia Literaria’, which essentially collects bibliographical 
references to certain specialized questions; the definition of critique is 
the sentence that introduces the 18-page chapter ‘Von der Critica’. 
Gottlieb Stolle initially calls ‘Critica’ or ‘Critic’ an ‘art’. He does so in the 
tradition of the philological line of the ars critica, as it dominated the 
concept of critique since the end of the sixteenth century, in other 
words, critique essentially as text critique. In keeping with the sense of 
techne, of ars from antiquity, we may presume that a technique, a 
technical procedure of the philological discipline is to be designated 
here, which is subsequently made concrete. The ‘old authors’ are 
defined as the object of critique, thus also seeking and establishing the 
familiar reference to antiquity and its theory protagonists, which takes 
up the line intended to suspend, skip and explode the Medieval authority 
of the clergy. Yet ‘authors’ – or as Stolle writes, ‘auctores’ – also 
indicates the central concept of authorship, subjectifying and specifying 
the origin, which – as we will see – is not to be interpreted as an 
essentialist figure, so much as a simple root: the Latin noun auctor stems 
from the verb augeo, for multiplying. Auctor is hence a person who 
multiplies something or brings together several components that do not 
necessarily belong together.10 
What Critic first involves is to understand the old auctores. The next 
step, which was relatively surprising for the context of that time, 
expands this ‘understanding’ with ‘making understandable’. The crucial 
difference between ‘understand’ and ‘make understandable’ is the 
relation between a passive continuation of the tradition of interpretation 
in the old tracks of knowledge and ‘making understandable’ as a 
definitive productivity of critique. Critique is thus based not only on the 
appropriation of linguistic competence to be able to understand the 
texts, it also actively intervenes in the text production. It goes beyond 
obediently following the rules just as it goes beyond slavish re-
construction of the original text. 
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Critique should nevertheless ‘distinguish’, it remains an ars iudicandi, 
a technique of distinguishing. But what does distinguish mean, what is 
to be distinguished here? That which the ‘old authors’ ‘have written’ 
from that which ‘has been imputed to them or falsified’. It is not only 
the sense of an unambiguous writing that has been clearly passed on 
that is to be interpreted here; before that, critique seeks to distinguish 
what was written from what was falsified. For this, we must imagine the 
often fragmentary quality of the handwritten manuscripts as well as the 
manifold revisions, the complex interlocking of generations of 
manuscripts and the various degrees to which the texts have been 
‘spoiled’ through various circumstances ranging from fire to less 
talented scribes. Evident here is the knowledge that text production and 
text critique are processes. Aspects of imputing and falsifying reveal a 
process, which multiplies authorship, shifting the focus to the interests 
of the respective historical contexts and their subjects in understanding, 
interpreting, shifting or even obfuscating the origin in their own 
interest. All of these revisions of the existing original material are to be 
understood as a productive process of re-composition. Instead of 
introducing the distinction as an essentialist excavation of an origin, it is 
instead a matter of reinstituting a heterogenetic process: not a pure tree 
schema, at the head of which there is an original text and an auctor, but 
rather a much more winding practice of continual re-combination. 
And what results over the course of time is a gigantic and complex 
interlocking apparatus of philological method and auxiliary sciences, the 
visual representation of which in the positive or negative apparatus, 
which sometimes takes up a large portion of the page of a book, 
illustrates its apparatus-like character. Yet the history, linguistics, 
conjectures, translations, and the biographical and political contexts of 
the authors form not only a gigantic apparatus, but also a productive, 
abstract machine. The copyists not only copied and 
improved/deteriorated the texts, they also filled gaps with much 
imagination, sometimes refined the texts, corrected them ideologically, 
sometimes even continued them. Text critique involves more than 
distinguishing between the source and its multiple shifts, it also involves 
‘improving or replacing what is spoiled’. With the words ‘improve’ and 
‘replace’, Stolle positions critique in the terrain of re-construction and 
re-composition. And the re- in both these terms does not necessarily 
indicate a return to an origin that must be re-produced, but rather a 
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new, more suitable place. The result is a scope for re-composition, re-
invention.11 
Critique is thus to be understood as an interplay between the 
suspended iudicium and inventio, between the capacity for judgment, 
which in ‘making understandable’ clearly goes beyond the practice of 
empirically distinguishing in the sense of separation and exclusion, and 
invention that newly concatenates the (signifying) components. 
Critique as Social Machine 
Even before the re-invention of critique as text critique, Foucault 
discovered a resistive practice against the pastorate: in the religious 
struggles of the second half of the Middle Ages, in the revolts of 
mysticism, in the nests of resistance against the authority of clerical 
exegesis, not only was the Reformation prepared, but for Foucault they 
were also “the kind of historical limit upon which this critical attitude 
developed” (Foucault, 1997a: 64).12 Both before and as scholarly 
resistance arose, the self-empowerment of philology against the clerical 
exegesis monopoly and the application of philological critique to the 
biblical scriptures, social machines against mediation by the pastor also 
arise. What especially interested me was the historical basis of what 
Foucault took as the starting point for his explanations, what he also 
mentions as questions that were still open for him in the discussion of 
his lecture from 1978. Here he asks:  
If we were to explore this dimension of critique, would we not then find 
that it is supported by something akin to the historical practice of revolt, 
the non-acceptance of a real government, on one hand, or, on the other, 
the individual experience of the refusal of governmentality? (Foucault, 
1997a: 73) 
Foucault himself left this question open in his lecture. In his lectures on 
the history of governmentality held in the same year, there are ideas that 
continue on from this. Especially in the eighth lecture from 1 March 
1978, Foucault brings up numerous indications of the various 
resistances against the pastorate in the late Middle Ages (Foucault, 2004: 
278). Yet Foucault did not really close the gap here either. His method 
remained eclectic and purposely on the surface. He listed the most 
important movements on the constantly shifting border between 
internal and external criticism of the church, referred occasionally to 
single specific features of these movements that tested a different 
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conduct, a counter-conduct.13 Not only witchcraft and the familiar 
heresies, but also a multitude of smaller and larger anormalities at the 
margins of ecclesiastical immanence are mentioned here. Waldensians, 
Utraquists, Calixtines, Taborites, Amalricans, Flagellanti, the mysticism 
of the Rhine nuns, the Society of the Poor and Jeanne Dabenton, 
Beguines and Beghards, the Brethren of the Free Spirit and Marguerite 
Porete populate the space and time of this marginal cartography of 
counter-conduct especially in the twelfth to the fifteenth century 
(Foucault, 2004a: 285, 306). 
However, Foucault does not go into detail about any of these 
examples of counter-conduct. The reason for his limitation to a 
movement along the surface certainly has something to do with the 
precarious source material, which is marked by the fact that sources 
from the perspective of the actors hardly exist, because the Inquisition 
so thoroughly destroyed them. This forced fragmentarity, however, also 
has an implicit quality. This made it possible for Foucault to collect 
single aspects from every possible area, which constitute individual and 
collective counter-conduct in (not only) the late Middle Ages: the 
election and the option of deposing the pastor among the Taborites, the 
new forms of ‘counter-society’ among the Society of the Poor, the 
emphasis on communal property and the rejection of personal 
ownership of goods. All of these are components of an abstract 
machine that assails the dimorphism of priests and laity, in which the 
suspension of the Christian pastorate goes hand in hand with the re-
composition and re-invention of social organization.14 These forms of 
counter-conduct have their specific features, but this remains a “non-
autonomous specificity” (Foucault, 2004a: 286). This means they 
develop in the connection with political revolts against power as 
sovereignty, with economic revolts against power as exploitation. Most 
of all, though, “these revolts of conduct, these resistances of conduct 
are equally linked with a very different, but decisive problem, namely the 
status of women” (Foucault, 2004a: 285).15 
When I look more closely in the following at one of the movements 
central to this question, then I am exploring somewhat below Foucault’s 
eclectic probing maneuver on the surface of counter-conduct in the 
high and late Middle Ages. I mainly limit myself to the thirteenth and 
early fourteenth century and to a single movement, but one that left 
traces throughout broad sections of Europe: the Beguines.16 At the turn 
of the twelfth to the thirteenth century, a new type of religious or semi-
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religious form of living crystallized primarily in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, in the Rhineland and in northern Italy (Dinzelbacher, 
1993: 21-23). The mulieres religiosae, the pious, honorable women who 
were soon called by the collective name Beguines (Leicht, 2001: 99), 
lived unmarried and in poverty, or more strongly formulated: in the 
rejection of the marital dominance of men and in the rejection of 
wealth, which was also understood at the time in the sense of a rejection 
of power and higher position.17 However, they lived without a fixed 
ecclesiastical rule, such as that which defines life in a religious order. 
Not least of all, due to this lack of a rule, they could also leave the 
community at any time, because they had not taken a vow of eternal 
obedience. This means that the Beguines were border-crossers, who 
were always and from the start in danger of being thrown into the 
outside of ecclesiastical immanence.18 Depending on the interpretation 
of the authorities, geographical and historical context and the 
conclusions of various practices of divine judgment, they were 
persecuted or revered, landed on the lists of heretics or later in the 
calendar of saints. 
The rise of the Beguine movement emerged not at all primarily as a 
revolt against worldly rule, but rather out of the desire for a suspension 
of the clerical-patriarchal order and the everyday misogyny that 
permeated all classes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As Foucault 
described it (2004a: 302-7), alongside the failed conduct of the clergy, it 
was primarily the growing dissatisfaction with the sacramental power of 
the priests that gradually incited a threatening perforation of the 
dimorphism between clergy and the laity. In the case of women there 
was an additional reason not to accept the alternative or early marriage 
or entry a cloister. The suspension of this alternative led them directly 
into the risky experiment of trying out a non-institutionalized, non-
secured, non-protected way of living. 
The desire for alternative forms of living generated essentially three 
practices of the Beguines, the withdrawal into the hermitage as an 
anchoress, the collective practice of living together without the rule of 
an order, and finally the nomadic practice of the mendicant wandering 
preacher. 
1. First the mystical practice of the anchoresses: this is essentially a 
technique of radical self-isolation, but does not only consist solely of a 
hermit existence, of the complete withdrawal of a hermit into solitude. 
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The anchoress’ hermitage was sometimes also attached to a church and 
furnished so that the anchoress could also take part in the mass. 
Ecstasy, trances, visions, and finally the unio mystica (mystic union as the 
bride of Christ) marked the anchoress' specific way of living; direct 
experience of God, the rapture or the enthousiasmos of God were the 
highest aim, and guidance from the confessor was the transformed 
remainder of ecclesiastical order. Here one should think about 
Foucault’s distinction between asceticism and obedience that would 
even shift the ascetic practice of the anchoresses into a light of 
disobedience towards church power, or as Foucault says: “a kind of 
raging and inverted obedience” (2004a: 301). However, here is not the 
place to go into this in more detail and especially more critically, and 
what I am interested in here is primarily the aspect of re-composition in 
the context of the Beguines. 
2. When the suspension of judgment is found here in the suspension 
of divine judgment (=ordeal) and clerical order, this means not only a 
movement of defecting from the extreme ecclesiastical order, but also a 
dangerous attempt to live without rule, beyond the discipline of the 
institutional order. The Beguines founded unofficial religious 
communities living in one or more houses, later entire city districts. A 
collective alternative form of living emerged in self-organization as 
fleeing from the practice of confession as a permanent trial, from 
penance and reconciliation imposed from outside, from the double 
domination by men and priests. Whereas entering a cloister was a final 
decision, leaving the community at any time remained open to the 
Beguines and with that also leaving the voluntary abstinence from sex. 
3. Finally, however, along with these radically individual and 
collective practices of being settled in one place, there was also a 
Beguine form of living in movement: vagabond, nomadic Beguines who 
regarded themselves as homeless mendicants (Cohn, 1970: 163). Initially 
the nomadic existence of the Beguines was an analogy to their notion of 
a spiritual path leading through detours and wandering without plan or 
destination through a difficult terrain. Like their male counterparts, the 
Beghards, however, these Beguines concretely led a deliberately 
impoverished life of wandering based on the pillars of begging and 
preaching. 
More or less public preaching, sometimes in more out-of-the-way 
places, sometimes in central squares, was probably imagined as an act of 
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provocation. Women like Hildegard von Bingen or Marguerite Porete 
who appeared in public, tested a rare form of female presence, but 
probably provoked the authorities all the more for it. The Beguines 
were easily attacked, since they belonged to no order, but the forms of 
living they practiced and propagated were also subject to persecution: 
recompositio and inventio, re-composition and re-invention, take on a 
dangerous tone here, because the new, ‘new fashions’ and ‘unheard of 
innovations’ were terms associated with the novi doctores, the heretics 
(Dinzelbacher, 1993: 21-23). In this respect, the bishops attacked both 
the anchoresses’ way of living, as the ecstasy of the brides of Christ was 
especially condemned as immoderate, and that of the nomadic 
Beguines, whose wandering way of life was also read as excessive 
(Dinzelbacher, 1993: 37).19 What was left – although increasingly 
regulated – was only the middle form of communal living under the 
control of worldly and ecclesiastical authorities. Towards the end of the 
thirteenth century, the attacks became increasingly massive, the border 
between inside and outside the church was clearly drawn again20: some 
were integrated into Catholic order, were accommodated in manageable 
city districts, were compelled to withdraw into communities with 
orderly ecclesiastical surveillance, regulation and institutionalization; 
others were increasingly exposed to persecution, condemnation and 
burning (Cohn, 1970: 165), or they made the transition into the 
clandestine. It may be supposed that under this pressure there was a 
development similar to the one asserted by Norman Cohn for the 
Beghards: the wandering Beguines also withdrew from the public 
practice of preaching and begging in “conspirational understanding 
which they were able to develop with certain of the Beguine 
communities” (Cohn, 1970: 162). This results in a new re-composition, 
or at least a re-ordering of the functions of settled and nomadic 
Beguines. Whereas the nomadic Beguines were able to continue their 
practice of preaching in the community houses, through this clandestine 
combination of moving and static elements, even communication with 
far distant Beguine centers was maintained (Cohn, 1970: 166). 
When I talk about a suspension of (divine) judgment in the context 
of the Beguine movement, I am not at all imputing a turning away from 
Christian practices, but rather the attempt to intensify, reinterpret and 
rewrite them, the excessive application and outdoing of the rule, the 
over-affirmation and exaggeration of the regulations: to the extent that 
Beguines exercised ecstatic practices, they were able to draw on non-
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biblical messages, the direct access to Jesus Christ in their mystical 
experiences. The knowledge of God grounded in experience (cognito Dei 
experimentalis) entered into competition with the mediating role of the 
church. The revelation experiences were thus not only supernatural, but 
also unmediated (self-)authorization, which went beyond the original 
authority of scripture, as well as beyond the mediating authority of the 
clergy. 
Along with this privileged access to God, which was primarily 
reserved to the anchoresses, there was also a direct attack on the 
scripture monopoly of the clergy. The Beguines used their knowledge of 
the bible to develop their own form of living and to become 
autonomous from the monopoly of the clergy (Gnädinger, 1987: 223). 
The type of relationship the Beguines had to exegesis is evident not only 
in this emancipation process, but also in the fact that they already 
attempted to translate the bible into French in the twelfth century, that 
they presumably interpreted its mysteries and discussed it in secular 
assemblies and even in the street (Cohn, 1970: 161; Gnädinger, 1987: 
223, 229). Not only the bible was interpreted and translated 
autonomously, but the Beguines also wrote texts. Even in the 
interweaving of experiential mysticism and theoretical mysticism, 
however, they did not use Latin as the language of scholars, but rather 
Middle Low German, other German dialects or French.21 And these 
self-assured texts are, not least of all, also invectives against the 
established theology (Leicht, 1999: 108), implicit and explicit criticism of 
the clergy. 
In this context, critique must also be seen as a search for alternative 
forms of living, different from the marital dominance, clerical and 
patriarchal order, and as a struggle for education, as a struggle over 
language, as a struggle for broader knowledge production. The social 
machine of the Beguines is not to be decoupled from the text machine 
that gradually and increasingly arose against the monopoly of the pastor. 
The concatenation of the two machines is the crucial indication of the 
quality of critique. 
And this brings me back to the opening question of the specific 
place of critique in the conceptual assemblage of expressions for the 
forms and forces of resistance. Of course, there should not be an overly 
hasty link made here between the historical and the current; space must 
be left for querying historical shifts both in terms of the text function 
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and in terms of the social re-compositions. The late Medieval 
concatenation of text critique and social machine undoubtedly follows a 
different mode than the opposition of an economic power as difficult to 
grasp as capitalism, which was central to the Marxian concept of critique 
in the nineteenth century. And if today we negotiate the position of the 
‘general intellect’, a collective and militant intellectuality in post-Fordist 
cognitive capitalism, this in turn means a new challenge for the various 
forms of critique as suspension and re-composition. Nevertheless, the 
place of critique is there, where the social machines of resistance are 
concatenated with text machines. What has made the concept of 
critique so relevant and so controversial in various phases of 
modernism, is the struggle against decoupling text machines and social 
machines, their concatenations, overlaps and superimpositions. 
 
Notes 
*  For suggestions and critical advice, I would like to thank Aileen Derieg, 
Isabell Lorey and Stefan Nowotny. 
1.  This essay is a revised version of the introductory lecture for the eipcp 
conference ‘The Art of Critique’, at the Kunsthalle Exnergasse in Vienna in 
April 2008 (cf. http://transform.eipcp.net/Actions/discursive/ 
artofcritique). 
2.  “[W]hose intent was to allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of 
itself” (Foucault, 1997a: 61). 
3.  Foucault contrasts this test of legitimacy with the strange concept of 
‘eventualization’ (Foucault, 1997a: 49). 
4.  His question describes the movement of deserting from this specific 
connection to the figure of not being governed like that: “In what way can 
the effects of coercion […] not be dissipated by a return to the legitimate 
destination of knowledge and by a reflection on the transcendental or semi-
transcendental that fixes knowledge, but how can they instead be reversed 
or released from within a concrete strategic field, this concrete strategic field 
that induced them, starting with this decision not to be governed” 
(Foucault: 1997a: 60)? 
5.  Foucault (2005: 702): “The point in brief is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that 
takes the form of a possible transgression.” This also illuminates the 
somewhat confusing conceptual shift from the critical attitude to the critical 
project. What Kant originally describes as Aufklärung clearly separates from 
critique, and finally dissipates into a notion of critique that is solely a 
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critique of knowledge, which for Foucault is “very much what I was trying 
before to describe as critique, this critical attitude which appears as a 
specific attitude in the Western world starting with what was historically, I 
believe, the great process of society’s governmentalization” (Foucault, 
1997a: 34). 
6.  These are also two main strands that Foucault indicates with his reference 
to pre-Reformation ‘religious struggles’ on the one hand and the “spiritual 
attitudes prevalent during the second half of the Middle Ages” on the other, 
when discussing the genealogy of the critical attitude (Foucault, 1997a: 64). 
7.  On the emergence of critica sacra, cf. Kosseleck (1976: 87-89); and Gürses 
(2006). 
8.  “The pastor can comment, he can explain what is unclear, he can name 
what is important, but this occurs in every case so that the reader can read 
the Holy Scriptures himself” (Foucault, 2004: 309). 
9.  The Italian humanist Angelo Poliziano, in his lecture about Aristotle’s 
‘Analytica priora’ in 1492, ties into the terminology from antiquity, ascribing 
to the critici the sole right to judge and improve writings. 
10.  Giorgio Agamben points this out in State of Exception (2005). Agamben sees 
the specific function of the auctoritas in contrast to potestas precisely where it 
is a matter of suspending right: “It is a force that suspends and reactivates 
right, but gives it no formal validity.” 
11.  There is something involved here that Cicero and Quintilian already 
addressed in conjunction with critique, but still clearly distinguished from 
critique in the narrower sense, from ars iudicandi. The recompositio, the re-
composition of the text, is also accompanied by a component of inventio or 
of ars inveniendi. Quintilian emphasizes, for instance, in the institutio oratoria, 
describing the meticulous and scrupulous character of the dialectical 
discussion of scholars, “that they claim for themselves both the part of 
invention and that of judgment, the first of which they call topic, the second 
critique.” Quintilian (Inst. orat. V, 14, 28): “ut qui sibi et inveniendi et iudicandi 
vindicent partis, quarum alteram topikén, alteram kritikén vocant.” 
12.  And he continues: “[T]hese experiences, these spiritual movements have 
very often been used as attire, vocabulary, but even more so as ways of 
being, and ways of supporting the hopes expressed by the struggle” 
(Foucault, 1997a: 74). 
13.  Foucault (2004a: 282): “By that I mean that these are movements that have 
a different conduct as their goal, which means wanting to be conducted 
differently, by other conductors [conducteur] and by other pastors, to different 
goals and to different forms of salvation, by means of other procedures and 
other methods.” Cf. also Foucault (2004a: 288): “an aspect of the search for 
a different conduct, for a being-conducted-differently, by other people, to 
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goals other than that which is provided for by the official, visible and 
recognizable governmentality of society.” 
14.  At this point Foucault repeats the familiar figure that resistance should not 
be understood as a subsequent reaction: rather than a linear sequence of 
action (by power) and resistance, there is “an immediate and fundamental 
correlation between conduct and counter-conduct” (Foucault, 2004a: 284). 
15.  In the early 13th century policies for women were more prohibitive in 
recognized orders such as the Premonstratensians, and at the same time 
there was a strong increase in the number of women joining the 
Waldensians, who initially instituted religious equality. Here women were 
permitted to preach, baptize, grant absolution, and celebrate the Eucharist. 
16.  See Cohn (1970: especially 148-186); Gnädinger (1987: 215-39); Vaneigem 
(1993: especially chapters 31 and 32); Dinzelbacher (1993; 1998: 13-30); 
Leicht (1999); Jantzen (2001: 29-44). 
17.  Initially this development was based on intercessions from bishops and 
permission from the Pope. At the intercession of Bishop Jakob von Virty, 
Pope Honorius III allowed pious women in France and Germany “to live 
together without assuming an approved order in common houses and to 
hold sermons for their mutual edification” (Dinzelbacher, 1993: 36). 
18.  The Beguines moved at the margins of the pastorate and brought a certain 
change to its limits at the same time. This relationship between limit and 
immanence corresponds with a figure that I call immanent transgression: 
transgressing a limit that does not presume the existence of a radical 
outside, into which the transgression of the limit is supposed to lead, but 
rather which changes the limit and the immanence. In his ‘Preface to 
Transgression’ from 1963, Foucault writes about Bataille and transgression 
as a ‘gesture that applies to the limit’. And many years later, in 1978, this 
concept of transgression returns: “This philosophical ethos may be 
characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of 
rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have 
to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting 
upon limits” (Foucault, 1997a). 
19.  It is doubtful, however, that the promiscuity, negation of sinfulness, 
complete absence of moral ideals, such as Cohn (1970: 179) presumes for 
the Brethren of the Free Spirit as ‘mystical anarchism’, also applied to the 
Beguines. 
20.  Official stages of this development are 1274, the Council of Lyon, the 
Provincial Synodes in Cologne, 1307, and in Mainz and Trier in 1310, and 
finally the general ban of Begine forms of living by the Council of Vienne, 
1311/12 (Leicht, 1999: 98). In 1317 the Bishop of Straßburg “organized the 
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first regular episcopal inquisition on German soil” (Cohn, 1970: 165; 
Dinzelbacher, 1993: 55-58). 
21.  Hadewijch, Beatrijs von Nazareth and Mechthild von Magdeburg wrote in 
German, Marguerite Porete in French (Gnädinger, 1987: 225; Dinzelbacher, 
1993: 20). 
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Attempt to Think the Plebeian: 
Exodus and Constituting as Critique 
Isabell Lorey 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
Critique is not a position outside the realm of modes of governing, it is 
an attitude that keeps struggles virulent. Critique is the ongoing 
questioning of the way of being governed. Against the background of 
these succinct theses by Foucault (1997a, 2000: 347), it is possible to 
focus on the fundamental fragility and instability of governmental 
circumstances. Questioning naturalized, stable circumstances means not 
only showing that things have become as they are and can therefore be 
changed again, but also, as Foucault says in his text on critique, always 
principally thinking the possible disappearance of certain relations of 
government. 
With and beyond Foucault, I would like to propose an immanent 
manner of resistive critique, in which rejection and refusal can be 
understood as a productive practice. When I speak of refusal as critique 
in the following, I want to introduce refusal in a seemingly paradoxical 
movement not as a simple negation, but rather as productivity. In 
addition, I want to show how it becomes imaginable to elude certain 
relations of government, specifically not as entering an outside of power 
relations, but rather as an immanent exodus. 
In the winter of 1977, a year before his text on critique, Foucault 
gave an interview entitled ‘Powers and Strategies’, in which he clarified 
his understanding of critique and resistance with the help of a new 
contextualization. In this conversation Foucault brought up, in a 
relatively abrupt and brief way, the example of the plebeians, the social 
formation representing a foundation of the Roman Republic.1 
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This brief reference from Foucault is also interesting, because the 
interview was conducted by Jacques Rancière, who would later base his 
political theory, not least of all, on the relationship of domination 
between patricians and plebeians. However, Rancière subjected ancient 
Roman history from the fifth century BCE to a relatively abbreviated 
and shifted reading that would not be an example for the understanding 
of critique and resistance that I want to represent here (Rancière, 2002: 
35). 
I find Foucault’s brief mention of the plebeians considerably more 
interesting, although he does not historically analyze them, but instead 
introduces them as an abstract figure of resistance and critique (the 
plebeian). He writes:  
The ‘plebs’ certainly have no sociological reality. However, there is 
always something in the body of society, in the classes, the groups and 
in the individuals themselves, which evades power relations in a certain 
sense; something that is not more or less malleable or recalcitrant raw 
material, but rather a centrifugal movement, a contrary, liberated energy. 
(Foucault, 2003: 542) 
This is an important thought for what I would like to show; here 
Foucault considers the recalcitrant as belonging to that which is 
‘formed’, better perhaps as that which emerges through power relations. 
What evades them, on the other hand, he calls ‘contrary’, centrifugal. 
The centrifugal refers to the energy of fleeing away from the center. 
What evades power relations is a force that flees, e-vades, departs. 
Critique can be understood accordingly as fleeing.2 Foucault continues:  
‘The’ plebs undoubtedly do not exist, but there is ‘something’ plebeian. 
There is something plebeian in the bodies and souls, it is in the 
individual, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, but with various 
expansions, forms, energies and origins. The part of the plebs forms 
less of an outside in relation to the power relations, but rather perhaps 
their boundaries, their flip-side, their echo. (Foucault, 2003: 542) 
And further, this plebeian “reacts to every advance of power with an 
evading movement; this motivates every new development of the 
constellation of power” (2003: 542). For this reason, it is indispensable 
for every analysis of dispositifs of power to assume the ‘perspective of the 
plebs’, specifically that of the reverse side and the boundary of power. 
In order to think ‘the plebeian’, I would like to briefly recount a part of 
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the more or less ‘actual’ history of the plebeians, specifically the start of 
the struggles with the patricians at the beginning of the Roman 
Republic. Let us return to the period in the early fifth century BCE. I 
will subsequently transform the strategic struggles of the plebeians into 
an abstract figure again, in order to understand critique and resistance as 
productive refusal. 
In telling of the struggles between the patricians and plebeians, I 
refer primarily to the line of the historiography of Titus Livius. The 
Roman historiographer wrote a chronology of the political history of 
Rome beginning with the time of the kings in the sixth century BCE up 
to the time of his own life, the period of the principality of Augustus in 
the first century BCE. In other words, Livius was writing almost 400 
years after the events to be recounted now. There are no written sources 
for this period, for which reason, among others, Livius’ account has had 
such a strong historical influence. It is relatively certain that Livius 
would have had no interest in the reading I offer of what the plebeians 
were doing in the early fifth century BCE in Rome. In his 
historiography he was primarily interested in highlighting the strengths 
and the glory of Rome and representing the history in such a way that it 
necessarily culminated in the rule of Augustus. This is one reason why 
Livius, in all his detailed representations of conflicts, ultimately always 
emphasizes the concordia, the Roman concord. 
The conflicts that interest me here are those between the patricians, 
the Roman aristocracy, and the plebeians, a very heterogeneous mixture 
of mostly Roman peasants, who were differently positioned, especially 
economically, but who were all considered ‘free’ in terms of personal 
status; they were not slaves, but they had few political rights. We find 
ourselves at the beginning of the Roman Republic. The last tyrannical 
king had been driven out a few years before, and a republic was 
established under the rule of the patricians. Republican order could not 
yet be characterized as stable, and patricians and plebeians did not form 
a homogeneous group. My focus on the events of the early Roman 
Republic consists of the question of how that which is called ‘secession’ 
in the ancient sources can be understood as a political division or 
separation, specifically as the departure of the plebeians from Rome. I 
would like to theorize this event as ‘exodus’. 
Livius places the history of the first of three secessions explicitly in 
the context of military service and indebtedness: according to his 
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account, around 495 BCE the situation in Rome became increasingly 
tense in terms of both domestic and foreign policies. The conflict 
between the patrician senators and the plebs broke out especially 
because of the plebeians who had ended up in debt bondage, were in 
other words economically dependent on a patrician patron. Then these 
indebted plebeians protested increasingly audibly that they were 
permitted to risk their lives for the freedom of Rome, but in times of 
peace were kept in servitude as a kind of serf (Liv. 2,23,1-2).3 
Following several victorious wars against the Volsci, Sabines and 
Aurunci, a promised edict was not granted, a decree that had promised 
the plebeians security and protection of property and familia during a 
campaign. Debt bondage was not ended. The patrician senators feared 
rebellions and conspiracies among the plebeians, but as creditors they 
supported the further disregard of the decree (Liv. 2,31,7 ff.; 2,32,1). 
For this reason, they attempted again to obligate the plebeians fit for 
military service to the existing pledge of allegiance and gave the legions 
the command march out of the city because of a presumably expected 
attack. According to Livius, “that accelerated the outbreak of outrage” 
(Liv. 2,32,1). 
The armed plebeian men, following Livius’ dramatic account, then 
considered whether they should murder the consuls to prevent 
conscription. Instead of implementing these kinds of ideas, however, 
the plebeians fit for military service did something completely different: 
they refused and withdrew, according to Livius, “without command 
from the consuls to the Sacred Mountain” (Liv. 2,32,2), to a hill outside 
the boundaries of Rome and thus beyond the sphere of influence of the 
patrician rulers. This exodus from Rome marks the first secession of the 
plebeians. 
The exodus of the plebeians, going out of the city, beyond the 
boundaries of the city, means revealing the boundary of the patrician 
dominated power relations at the same time. Becoming aware of the 
boundary also means leaving, withdrawing, and thus no longer taking 
this boundary as an absolute horizon. Foucault writes that the plebeian 
“forms less of an outside in relation to the power relationships, but 
perhaps its boundary instead” (Foucault, 2003: 542). The exodus does 
not lead into a beyond the realm of power. Instead it involves a 
withdrawal and leaving that results in a centrifugal force, which 
motivates a “new development of the assemblage of power”. The plebs 
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dynamized the demarcation of patrician dominated power relationships, 
the structure of power in Rome began to move, to change. 
The plebeians’ strategy of fighting for their political, economic and 
legal goals with a secession is still extremely unusual today. No 
indications can be found in the existing sources that this could have 
involved a civil war, nor even a singled armed battle between patrician 
and plebeian men. The struggle against patrician rule consisted at first 
exclusively in disobedience. It was a refusal of obedience in both 
military and political terms, a revocation of the acceptance of 
constraining patrician power. 
Those who refused, without using their weapons to fight, were the 
armed plebeian men.4 In other words, they were the ones who, under 
other circumstances, defended Rome and thus always also its patrician 
dominated power relationships against warring attackers from the 
outside. These plebeians then withdrew from armed battle to enforce 
their internal political and economic interests. They refused allegiance to 
the patricians, both as commanders and as creditors. 
This revocation of the acceptance of patrician power through refusal 
and exodus from political and economic limitation is an example for the 
questioning, the rejection of the acceptableness, the self-evidence of 
modes of governing that Foucault addresses in his text on critique. And 
according to the post-Operaist philosopher Paolo Virno, this 
revocation, this refusal can be called ‘radical disobedience’ (Virno, 
2004a: 69), because with their exodus, the plebeians eluded the 
jurisdiction of laws and commands. It was important to Livius to write 
that it was “without command from the consuls” (Liv. 2,32,2) that the 
plebeians went out to the sacred mountain. The plebs eluded by leaving. 
They not only acted here on their own authority, but with their action 
they fundamentally questioned the imperium, the consuls’ authority of 
command, in other words the structure of public rule in Rome. 
In this respect the secession of the plebeians can be understood as 
exodus. However, it is not the form of exodus of the Israelites, who did 
not return to Egypt (Walzer, 1986). The exodus of the Plebeians 
signified a strategy of self-constitution as a political alliance. And at the 
same time, the exodus, the withdrawal through departure, is a means of 
pressure and threat to express political demands for rights. 
When they arrived on the sacred mountain, as Livius continues the 
story, the plebeian men set up a strong camp without being attacked or 
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attacking. During their stay on the sacred mountain, the plebeians 
formed an alliance with an oath and agreed in sacred laws to install 
plebeian tribunes for their protection and to achieve their political 
interests. These tribuni plebis were to be invulnerable, sacrosanct and 
have a right to aid for the plebs. Negotiators and the patriciate accepted 
these demands of the now constituted plebs. From this point on, the 
plebs were granted their own sacrosanct officials, and anyone who 
‘violated’ the tribuni plebis faced the death penalty. Following the election 
of two tribunes the plebeians returned to Rome (Liv. 2,32,4-33,3; 3,55,7; 
3,55,10). 
The plebeians departed three times, three times they returned, as 
their struggle was for a republican political legal order in Rome. From 
the beginning, the plebeian exodus was thus not something ‘new’ in the 
sense of founding a city of their own with its own constitution. Yet it 
was also not solely a reaction, but rather an action specifically because 
this withdrawal was the first act for a newly invented constituting. This 
constituting, along with the plebeian power/order emerging in it, 
heralded the instrument and the weapon for intervening in the existing 
patrician power and rulership order that had become endangered and 
unstable due to the exodus. There was no new order thus created in a 
new place, but rather an ‘alternative’ order as a means of intervention 
(Fiori, 1996). First of all, however, the plebeian exodus called the power 
relationships radically into question, because secession meant eluding 
binarity, the binarity between command/law on the one hand and revolt 
on the other, in order to return again with a shared capacity and fight. 
In Livius’ account, the capacity space of the plebeian, so to speak, is the 
sacred mountain a few miles outside the city. It is the space of alliance 
and organizing. 
Without sufficient political rights and without any representation of 
interests, the plebeians invented themselves in a sense independently 
from the existing patrician order and structures of rule as capable of 
political action. Their strategy for this consisted primarily in a self-
empowerment that I would like to consider with the term constituent 
power.5 
In keeping with the various meanings of the Latin verb constituo, the 
term ‘constituent’ power moves in a semantic field of ‘situate’, 
‘together’, ‘set’, ‘settle’, but also ‘to decide’, ‘to create’ and ‘to determine’. 
The prefix con- imbues constituo with a strong meaning of the shared, of 
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joint situating. This line of meaning is the basis for “common agreement 
and decision-making, ‘con-stituting’ in other words, found a common 
‘con-stitution’”, as Gerald Raunig puts it in his essay in the last section 
of this volume. 
Against this background the plebs assembled on the sacred 
mountain as a community of interests, as an alliance: according to 
Livius, they settled themselves there ‘securely’, in a strong camp with 
wall and moat and, as he emphasizes, “without leaders” (Liv. 2,32,4). 
No one forced or led the plebeians, they (re-)moved (themselves) 
together, giving themselves tribunes as representatives only in a second 
step. The formation as an alliance initially developed without leadership, 
without being led and governed. It was only in the process of 
constituting that representation first emerged, only then were the 
tribunes elected. 
The plebeians decided to bind themselves together with an oath and 
to secure themselves politically and legally by their own authority 
through the alliance outside patrician-defined legality. When I speak of a 
‘plebeian’ constituent power, I mean this capacity to join together, to 
protect and defend oneself based on a refusal of obedience. 
This form of critique, the refusal of obedience is, in this sense, a 
productive practice. Productivity relates to the constituting, the 
composition, productivity refers to the centrifugal force and the 
constituent capacity. Constituent plebeian power is the capacity of 
composition, of constituting an order of one’s own, which means the 
capacity for (self-)organizing. The plebeians constituted themselves as a 
political community of interests, not as a rigid order that separated itself 
permanently in Rome to oppose the patricians in an equally rigid 
dichotomous relationship. Rather, the constituent power of the plebs 
affected a flexible order, which instigated a political, legal and economic 
transformation process, ultimately leading in 287 BCE into the Lex 
Hortensia. This law determined that the plebiscite also officially no 
longer represented only the decrees and resolutions of the plebeians, but 
was now ‘legally’ binding for everyone living in Rome. 
The plebeian constituent power, this capacity is thus instituted in 
several acts: first the withdrawal through departure, the exodus, then 
through the act of the oath and legislation, and finally through the 
creation of an office, the holders of which, the tribuni plebis, are to 
protect the plebs with the threat of the most severe punishment for 
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their violation. With these acts the plebeians turned their meager 
political capacity into such a potent power that they were armed for 
conflicts with the patricians. 
The exodus and the self-constitution of the plebs modified the 
power relationships in which the struggles of order between plebs and 
patriciate took place, instead of accepting the power of the patricians as 
an immutable horizon. Yet the battle strategy of the plebeian men is one 
that is in turn limited and does not question, revoke or reject 
relationships of power and domination beyond one’s own interests. 
Throughout all the confrontations between plebs and the patriciate, the 
domination of the pater familias in the domus was not fundamentally 
questioned, just as little as slavery was. 
For an abstract figure of resistive critique, it must also be stated 
again in this framework: the capacity of a constituent power always 
remains limited itself as well, produces exclusions and always also 
manifests certain relationships of power and domination instead of 
rejecting, reversing or even making them disappear. Eluding 
constraining power relationships is only possible to the degree, only 
with the means available for becoming aware of the limitation. There is 
not one way of rejection, not one way of withdrawal, not one way of 
critique, but always only specifically limited ways that are differently 
actualized. Nevertheless, what is true for plebeian struggles is that they 
change the contexts in which a problem emerges as a problem, rather 
than choosing one or another solution already offered. They change the 
assemblage of power and multiply the power relationships.6 
Without the constituting of the plebeian, power relationships appear 
as the power, as relationships of domination without alternatives, the 
boundaries of which purportedly signify the horizon. The plebeian must 
be constituted, otherwise it remains a potentiality that inevitably 
emerges in power relationships. It is only when it is constituted as the 
plebeian and thereby evades limitations that it newly composes itself. 
The plebeian always signifies an immanent refusal; that is why it is 
productive. The plebeian is the capacity to productively refuse power 
relations and elude them in this way, whereby the assemblage of power 
permanently changes and one or the other constraining mode of 
governing vanishes. 
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Notes 
1.  My own reflections on the plebeian, which are only briefly sketched in the 
following, are part of a larger study of the Roman struggles of order 
between the patricians and the plebeians and a resultant political theory of 
immunization. 
2.  The concept of fleeing is not a slip on Foucault’s part; in 1982, only a few 
years before his death, he wrote: There is “no relationship of power without 
the means of escape or possible flight” (Foucault, 2003: 346). 
3.  See Titus Livius (=Livy), Ab urbe condita, http://www.thelatin 
library.com/ liv.html. 
4.  The plebeian men fought with the exodus from Rome for their ‘full’ 
political freedom, meaning to be regarded as ‘free’ to the same degree as 
patrician men. The free Roman women, patrician and plebeian women, 
were regarded as free only to a limited extent, as they were subject to the 
authority of their pater familias or their husband. Female and male slaves had 
no personal rights at all in the Roman Republic, they were considered 
‘unfree’. 
5.  This not only ties into central theorems of political history, such as Antonio 
Negri’s ‘Repubblica Constituente: Umrisse einer konstituierenden Macht’, 
published in Negri, Lazzarato and Virno (1998: 67-82), Raunig (2007: 59-
66), and Negri (1999). The term ‘constituent power’ also ultimately signifies 
a continuation of appraisals of secession in antiquity studies (cf. Wieacker, 
1988: 379; Mommsen, 1971: 274; and Ungern-Sternberg, 2001: 314). 
6.  Here I subscribe to Virno’s ideas (2004a: 70). 
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Inside and Outside the Art Institution: 
Self-Valorization and Montage in 
Contemporary Art 
Marcelo Expósito 
(Translated by Nuria Rodríguez, supervised by Aileen Derieg) 
This text was written on 1 October 2006 as a broad and immediate 
response (hence, its ‘informal’ style) to a short questionnaire posed by a 
Spanish digital magazine on contemporary art and critical theory. It was 
not published; it is reproduced here almost unaltered. The original 
questions have been replaced by epigraphs describing the subject matter 
that the different sections dealt with. 
The title of this text paraphrases an important essay by the German-
American art historian Benjamin H.D. Buchloh: ‘Allegorical Procedures: 
Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art’. Written in 1982, 
Buchloh’s influential essay sought to provide an explicitly political and 
historically grounded approach (going back to particular instances of 
politicization in the classic avant-garde movements, such as John 
Heartfield’s photomontage) to specific practices that, beginning in the 
late 1970s but more emphatically during the 1980s, opposed the 
hegemony of the market within the arts institution – with its emphasis 
on strong notions of ‘work’ and ‘artist’ – through methodologies like the 
appropriation of images and the reinvention of montage. The (not quite 
fully-developed) hypothesis underlying my text is that the procedures 
analyzed by Buchloh were neutralized by the new hegemonies at the 
heart of the arts institution, which were, however, integrated into (or are 
in a sense the starting point for) the new forms of ‘unbounded’ 
politicization of artistic practice that have been taking place in 
synchrony with the laborious production of a new cycle of struggles, 
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which originated in the late 1980s and has filled the past decade with a 
series of explosions.  
Another aspect of my hypothesis that needs to be developed 
suggests that the certain exhaustion of those same critical practices of 
appropriation and montage that Buchloh’s essay tried to endow with 
critical and political meaning was precisely due to their ‘confinement’ 
within the margins of the arts institution, and the central importance 
they continued to give the very institution that they criticized because of 
its role as virtually the only space of legitimization and valorization. 
Some new forms of politicization of artistic practices based themselves 
on the assumptions established by these earlier critical practices, putting 
into practice various kinds of ‘going beyond’, as well as going ‘in and 
out’ of the institution and using other processes that deny, displace or 
relativize the arts institution’s centrality as a space for valorization and 
legitimization. As explained below, it seems appropriate to apply the 
Operaist notion of the ‘self-valorization’ of labor to these processes. 
A Critique of the Traditional Division of Artistic Labor 
I don’t know whether I can say anything new on this subject, because to 
me, the situation seems quite clear: this division was breached a long 
time ago and we’ve moved beyond it, although it probably continues to 
hold a contradictory symbolic and political hegemony in the art field. 
Part of my training took place in Spain’s independent video movement 
of the 1980s and 90s, in which traditional role hierarchies were almost 
totally broken down. It was perfectly normal for activities like writing, 
criticism, the organizing of activities, editing and publishing, the creation 
and distribution of works and so on to be carried out by those who 
made up the network. This shouldn’t necessarily be attributed to an 
unusually high level of political awareness. It can probably be partly 
explained by the fact that, at the time, video was developing on the 
fringes of the art institution, and we know that there have been similar 
experiences of hierarchies being dismantled and roles shared or 
interchanged on the ‘periphery’ of the institution at various times and 
places in history, not just in the recent past. It could be said that the 
breakdown of this ‘traditional’ division of labor is deeply rooted in the 
tradition of the avant-garde movements, and it is therefore, from certain 
points of view, quite ‘traditional’ itself. 
So, I’m not really sure that practices which avoid falling into this 
particular division of labor can automatically be considered, as is 
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sometimes tritely claimed, a ‘negation’ of a traditional model or a search 
for ‘new’ or ‘other’ paradigms. Rather, I think that at their best, they 
show their own strength, they enjoy their own ontological consistency 
when they are rooted in history, so they can’t always be interpreted in 
terms of their ‘alternative nature’ in relation to the ‘traditional’ model. It 
was a long time ago now that I stopped seeing my own work in terms of 
putting forth an ‘alternative’ to a ‘central’ model, and started seeing it 
instead as a form of positivity, an exploration of independently 
consistent ways of working.  
I began by describing the symbolic and political hegemony of a 
particular division of labor in the art field as contradictory because the 
vague ‘artist-entrepreneur’ model has become so widespread that it has 
burst its banks. In the cultural and the art field, labor now perfectly 
matches the ‘communicative’ labor paradigm that is at the centre of the 
post-Fordist mode of production, but division of labor still has a 
symbolic hegemony and is upheld by economic and institutional 
interests. Today, the work of cultural producers is de facto essentially 
communicative, linguistic and semiotic. It fundamentally involves the 
production, through language, of processes that are usually exploited by 
institutions when they valorize them exclusively at the moment that they 
materialize as objects or events that are profitable in economic, political 
and/or symbolic terms. The way I see it, the key to the contradiction 
lies in the fact that upholding one particular division of labor is no 
longer ‘natural’ – it isn’t an inherent aspect of today’s most highly 
developed forms of cultural production or most of its major trends: all 
it does is support that particular way of valorizing artistic labor – the 
moment of crystallization into marketable objects or certain kinds of 
events. 
When the decision is taken to valorize artistic labor under different 
forms, in different places and times, through other processes, and, 
above all, to self-valorize artistic labor, this doesn’t really mean negating 
or criticizing a certain model of the division of labor: it means that the 
instituted model simply loses its relevance. 
That said, it is important to add that although within the art 
institution there is a growing acceptance of a particular, vague ‘artist-
manager’ model (a slippery term, right? We could also add the ideas of 
the artist-entrepreneur, curator-artist and artist-‘businessman’, just as 
Maurizio Lazzarato speaks somewhat provocatively of the post-Fordist 
Marcelo Expósito 
144 
worker as an entrepreneur or ‘businessman’...), this doesn’t necessarily 
entail a critical or alternative practice, nor one that moves towards self-
valorization. It did, to a large extent, thirty years ago, during the cycle 
around 1968, with its mood of widespread criticism of social 
institutions, just as it did with the explosive meeting of politics and the 
avant-garde in the period between the wars. Today it is an ambiguous 
model (just look at how different ‘relational’ artists and curators work). 
The way in which a ‘traditional’ function of artistic labor is currently 
being blurred corresponds, almost blow by blow, to the forms of the 
‘flexibilization’ of labor in the context of production in more general 
terms. Just as in renewed capitalism overall, the ‘flexibility’ of artistic or 
cultural labor is profoundly ambivalent from the start. But the process is 
irreversible: we have no choice but to work within this contemporary 
condition.  
Artistic ‘Work’ and ‘Non-artistic’ Work: On the ‘Artisticness’ of 
Art Labor 
The distinction that is sometimes made in the work of certain artists (I 
count myself among them) between labor that is ‘not strictly’ ‘artistic’, 
and that which ‘explicitly’ is, corresponds to a hierarchical taxonomy 
based on the primacy of a somewhat old-fashioned idea of what an ‘art 
work’ is. Near the end of his life, El Lissitzky claimed that he considered 
the pavilions he had designed for the Bolshevik government in the early 
stages of the Soviet Union to be his most important art work. The 
historiographic distinctions that are usually made between ‘artistic 
work’, ‘design’ and ‘works for the State apparatus’ in order to 
taxonomize Lissitzky’s career, are clearly an aggression against the 
nature of his practice. I think it would be much more useful to take his 
own statement seriously and ask ourselves: but where the hell is the ‘art 
work’ in his pavilions? 
In historical terms, for many years I have considered names like 
Lissitzky, Klucis, Heartfield, Renau or the Benjamin of the ‘reproducible 
work of art’ and the author as producer to be the foundational paradigm 
(precisely because they are neither ‘unique’ nor isolated) of a particular 
way of surpassing a pre-existing traditional model. They marked an 
opening up to a type of practices that didn’t start from scratch in any 
sense, but marked the start of forms that no longer ‘negate’ other, 
predominant models, but organize their own coherence, their own 
positivity. A pavilion designed by Lissitzky is a collective project that 
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includes multidisciplinary dynamics, and contains ‘art works’ and other 
things that don't strictly qualify as such, as well as an infinite number of 
‘in-between’ elements. It’s a work based on co-operative principles and 
the sharing of many different kinds of skills. And it radically assumes 
two characteristics that strongly challenged the then-traditional model in 
order to leave it behind: its useful nature and its communicative 
dimension. When almost a century ago avant-garde art had to openly 
question its political function and face its communicative dimension, no 
longer questioning them in terms of content but rather incorporating 
them structurally, I think it marked the start of what we are now, or 
what we may still become. 
(Incidentally, one of the artists whom I’ve most admired, Ulises 
Carrión, worked without rest and didn’t produce much legible ‘art 
work’. His practice largely consisted of interventions in the dominant 
communicative processes, or in producing others, constantly shifting 
the form and the moment of (self-)valorization, always changing. 
Interrupting communication channels, producing alternative 
communication and weaving together organization and networks – this 
was his labor.) 
I think that in historical terms, certain avant-garde movements can 
teach us two things: firstly, that there can be ‘art’ without ‘art works’ 
(Godard used to say that cinema is one thing and films are another, and 
films often don’t have anything to do with cinema: thus the history of 
cinema should be rigorously differentiated from the more usual history 
of films and directors. For some time now I’ve wondered: How can you 
write a history of art ‘without art works’, or where the usual notion of 
an art work is radically de-centred?); secondly, that it is possible to make 
a kind of art ‘that doesn’t appear to be so’ (as soon as one looks outside 
the European scene and the ‘classic’ avant-garde movements, the 
examples increase exponentially). I don’t think that the first lesson leads 
us necessarily to hackneyed academic chattering on the 
dematerialization of the object. Rather, it leads to the radical change of 
mentality that occurs at specific moments in history in which the 
valorization of artistic labor comes into focus as a relevant political 
problem, together with the definition of what ‘new’ forms, as a result, 
this labor has to take on in order to achieve self-valorization. The 
second lesson refers us to the contingency statute that characterizes 
artistic labor, which doesn’t always have to give primary importance to 
being recognized as such in accordance with the primacy of current 
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legibility criteria sanctioned by the corresponding institutional fields (the 
legibility criteria that determine an ‘art work’s’ artistic status, which we 
now know to be contingent and which are themselves historical, in no 
way absolute and essential; in no way disinterested. In this sense, it’s 
advisable to always keep in mind, for example, the lessons of feminist 
readings of the history of art and feminist film theory), in particular 
when the formalization of the work or its processes shift outside a 
particular institutional field, or flow in and out of it. In this latter case, 
it’s particularly important to be aware that the ‘artisticness’ of work is 
not an identity or an essential or pre-existing condition: it is a 
contingency that can correspond to tactical or political functions, and its 
sanctioning as an ‘art work’ has to be disputed and challenged in 
discursive and material terms against the institution’s ‘common sense’ 
through conflict and negotiation. This is why I think it is essential to 
practice writing and criticism, which shouldn’t be understood as the 
occupation of those who emit inspired opinions, but as the field in 
which legitimacy criteria and the valorization of practices are negotiated 
through conflict (Butler, 2002). 
Montage 
In my opinion, the most momentous innovation that the artistic avant-
garde movements contributed to twentieth-century culture and politics 
simultaneously, is montage. I’m not referring to montage as a stylistic 
exercise that folds in on itself, but the kind that, whether in Tucumán 
Arde, Heiner Müller or Alexander Kluge, constitutes a tool for thinking 
– for critical thinking. In this sense, montage brings heterogeneous 
things together into a fragmented whole that highlights its structural 
discontinuity, shattering the illusion of self-consistency and unity of 
both form and discourse, without relinquishing the production of 
meaning as a result. This convergence of a diversity of things deserves 
to be conceived as a part of a whole that in itself points elsewhere. I 
marvel at how much this invention can continue to contribute to the 
construction of forms and discursive practice at the same time. 
I’ve always considered my incursions into editorial activities, for 
example, to be either fully or partly artistic projects. At least to some 
extent, the publishing projects I’ve participated in usually consist of 
taking elements that are at different stages of materialization and 
diffusion within larger networks or flows – which we consider ourselves 
part of – catalyzing through reorganizing. In very simple terms, the 
Inside and Outside the Art Institution 
147 
editorial process becomes a montage technique that discontinuously 
articulates a discourse that then enters into circulation once more. 
Inversely, I’m increasingly less likely to describe the ‘artistic’ research, 
teaching or curatorial projects that I’ve generally worked on as hybrids 
or interdisciplinary projects. Instead, I see them as suspended between 
the categories of art, criticism and editing; technically, they almost 
always consist of small exercises in construction and montage. 
In short, I think that the usual distinctions that separate what some 
of us do into actual ‘art works’ and ‘secondary’ work (criticism, editing, 
writing...) is inappropriate when it comes to considering what needs to 
be done, because I believe, above all, in the labor of construction and 
montage that occasionally produces ‘things’ that can’t necessarily be 
read as ‘art works’. I’ve always felt suspicious of the ongoing presence 
of the surrealist object in certain kinds of contemporary art, as well as 
the way in which dominant conceptualism and its effects managed to 
reintroduce the fetishism of ‘form’ through the back door. I only have a 
little faith left in Dada now, whereas I’m still a believer in 
constructivism and productivism, modern political documentary and 
montage cinema. Almost all of the art that I still continue to learn from 
consists in constructing, (re)structuring, combining and putting 
together, in order to produce artefacts whose legibility is ambivalent, 
always site- and time-specific. 
The Artist as ‘Multifaceted’ Worker: Contradiction, Adaptation 
and Complicity with the Institutional Medium 
It may be interesting to pause for a moment and consider this strange 
adjective, ‘multifaceted’. The history of modern Western art needed to 
create a narrative that would include, and thus ‘normalize’, the ruptures 
caused by some of the avant-garde movements, so it captured Soviet art, 
for example, articulated its (re)presentation by organizing it into a 
narrative that separated biographical lines into pieces that made up a 
‘plural’ movement, and created a narrative for each of those separate 
and more or less isolated lines in turn, based on an organization that 
classified their ‘art works’ into different styles and formats. This 
taxonomy and juxtaposition produced the effect of simultaneity in the 
way artists used techniques, languages and media. At moments like this, 
the history of twentieth century art constructs the myth of the modern, 
‘multifaceted’ artist. Alexandr Rodchenko and Varvara Stepanova never 
set out to be multifaceted artists. Their ‘multifacetedness’ is an effect of 
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the way in which the history of modern art recovers the ruptures that 
these artists represent by incorporating them into a normalized narrative 
in which conflict has been tamed. Their work isn’t multifaceted: if 
anything, it is conflictive. 
In terms of work in general, today’s workers aren’t ‘multifaceted’: 
they are multi-exploited, or rather, subject to a regime of flexible 
exploitation.1 It would be amusing to switch the concepts and consider 
how the illusion of the ‘multifacetedness’ that is now being required of 
workers in order to make the new form of capitalist control of the 
workforce more bearable is similar to the kind of flexible exploitation 
that Vladimir Tatlin or Liubov Popova are subjected to by the history of 
modern art in order to extract some kind of cultural added value that 
fuels its existence and in return distorts the nature of the original, 
simultaneously artistic and political, experience. 
The other term that I find curious is ‘complicity’. I appreciate the 
clarity with which it is stated, but it is based on a way of framing the 
issue that I find inoperative: What should one declare oneself, sitting on 
the bench of the accused? Guilty, innocent of acting in collusion or 
complicity with an institutional system? (I can’t speak for anyone else, 
but I’m not in this in order to submit myself to a political trial or to earn 
myself a place in heaven). If the idea is to question whether ‘critical’ 
positions ‘genuinely’ question the state of things or, on the contrary, 
help to reproduce it, I think a very simplified answer would be: both. 
But this does not go far enough.  
In this order of things, labor in art is no different to the way in 
which post-Fordist labor in general oscillates between self-valorization 
and control (subjugation), and it’s often paradoxical because it operates 
under the conditions of autonomy and subjection simultaneously. For 
much of last century, artistic and cultural labor was an ‘extraordinary’ 
social activity – outside of the ordinary, exceptional. Today, the 
characteristics that have traditionally defined it (deregulated activity not 
subject to the same discipline as ‘industrial work’, with an emphasis on 
the value of self expression, giving maximum importance to 
subjectivity...) are increasingly becoming the paradigm for the core 
forms of labor in renewed capitalism. 
In my generation, those of us who started off doing artistic work 
before political work, only gradually became aware of how our activities 
functioned within the arts. At the beginning, we didn’t have the slightest 
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idea that the flexible exploitation system we were subject to was 
intensive but discontinuous. Its discontinuous nature is precisely the key 
that makes sustainable exploitation possible. If your work is ‘at the 
disposal’ of an institution in a continuous, regulated way, you 
immediately consider entering a standard ‘labor for wages’ relationship. 
If your work is at the institution’s ‘disposal’ in a discontinuous, 
deregulated way, then the relationship will be based on casual ‘labor for 
income (honorarium)’ terms. Discontinuous income, rather than a 
continuous wage, is what you get paid circumstantially for ‘rendering 
services’ on a casual basis; in this case, the rest of the time is ‘yours’. But 
the work of self-education, training or testing, preparation, production 
and so on that is carried out in the periods when your relationship to 
the institution is ‘inactive’ is time that you use for producing, for the 
rendering ‘of services’, without remuneration. Thus, the exploitation of 
artistic labor is intensive, because it is exercised in the overall time that 
you commit to your work, but the key to its economical sustainability 
for the institution resides in the fact that it is formalized 
discontinuously: you only get paid for the specific project, exhibition or 
investigation or the number of hours ‘you work’. The extent to which 
this kind of exploitation is widely accepted in the arts is because, 
obviously, your activity is presumably ‘gratifying’ in terms of vocational 
self-expression and freedom. Also because your subjection to the 
institution is irregular in terms of labor-income, but constant in 
symbolic terms and in its forms of subjectivization: the artist is taught to 
always turn to the institution as a guarantee of legitimacy and, above all, 
the ‘relevance’ of his or her own activity. 
There was an inescapable structural contradiction for those of us 
who started to think about the politicization of our art practice without 
breaking out of the vicious circle of its valorization predominantly 
within the institution. The currents of thought based on a critique of 
institutions and certain forms of public and critical art, and some critical 
theory of the visual representations that fuelled us from the 1980s until 
part of the 1990s were like manna from heaven in the middle of the 
desert of the postmodern cultural counterrevolution (as Virno calls it). 
Nonetheless, it was becoming increasingly clear that critical practice 
would only be able to put forth its own consistent and powerful forms 
of creation (and self-creation!) through the same solution that some 
avant-garde movements adopted when they reached the same 
crossroads: a critique trapped within its own field. What they did was to 
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look to other times, places and forms of the valorization of artistic labor 
apart from or as well as those that involved a relationship with the 
institutional apparatus. In terms of my own experience, I think this 
didn’t start to take place until the 1990s, when the possibility arose for 
the self-valorization of artistic labor linked to new forms of protest and 
new social autonomy dynamics. I believe that this is behind the 
enormous importance of the new collaborative experiences of what 
where originally (mostly) artists groups such as La Fiambrera in Spain, 
Ne pas plier in France, Grupo de Arte Callejero (GAC) and Etcétera in 
Argentina, and probably many others that have either faded, or were 
less consistent, or we have yet to discover: they reinvented a way of 
valorizing artistic labor, at a time when art practice was already clearly 
paradigmatic of post-Fordist production overall. They brought it out of 
its state of subjection (even if it was a critical subjection) to flexible 
exploitation, and allowed this self-valorization to help strengthen the 
new social opposition dynamics that had emerged precisely from the 
post-Fordist neo-liberal hegemony. 
This way of breaking out of the circle in which critical practices were 
imprisoned certainly didn’t ‘solve’ all the problems involved in the ways 
in which critical work in the arts is subject to the institution – a complex 
relationship that includes aspects ranging from the symbolic to the 
economic. But it did favor conditions that allowed it to come to light 
and be approached from other material and political positions. 
This condensed account seems to culminate in the idea that it 
would, therefore, be necessary to take this dynamic to the limit and 
bring about a pure and simple escape from the art institution or to relate 
to it from the outside in a merely cynical or instrumental way. I’ve never 
considered this to be the only possible conclusion; in fact, it doesn’t 
seem to me to be necessarily a productive political position. For many 
reasons. One of these reasons is patently obvious: the production of 
artistic or cultural artefacts is not equivalent to the production of cars or 
weapons. The results of our kind of production have a complex 
function in semiotic capitalism. Regardless of the attractiveness of the 
post-Situationist perspective, there is no rule stating that cultural 
artefacts are not, or cannot be, anything other than (or as well as) goods 
or tools for the ideological control of consciousness. In empirical terms, 
it’s not sustainable for all ‘forms’ of labor in the industry of the 
spectacle to be objectified, and I can’t stand the hypothesis of the 
system’s omnipotent capacity to recuperate or co-opt. I’m not saying I 
Inside and Outside the Art Institution 
151 
believe in the intrinsic goodness of culture or its essential legitimacy as a 
means of emancipation! But in the face of so much (both cynical and 
erudite) skepticism within our institutional field, I have no choice but to 
declare myself a believer (that is, of liberation theology!) in the potential 
of critical labor within art, cultural and educational institutions – not 
only to enlighten some minds but, above all, to influence the established 
modes of the production of knowledge and subjectivation. 
Nevertheless, I think that the operations carried out within the 
institutional field should seek to go beyond it, and above all valorize that 
which is produced, at least partly outside of it. To me, this is not just a 
political necessity but more importantly one of life’s lessons. Because in 
this way, many of us found a way to break out of the desperate circle of 
critical theories that seems unable to do anything other than wait to be 
recuperated for the umpteenth time. 
Whether a particular critical theory is recuperated or not isn’t as 
important as what it was able to generate in addition to being put into 
practice. What counts is the direction in which your work contributes to 
mobilizing individual and collective energies, which it can do in many 
diverse ways and on a bigger or smaller scale. I don't think declaring 
each of us an ‘accomplice’ to a situation leads anywhere, except to 
widespread cynicism. Likewise, it disturbs me to hear people whose 
work I admire state that ‘we’re all on the inside’, ‘we’re all institution’ or 
‘we’re all prostitutes’ in the arts and leave it at that. These declarations 
are not only inaccurate, they also stop short, and I think that they 
provoke the responsibility to immediately respond: Then, what’s to be 
done? 
For quite a few years now, there has been an ongoing stream of 
projects that approach the relationship to institutions in ways that are 
neither cynical nor instrumental. They aim to generate critical practices 
within the institutions with the idea that they should be valorized there 
and at the same time at some other time and place, in other ways. The 
idea would be to move from the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’ of the 
institution in a continuum that doesn’t avoid the institutional mode of 
formalization, and even examines it, without making it the central or 
unique objective.2 The production of networks and flows that don’t 
heed pre-existing boundaries and instead establish their own kinds of 
public sphere – a concept that we’re probably starting to find a bit static 
– is surely one of the most important inventions to have emerged from 
political creativity in this new cycle of protest.  
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But to understand the extent to which we are obviously dealing with 
difficult and problematic dynamics, we don’t have to look any further 
than Desacuerdos.3 In terms of what I am proposing here, I see 
Desacuerdos as a clear example of how extremely difficult it is to 
negotiate the simultaneity of different times and forms of evaluating art 
labor, especially when most of the labor comes from the outside or 
fringes of the field. That may have been the principal failure of those of 
us who were involved in co-ordination in different ways and with 
varying responsibilities: to have made it impossible for there to be 
compatibility, at the core of the project and in a complex way, between 
the different dynamics and interests in relation to valorizing the work 
put into it. It was important to try, and we can only hope there will be 
many more attempts. And I don’t think that this negates the project’s 
other, equally important accomplishments (you only have to look at the 
publications edited). But the fact that this particular failure took place 
amongst individuals and institutions that had spent a long time fighting 
in favor of precisely those kinds of principles, makes us take a much 
more cautious approach and exercise a greater degree of reflection and 
modesty. I think that the outcome of Desacuerdos inevitably demands 
that we consider the problems of scale, rhythms, the division of labor 
and the way decision-making processes are managed in critical 
production projects linked to institutions. In addition (to continue with 
the question of the relationship between criticism, art practice and art 
institutions), I think it demonstrates the need to turn the cliché that 
‘behind the institutions, in the end, are the people’ upside down. 
Because in the end, there in the background, behind the people, are the 
institutions (that through inertia have many different ways of applying 
the microphysics of power), and all the other power relationships that 
play a part in the arts, outside of the institutions. In theory, this isn’t a 
problem. Foucault would insist that his critique of institutions should 
not have a paralyzing effect, and that it didn't refer to an idea of 
essential freedom, because attempts at constructing freedom and the 
enjoyment of freedom itself could only take place inside given power 
relations. I think that the kinds of contradictory and complex ways of 
proceeding that I am dealing with here (and which I certainly don’t 
claim will exclude others!) are essential in today’s world, with all its 
difficulties. But I also think that future attempts through trial and error, 
conflict and negotiation, will need more politics, not better intentions.4 
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Notes 
1.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precarity 
2.  See http://transform.eipcp.net/calendar/1153261452, 
http://transform.eipcp.net/transversal/0406/crs/en, 
http://www.fridericianum-kassel.de/ausst/ausst-kollektiv.html# 
interfunktionen_english, http://www.exargentina.org/lamuestra.html, 
http://transform.eipcp.net/correspondence/1177371677 
3.  http://www.desacuerdos.org 
4.  Additional links: http://www.arteleku.net/4.0/pdfs/1969intro.pdf, 
http://www.arteleku.net/4.0/pdfs/1969-1.pdf, 
http://www.arteleku.net/4.0/pdfs/1969-3.pdf, 
http://transform.eipcp.net/transversal/0106/brumaria/es, 
http://usuarios.lycos.es/pete_baumann/marceloexpo.htm 
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The Rise and Fall of New Institutionalism: 
Perspectives on a Possible Future 
Nina Möntmann 
Only a few years ago, ‘new institutionalism’ was recognized as a 
curatorial intention to create ‘an active space’ that is ‘part community 
center, part laboratory and part academy’1. I quote these attributes from 
the profile of the Rooseum in Malmö, which – under the directorship of 
Charles Esche and later Lene Crone Jensen – was one of the model 
institutions of this new experimental and multi-functional approach to 
curating. At the zenith of these activities and their discourse Jonas 
Ekeberg edited a publication with the title ‘New Institutionalism’, in 
which he defined this subject as an “attempt to redefine the 
contemporary art institution [...] ready to let go, not only of the limited 
discourse of the work of art as a mere object, but also of the whole 
institutional framework that went with it.” He states further that new 
institutionalism was “far from peripheral, but rather central, even 
crucial, to the contemporary art scene” (Ekeberg, 2003: 9, 14). What 
Rooseum and other progressive art institutions had in common was that 
they were institutions of critique, which means institutions that have 
internalized the institutional critique that was formulated by artists in 
the 1970s and 90s and have developed an auto-critique that is now 
actively embraced by curators. Indeed, curators no longer just invite 
critical artists, but are themselves aiming to change institutional 
structures, hierarchies and functions. Reacting to the current 
developments, ‘institutions of critique’, from the mid- or late-1990s on, 
deployed a criticism of globalized corporate institutionalism and its 
consumer audience. 
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Since then, and within a very short space of time, these approaches, 
although successful in terms of opening up to new local publics and 
gaining international recognition in the art world, have been cut down 
to size and things have changed dramatically. To provide a few more 
examples: In 2004, during my time as a curator for the Nordic Institute 
for Contemporary Art (NIFCA), I worked with the Swedish artists Mike 
Bode and Staffan Schmidt on the project ‘Spaces of Conflict: An audio-
visual, research-based essay on institutional spaces’.2 The project was 
based on close cooperation and exchange among curators and directors 
of seven international institutions in Berlin, Oslo, Copenhagen, Vilnius, 
Malmö and Helsinki. It is remarkable that almost all the institutions 
portrayed by Bode and Schmidt – the Rooseum, Kunst-Werke Berlin, 
the Museum of Contemporary Art in Oslo, the Contemporary Art 
Center in Vilnius, Kunsthalle Helsinki, the x-room in Copenhagen and 
NIFCA itself – are now in a period of profound change that demands a 
radical change of political course. The Rooseum is becoming a branch 
of the expanding Moderna Museet in Stockholm; the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Oslo has been merged with other national 
museums in Oslo under the umbrella of the National Museum for 
Contemporary Art, Architecture and Design; Vilnius is suffering from 
severe budget cuts; in several places curators and directors have been 
replaced, which has a severe impact on the programmatic approach of 
the institutions, and in the case of NIFCA itself the institution has even 
been closed down. Most of the institutions seem to have been put in 
their place like insubordinate teenagers. 
What is not wanted, in short, is criticality. Criticality didn’t survive 
the ‘corporate turn’ in the institutional landscape. This is not only due to 
the larger institutions that are run like branded global companies in an 
obvious way, like the Guggenheim, which provides the clearest example 
of how an institution is conceived and staged by politicians and 
sponsors. More and more this also applies to mid-sized and smaller 
institutions, such as the German Kunstvereine or art associations, which 
are supposed to be experimental, but find themselves increasingly 
forced into curating programs similar to an established Kunsthalle. 
This situation raises some crucial questions: What is ‘new 
institutionalism’ today? Is there still anything like an institution of 
critique, and what does it mean in the present context? Can the 
discussion of the conditions of production be carried out within the 
institutions themselves, and what are the consequences for their internal 
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structures, functionality, programming and projections? Or, as Hito 
Steyerl poses it in her essay in the first section of this volume: “is it not 
rather absurd to argue that something like an institution of critique 
exists, at a time when critical cultural institutions are clearly being 
dismantled, underfunded, and subjected to the demands of a neoliberal 
event economy?” 
This current situation, which goes hand in hand with the dismantling 
of the welfare state, produces an urgent need for emancipatory forms of 
action in the institutionalized art field and thus for new institutions. This 
brings us back, first of all, to a fundamental question: What do we 
actually expect from an art institution? What do we want an institution 
to stand for? What desires does an institution in the art field produce? 
In his essay for the publication Art and its Institutions, the Swedish 
philosopher Sven-Olov Wallenstein analyzes ‘institutional desires’ that 
are connected with art institutions and exposes a profound paradox by 
asking: “Why is there such a desire for institutions, and why does the 
very attempt to meet it only give rise to more dissatisfaction?” Referring 
to Guattari, he concludes that “the need for facilities is an illusion, or 
rather a retroactive rationalization.” Instead it is the very institution 
which, he continues, “produces a certain structure of desire, it enables a 
certain space where signifiers and desires can circulate, and in this sense 
it is just as futile to dream of a fully de-institutionalized space as it is to 
dream of an institution that would work” (Wallenstein, 2006: 121). 
While you can’t beat this argument on the one hand, on the other the 
conclusion cannot be – as Wallenstein also claims – to leave institutions 
completely aside in order to enter alternative spheres. I fully agree with 
the artist Gardar Eide Einarsson, who says, “It is a classical democratic 
problem, whether one should engage in order to change, or simply 
ignore in order to establish something else on the outside (the classical 
and in my view false distinction between alternative and oppositional)” 
(Einarsson, cited in Ekeberg, 2003: 83). 
In the face of this dilemma, what is therefore required is the 
establishment of transgressive institutions that question and break with 
the current developments of privatization and simultaneously orient 
themselves towards other disciplines and areas besides the corporative 
business of globalized capitalism. In searching for participatory 
institution-forming activities, my attention has recently turned to the 
institutional situation in several regions in the Southern hemisphere. 
There, the few official contemporary art institutions mostly are 
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inaccessible for young artists and dysfunctional as part of the public 
sphere, and artists and curators don’t have easy access to public or 
private funding. These kinds of local situations where there is a lack of 
access to institutional infrastructure often give rise to community 
projects, that are characterized by their institution-forming character, 
such as Sarai or Khoj in Delhi, PUKAR and crit in Mumbai, or 
ruangrupa in Jakarta. You often find collective and occasionally 
interdisciplinary activities by artists, sometimes together with curators, 
researchers, activists or new media workers. They start with a small 
space and very local programming, exhibiting their own work and that 
of artists they know, or using the space for other community activities 
such as discussions or parties. In the beginning there is thus a kind of 
community center or hangout for friends from the art field. In the 
regions I am talking about these activities are assuming a quasi-
institutional status that often goes hand in hand with an expansion of 
their activity. They then start to fundraise internationally, to set up 
residencies, offer research possibilities, invite foreign curators and 
artists, organize film programs, edit magazines and so on. 
In my opinion, what institutions in Western countries need to do is 
precisely to reduce the number of structures and standards, and 
disengage spaces from too many codes and contexts. Here, where we 
have an institutionalized art field – and consequently the opportunities 
to participate in semi-public spaces, but also the difficulties caused by 
the control mechanisms of these spaces – the options are somewhat 
different. Here there are inherently many categories and conventions for 
all kinds of art spaces, and alternatives are always measured against the 
official system that already exists and is increasingly defined by the 
politics of city marketing and sponsorship. It may seem paradoxical, but 
from this perspective, in fact we have less scope here and more control. 
Therefore, a conceivable new institution of critique would be one that 
maintains and expands its participation in (semi-) public space, and at 
the same time creates free unbranded spaces and negates dependencies. 
It could counter the corporate globalization that neo-capitalism 
created, instead enabling an active and immediate global exchange of 
diverse public groups and individual voices, and a critique of the nation-
state. It would have to widen its scope, consider cross-genre 
collaborations with established as well as alternative organizations, and 
initiate multi-disciplinary activities. This conceivable critical institution 
could, for example, take on the form of an internationally operating 
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‘organized network’, which strengthens various smaller, independent 
institutions and activities – be they alternative, artist-run, or research-
based – and could also set up temporary platforms within bigger 
institutions. Ned Rossiter describes the potential of ‘organized 
networks’ for superseding modern institutions that are just “rebooted 
into the digital age” by “reconciling their hierarchical structures of 
organization with the flexible, partially decentralized and transnational 
flows of culture, finance and labor.” The advantage of “organized 
networks” instead is the way they function as “social-technical forms 
that co-emerge with the development of digital information and 
communication technologies” (Rossiter, 2006; 2007). In the art field this 
new institution of organized collaborations could serve then as an 
information pool, a hub for various transdisciplinary forms of 
collaboration, in legal matters as a union, and as an entry for audiences 
to participate locally and exchange internationally. 
The transformative public potential of an institution so structured 
lies in creating ‘diasporic public spheres’, that are described by Arjun 
Appadurai – who like Ned Rossiter derives his transferable model from 
an analysis of the globalized use of electronic media – as “phenomena 
that confound theories that depend on the continued salience of the 
nation-state as the key arbiter of important social changes” (Appadurai, 
2001: 4). Precisely in this lies both an internationalization as well as a 
democratization of the art institution and its research facilities, which 
not only breaks down or questions certain dominant forms of 
institutional politics, but also opens up a “new role for the imagination 
in social life” (Appadurai, 2001: 4). On the level of funding, 
groundbreaking new private as well as public foundations are required 
to create self-sustainable, independent and powerful alternatives – a 
‘globalization from below’, if you will. 
 
Notes 
1.  Quoted from http://www.rooseum.se 
2.  For a detailed description of the project, see http://eipcp.net/ 
transversal/0106/moentmann/en. 
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The Political Form of Coordination 
Maurizio Lazzarato 
(Translated by Mary O’Neill) 
Based on the model of ‘coordination’, the struggle of the ‘intermittents 
et précaires d’Ile de France’1 is a veritable laboratory that could well 
highlight the demise of the political schema born of the socialist and 
communist tradition. Where this tradition places the emphasis on a logic 
of contradiction, of the political representation of an injustice that 
brings remarkable identities into play, the political form termed 
‘coordination’ is meant to be resolutely expressive, transformist, 
attentive to the unstable dynamics of ‘post-identitarian’ identities, of 
which the reality of our world is woven. Coordination is aimed less at 
the formation of a common collective that seeks its members’ equality, 
at all costs, than it is at the becoming of the singularities comprising it 
within an unstable, networked, patchwork-loving multiplicity – defying 
all theoretical definition as well as trade-union or state identification. It 
is a politics of experimentation that lays aside prior knowledge and 
opens up to the unknown, without which no new life can be envisaged. 
Contemporary political movements are breaking radically with 
socialist and communist tradition. They are deployed not according to 
the logic of contradiction but rather to that of difference, which does 
not mean that there is no conflict, opposition or struggle. Rather, these 
are radically altered and deployed on two asymmetric levels. Political 
movements and individualities are formed according to a logic of 
‘refusal’, of being ‘against’, of division. They seem, at first sight, to 
reproduce the separation between ‘them and us’, between friend and 
enemy, which characterizes the workers’ movement or indeed politics 
itself. But this ‘no’, this assertion of division, is expressed in two 
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different ways. On the one hand, it is directed against politics, and it 
expresses a radical break with the rules of representation or of the 
staging of a division within the same world. On the other, it is the 
precondition for opening up to a becoming, to a bifurcation of worlds 
and to the way these are created, in a confrontational manner, not a 
unifying one. 
On the first level, the struggle is represented as a flight away from 
institutions and the rules of politics. People quite simply escape – they 
walk away as the ‘peoples of the East’ walked away from real socialism, 
crossing the borders or staying in situ to recite Bartleby’s formula: ‘I 
would prefer not to’. On the second level, the individual and collective 
singularities that make up the movement deploy a process of 
subjectivation, which involves both a composition of common 
platforms (collective rights) and the differential assertion of a 
multiplicity of practices for expression and for living. Flight, politically 
elusive practices on the one hand; creation, strategies of ‘empowerment’ 
on the other. This new process renders the behaviors of movements 
and singularities opaque and incomprehensible to political scientists, 
sociologists, political parties and trade unions. 
In France, one of the most interesting devices that movements 
employ to hold both levels together is that of ‘coordination’. The 
coordination of the ‘intermittents et précaires d’Ile de France’ is the 
latest and most accomplished of the coordinations that, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, have organized all forms of struggle of a certain 
scale (coordinations of nurses, students, railway workers, the 
unemployed, teachers, etc). The refusal, the ‘no’ (‘we’re not playing any 
more’) is what has pushed the intermittent workers from an ambiguous 
yet always individual relationship to the organization of the culture and 
communications industry into a new relationship to themselves and to 
the power that comes through the ‘power of us’. Instead of being 
subjected to appropriation and exploitation by industry, all the 
characteristics of the intermittent workers’ cooperation operate as 
drivers of the struggle. 
Coordination is what the event of the struggle has made possible. In 
this event, we see what is intolerable about an era and at the same time 
the new possibilities for living that it enfolds. The de-structuring of 
what is intolerable and the articulation of new possibilities for living 
have a very real existence, but they are first expressed as a 
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transformation of subjectivity, as a mutation of the mode of sensibility, 
as a new distribution of desires in the ‘souls’ of the intermittent workers 
engaged in the struggle. This new distribution of what is possible opens 
up to a process of experimentation and creation: experimenting with 
what the transformation of subjectivity involves, and creating the 
devices, institutions and conditions capable of deploying these new 
possibilities for living. 
Speaking about 1968, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1984) said: 
“Society must be capable of forming collective agencies of enunciation 
that match the new subjectivity, in such a way that it desires its own 
mutation” When we consider political action in the light of the event, 
we are faced with a twofold creation, a twofold individuation, a twofold 
becoming (creating a possibility and bringing it about) that is confronted 
with the dominant values. This is the point where the ‘conflict’ with 
what exists manifests itself. These new possibilities for living come up 
against the organization of governments in power and the manner in 
which these actualize this same constituent opening. 
Coordination has developed the struggle on the two asymmetric 
levels in an exemplary fashion: refusal and constitution, de-structuring 
what is intolerable and deploying new possibilities. De-structuring what 
is intolerable, by taking a step alongside the codified and conventional 
forms of the unions’ struggle (the meeting, the demonstration), will find 
expression in the invention of new forms of action, whose intensity and 
reach will increasingly open up towards harassing and unmasking the 
command networks of society-as-business. Deregulation of the labor 
market and social rights is being countered by a deregulation of the 
conflict that is following the organization of power right into the 
communications networks, into the expression machines (interruptions 
in television programs, recovery of advertising spaces, interventions in 
press editorial offices, etc.), something which those involved in the 
conventional union struggles ought not to ignore. 
Coordination has coupled (not opposed) a diversifying of actions 
(by the number of participants, by the variations in objectives), using the 
‘just-in-time’ method (by the frequency and speed of their planning and 
execution), to the unions’ monumental mobilization tactics (strikes), 
which are concentrated in time and space. This gives some indication of 
what effective actions can be in an organization of mobile, flexible 
capitalist production, where the expression machines (television, 
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advertising, press, cinema, festivals) are constituent elements of 
‘production’. 
If de-structuring what is intolerable has to invent its modes of 
action, the transformation of modes of sensibility implied by refusal is 
only the precondition for opening up to another process, a ‘problematic’ 
one, of creation and actualization in relation to multiplicity. ‘Problems’ 
are what characterize the life and the organization of coordination. The 
subjectivities engaged in the struggle are caught between the old 
distribution of the sensible, already defunct, and the new, which is not 
yet in existence other than as methods for transforming sensibility and 
changing modes of perceiving the world. Coordination is not a 
collective but a mapping of singularities, composed of a multiplicity of 
committees, initiatives, forums for discussion and planning, political and 
union activists, a multiplicity of trades and professions, friendship 
networks, ‘cultural and artistic’ affinities, which form and break up at 
different rates and with different aims. The process of constituting 
multiplicity that is initiated here is not organic; it is, rather, polemical 
and confrontational. There are, engaged in this process, individuals as 
well as groups clinging desperately to the identities, roles and functions 
modulated for them by the organization of industry, and also individuals 
and groups involved in a radical process of de-subjectivation from these 
same modulations. There are conservative forms of behavior and 
expression and other, innovative, forms distributed among various 
individuals and groups, or coming through a single individual or group. 
The word ‘precarious’, added to the name ‘intermittent workers’ of 
the coordination d’Ile de France, is the word that has caused passions to 
run highest and provoked the most vocal reactions. There are those for 
whom the term ‘precarious’ denotes a fact, an assessment (there are as 
many non-indemnified intermittent workers as there are indemnified 
ones, if not more; at any rate, 35 percent of indemnified workers are 
transformed into precarious workers by the new draft agreement). 
Others happily embrace it, seeing it as a reversal of the terms under 
which power is assigned (like ‘unemployed person’, ‘errèmiste’2, 
‘immigrant’, etc.), and as a rejection of the categories into which they are 
forced. Still others, paralyzed by the vague, negative terms of this 
attribution, demand the reassuring identity of ‘artist’ or ‘live-
performance professional’, which are also categories but, in their minds, 
‘positive’ ones. One can identify with the artist or the professional 
whereas ‘precarious worker’ is a form of identification by default. There 
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are those too for whom the word ‘precarious’ is sufficiently ambiguous 
and polysemous to open up to multiple situations that go beyond ‘live 
performance’ and [for whom] it allows enough possibilities for 
becomings that elude the categories assigned by power. And there are 
yet others who demand ‘existential precarity’ and denounce ‘economic 
precarity’. There are those for whom the term ‘precarious’ denotes the 
point where categories, attributions and identities become blurred (artist 
and at the same time precarious worker, professional and at the same 
time unemployed, alternatively within and outside, on the edges, at the 
limits): the point where relations, since they are not sufficiently codified, 
are – at the same time and in a contradictory manner – sources of 
political subjection, of economic exploitation and of opportunities to be 
grasped. 
‘Precarious’ is the very model of ‘problematic’ naming, which poses 
new questions and seeks new replies. Lacking the universal impact of 
names like ‘worker’ or ‘proletarian’, it plays the role – as these once did 
– of that which defies, and it can only be named negatively by power as 
a result. All are in favor of neutralizing precarity as a weapon of political 
subjection and economic exploitation. Where division occurs is on the 
means by which to bring it about and on the significance of this 
achievement. Do we take the unknown aspects of problematic 
situations conjured up by precarity back to what is known in established 
institutions and their forms of representation: wage earning, the right to 
work (employment), the right to state benefits indexed to employment, 
the joint democracy of employers’ and trade union organizations? Or do 
we invent and impose new rights encouraging a new relationship to 
activity, time, wealth, democracy, which exist only virtually and often in 
a negative way, in conditions of precarity? 
We see that the economic questions, those affecting insurance and 
representation schemes, immediately pose problems of political 
categorization, which relate back to different processes of 
subjectivation. Fitting into the pre-fabricated mould of the capital-labor 
relationship, by viewing art and culture as their ‘exception’, or analyzing 
the transformation of the concept of work and the concept of art, and 
opening up to the becomings these very questions imply, by defining 
the ‘artist’ and the ‘professional’ in different terms. Or else bringing the 
‘precarious’, that which has not yet been codified, back into the 
institutionalized conflict, which has already been standardized (and also 
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includes the revolution of a great many revolutionaries!), or seizing the 
opportunity to develop struggles for identities still in the making. 
The post-feminist movements have already wrestled with the knotty 
issue of becoming, the problem of the relationship between difference 
and repetition, through the ‘aporetic’ concept of post-identitarian 
identity: shifting identities, fractured identities, eccentric identities, 
nomadic subjects, where identity is both asserted and stolen, where 
repetition (identity) is in favor of difference, where the assertion of 
rights is not an assignment or an integration but, rather, a precondition 
for becoming. Here this same question takes over the more traditional 
field of law and of the institutional forms regulating social issues. 
Different modes of behavior and expression are represented in 
coordination, as they become widespread like skills or ‘collective bodies 
of expertise’ (as the intermittent workers put it when referring to their 
activities), each time revealing the political ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’. These 
skills and expertise, as soon as they are in operation, trigger a 
proliferation of problems and responses. 
The production of an alternative model to the one proposed by the 
government is one of these skills that questions the organization of our 
societies generally, using the specific practices of live-performance 
professions as a basis. By analyzing the legitimacy of the division 
between experts and non-experts, the modes whereby the new model is 
constructed also put the division between representatives and 
represented to the test. The action of coordination may be extended to 
experimentation with devices for being together and being against, 
which repeat codified political procedures and, at the same time, invent 
new ones but which, all of them, also take great care to encourage the 
meeting of singularities, the arrangement of different worlds and 
universes. 
The general form of the organization is not the vertical and 
hierarchical structure of political parties or trade unions, but that of the 
network in which different organizational and decision-making methods 
operate, which co-exist and are coordinated more or less felicitously. 
The general assembly operates on the principle of the majority vote 
without, however, selecting elites and vertical, directive or permanent 
structures. But the life of the coordination and the committees is based 
on the model of patchwork that allows an individual or a group to 
launch initiatives and new forms of action in a more flexible and 
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responsible way. Organization in the form of networks is more open to 
learning and the appropriation of political action by all. The network 
favors the development of minority politics and decision-making. 
The coordination has adopted a strategy that operates transversally 
within the divisions instituted by politics and the majoritarian models 
(representatives/represented, private/public, individual/collective, 
expert/non-expert, social/political, audience/spectator, employee/ 
precarious worker, etc.). The opening of this instituting space fuels a 
tension between the assertion of equality proclaimed by politics (we all 
have equal rights), and the power relations between singularities which 
are always asymmetric: (in a meeting, a discussion, a decision-making 
process, the circulation of speech, of places and roles is never based on 
equality). 
‘Collective’ rights are what define the conditions for equality; rights 
are for everyone. But this equality is not for itself; it is not in itself a 
goal. It is for difference, for everyone’s becoming; otherwise, it is 
nothing more than a leveling out of multiplicity, an averaging out of 
subjectivities and an average (majority) subjectivity. The differences 
imposed by power are rejected, but the differences between singularities 
are arranged (on this second level, equality can only be the possibility 
for everyone not to be separated from what he/she is capable of, [for 
everyone] to be able to fully realize his/her potential). The hierarchy of 
the cultural industries is rejected and there is an arrangement of the 
asymmetric relationships between singularities that cannot be measured 
one against the other, “as it is in the worlds of artists, where there are 
no ranks but a variety of sites.” 
Coordination makes it possible to cross borders, to blur the 
divisions, categories and assignments into which intermittent workers, 
all of us in fact, are forced. The space of coordination is located 
transversally vis-à-vis the logic of equality and that of difference 
(freedom) by constructing their relationship as a problem, by trying to 
analyze the limits within which socialism and liberalism had separately 
considered and practiced them. Coordination is the contentious site for 
transforming multiplicity: from the subjected and enslaved multiplicity 
to a new multiplicity the outlines of which cannot be measured in 
advance. 
More generally, we can say this: the form of political organization of 
coordination relates back to invention, experimentation and to their 
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modes of action, not to a new form of warfare. We are currently living 
in conditions of ‘planetary civil war’ and a permanent ‘state of 
emergency’, but I think that the response to this organization of power 
is only possible if the logic of war is turned back (invaginated) into a 
logic of co-creation and co-implementation. The logic of war is the logic 
of conquest or of the distribution of one sole possible world. The logic 
of invention is one of creating and bringing different worlds into being 
in the same world; it hollows out power and at same time makes it 
possible for us to stop being obedient. This deployment and 
proliferation means extending singularities within the vicinity of other 
singularities, drawing a line of force between them, rendering them 
temporarily the same and making them cooperate for a time towards a 
common goal, without necessarily denying their autonomy and 
independence, without reducing them in a process of totalization. And 
this action is, in turn, an invention, a new individuation. 
Coordination is set up according to modes that relate back to the 
unpredictability of propagation and distribution of the invention (by 
reciprocal capture, based on trust and affinity), rather than to the 
realization of an ideal plan or of a political line aimed at raising 
awareness. It succeeds only if it expresses a power in which singularities 
exist ‘one by one, each one for itself’. It takes shape only if it expresses a 
‘sum that is not reduced to a total of its own elements’. The transition 
from micro to macro levels, from the local to the global, must not take 
place in a process of abstracting, universalizing or totalizing, but 
through the ability to hold together, to coordinate networks and 
patchworks gradually. 
Compared to these dynamics of coordination, the instruments and 
forms of organization of the workers’ movement are largely inadequate 
since, on the one hand, they refer to the cooperation of the Karl Marx 
and Adam Smith factory and, on the other, political action is not 
conceived of as an invention but merely as a revelation of something 
already there, the main operator of which is awareness and 
representation. Turning what is potential into something present, 
current, is an entirely different matter from representing a conflict. The 
political action of what remains of the workers’ movement (in its 
institutional or left-wing form) is dominated as ever by the logic of 
representation and reductive totalization, which means exercising 
hegemony in one sole possible world (whether it is a question of taking 
power or sharing it), whereas coordination is a politics of expression. 
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The deployment of the political form of coordination calls first of all for 
the neutralization of these methods of operating and expressing politics. 
Where there is a hegemony of the organizational forms of the workers’ 
movement, there can be no coordination. Where there is coordination, 
these organizations can be a part of it, but only by abandoning their 
claims to hegemony and by adapting to the constitutive rules of 
multiplicity – (we can also see this co-existence at work in the forms of 
organization mobilizing against neo-liberal globalization!). Coordination 
alone represents a public space that includes differences. 
The activist in a coordination is someone who is committed and at 
the same time elusive. Contemporary political movements do not 
develop according to the ‘mystical’ modes of the transition from the 
individual to the collective. All creative activity stems originally, from 
singular initiatives (by a group or individuals) that are more or less small 
in scale, more or less anonymous. These initiatives cause an 
interruption, introducing a discontinuity not only in the exercise of 
power on subjectivity, but also and especially in the reproduction of the 
mental habits and the corporeal habits of multiplicity. The act of 
resistance introduces discontinuities that represent new beginnings, and 
these beginnings are multiple, disparate, heterogeneous (there are always 
multiple foci of resistance). 
Rather than relating back to the position of warrior or to religious 
commitment, the activist in contemporary movements takes on the 
attributes of the inventor, the experimenter. The activist is committed 
and elusive as these are, since he/she too must escape for his/her action 
to be effective in the chain of ‘prevailing habits and imitations’ codifying 
the space of political action. The fascination that the figure of 
Subcomandante Marcos exercises is the result of all the elements 
present in his way of conducting and expressing himself. In a situation 
that is restrictive in a different way from our own, he asserts himself as a 
warrior, as a political and military commander; at the same time, using 
the same gestures and the same words, he immediately eludes the 
warrior identity, rids himself of the assigned role of commander, of 
military and political leadership. The situation that is appropriate for the 
action of beginning something new is expressed in the aporetic 
definition of ‘subcommandante’: subjectivation and at the same time de-
subjectivation, each presupposing and re-launching the other 
reciprocally. 
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In contemporary militancy, the warrior dimension must be turned 
into an inventive force, into the power to create and realize 
arrangements and ways of living. The activist is not the one in 
possession of the movement’s intelligence, who sums up its strength, 
who anticipates its choices, who derives his/her legitimacy from an 
ability to read and interpret the movements of power; rather, he/she is 
the one who, by introducing a discontinuity into what exists, facilitates 
an increase in the power of arrangement and connection of cooperation, 
the flows, the networks and the singularities that comprise it, according 
to modes of disjunction and coordination that are non-totalizing, non-
homogenizing, non-hierarchical. 
The intermittent workers say: we do not know what it is ‘to be 
together’ and ‘to be against’ in conditions where different worlds 
proliferate within a single world; we do not know what the institutions 
of becoming are, but we raise these questions by means of devices, 
techniques, arrangements, statements, and in this way we analyze them 
and we experiment. The traditional modes of political action are not on 
the way out, but are dependent on the deployment of this power of 
coordination. The constitution of the self as multiplicity is not sacrificed 
to the struggle against the imperatives of power. The activist continues 
to put forward initiatives, to be the originator of new beginnings, but 
not according to the logic of realizing an ideal plan, of a political line 
that sees what is possible as a readily available image of the real. 
[He/she does so] according to an actual understanding of the situation, 
which obliges him/her to put his/her very identity, his/her worldview 
and methods of action at stake. In fact, he/she has no other option 
since all attempts at totalization, at homogenizing generalization, at 
creating a relationship of force exclusively oriented towards 
representation, at instituting modes of hierarchical organization, lead to 
flight and the breakdown of coordination (of multiplicity). 
 
Notes 
1.  Translator’s Note: intermittent and precarious workers of the Ile de France. 
2.  Translator’s Note: people living on RMI = Revenu minimum d’insertion, a form 
of income support. 
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Instituent Practices, No. 2: 
Institutional Critique, Constituent Power, and 
the Persistence of Instituting* 
Gerald Raunig 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
Insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to 
arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on ‘institutions’. It is not 
a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established 
collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established. 
If I leave the established, it is dead and passes into decay. (Max Stirner, 
The Ego and Its Own) 
Institution and Critique 
An attempt to deconstruct, problematize and reformulate institutional 
critique, such as the one undertaken from several different perspectives 
in the transversal issue ‘Do you remember institutional critique?’1, 
published in early 2006, cannot avoid questioning the understanding of 
both institution and critique in the first two phases of artistic 
institutional critique, as well as the analogous figures in the history of 
leftist movements. Here one problematic pole of the critique of the 
institution could be regarded as the fundamentally critical approach of 
constructing an absolute outside of the institution, whether as a 
distorted image of the pathos of the artistic avant-garde (still evident in 
the 1970s) or as a phantasm of radical anarchisms: this approach ignores 
the techniques of self-government and the modes of subjectivation and 
contributes, beyond pure forms of rigid institutional subjection, to 
producing forms of ‘machinic enslavement’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 456-7; Lazzarato, 2006) – and with them the imagination of 
spaces free of power and institution. 
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The other pole – frequently found in institutional critique art 
practices since the 1990s – would be the self-obsessed self-critique that 
substantializes one’s own involvement in the institution and crowds out 
the horizon of change from perception. This also includes the 
misconstrual of theoretical approaches from Foucault (the 
interpretation of his theory of power as a dead-end of a comprehensive 
dispositif of power allowing neither escape nor resistance) and Bourdieu 
(the hermetic interpretation of his field theory), in ways that reinforce 
what exists – what is established, arranged, striated and gridded – as the 
seemingly sole and immutable possible. 
Avoiding both polarizations suggests a movement of exodus, of 
defection, of flight, but looking for a weapon while fleeing. There is a 
consistent thread running from Max Stirner’s remark about ‘leaving 
what is established’, to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘lines of flight’, to 
Paolo Virno and Antonio Negri’s more recent conceptualization of 
‘exodus’: the differentiated construction of a non-dialectical way out of 
purely negating and affirming the institution. Seeking out these kinds of 
exits from the dead-ends of the critique of the institution also means, 
not least of all – and this is the basis of this essay – a conceptual 
movement of flight, a defection from the treacherous concept of 
institutional critique, a dissolving of its conceptual components and 
their re-composition in a different conceptual genealogy. 
Against Closure of/in the Institution 
Against the background of a renewed concept of critique, as that begins 
to emerge from the essays collected here, it is possible to take a closer 
look at the question of the institution. What is at stake is specifically not 
the institution as an unchanging structure and state apparatus, as a mere 
element of a dominant repressive system. If, instead, institutions are 
grasped as processes, then the problem goes beyond the terrain of the 
critique of the state and capitalism, for social movements and 
revolutionary machines cannot dispense with institutions, nor are they 
immune to the occurrence of structuralization, rigidification and 
institutionalization. 
In 1844, Max Stirner, individualist anarchist opponent of the young 
Karl Marx,2 wrote the remarkably post-Hegelian and proto-structuralist 
Der Einzige und sein Eigentum [The Ego and Its Own]. In it, we encounter a 
molar concept of revolution that specifically takes into account the 
structuralization and terror of the French Revolution. Against these, 
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Stirner poses the concept of ‘insurrection’: “The revolution commands 
one to make arrangements, the insurrection [Empörung] demands that he 
rise or exalt himself [empor-, aufrichten]” (Stirner, 1927: 287; 2001). This 
kind of rising up, this insurrection, which Stirner had to argue 
linguistically in this manner in order to avoid criminal prosecution,3 
does not want to arrange itself, does not want to accept the institutions, 
even those of the revolution as such, if they close themselves off again. 
Insurrection sets ‘no glittering hopes’ on institutions; a new state, a new 
people, a new party, a new society are not options for Stirner. The mode 
of subjectivation of the closure of/in the institution simultaneously 
means arranging oneself in the institution and adapting the self like all 
those arranged. 
In his works on institutional analysis Félix Guattari demonstrated 
the tendency to ‘structuralization’, as he called the process of the closure 
of/in the institution. He developed his specific approach from what he 
experienced in diverse contexts: from the experience of the fight against 
the Stalinist and Euro-Communist variants of the state left and against 
the phenomena of the rigidifying of the New Social Movements after 
1968, but also and especially from his experience in the micro-political 
field of the (psychiatric) clinic. In all of these contexts, Guattari was 
interested in institutional translations of revolution in its non-molar 
form:  
The revolutionary project as a machine activity of an institutional 
subversion would have to uncover these kinds of possibilities and 
ensure them in every phase of the struggle against structuralization 
ahead of time. (Guattari, 2003: 247) 
As Guattari stresses, it is not enough to think of theoretical models of 
this institutional subversion, but rather it is specifically a matter of the 
practical testing and stuttering invention of machines that tend to elude 
structuralization: 
The problem of the revolutionary organization is basically that of 
setting up an institutional machine that is distinguished by a special 
axiomatic and a special praxis; what this means is the guarantee that it 
does not close itself off in various social structures, especially not in the 
state structure. (Guattari, 2003: 137) 
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Precisely this kind of elementary treatment of forms of organization, the 
permanent opening of social structures and assurance against their 
closure were and are the aim of offensive practices of insurrection and 
molecular revolution that generate something other than copies and 
variations of what already exists. Wherever state apparatuses tend 
towards the orgic and revolutionary machines simultaneously test new 
forms of organizing (Raunig, 2007), insurrection takes place as a fight 
against structuralization: in the Paris Commune, with the soviets and all 
the subsequent soviet-like modes of organization, in the Spanish 
Revolution and in May 1968, in the Zapatist revolts and the anti-
globalization movement. Fleeing from what exists, however, by no 
means dispenses with the question of the institution. Focusing on 
institutions’ tendencies to closure and structuralization is one side; 
fleeing from structuralization, on the other hand, corresponds to the 
complementary aspect of inventing other forms of institution and 
instituting. 
Constituent Power and Instituting 
Even without a prefix, the Latin verb statuo means roughly to establish, 
set (up), decide. On the one hand this means a process of setting up 
objects, the erection of buildings and the placing of objects or people in 
a certain arrangement, but on the other also such performative speech 
and positioning acts to establish an arrangement of rule – or even to 
found empires. As static as the noun status is literally as standing, 
position, state, the concomitant verb statuo is just as dynamic. 
The prefix con- changes primarily the relationship between the 
subject and object of the im-position/in-stitution, now the com-
position/con-stitution: an aspect of the collective, the common is 
added. In setting up bodies of troops, this may mean simply a 
multiplication of the placed objects, a co-location of multiple 
components. With the performative aspect of deciding, determining, 
founding, the compositum constituo takes on the meaning of collective 
subjectivation and common positioning. Common agreement and 
decision-making, ‘con-stituting’ in other words, found a common ‘con-
stitution’. As with especially the word constituo, it seems that a dynamic 
aspect of establishing, setting up, founding correlates with a closing 
aspect of defining, determining, deciding. 
These two strands of constitution are differentiated in the concepts 
of constituent and constituted power. The pair of concepts emerges in 
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the history of the constitutional process in the French Revolution. In 
his text ‘What is the Third Estate’, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, 
protagonist of the constitution of 1791, already distinguishes in 1789 
between the pouvoir constitué and the pouvoir constituant. For Sieyes, 
constituted power corresponds to the written constitution as 
fundamental law, constituent power corresponds to the constitutional 
assembly, the Constituante. 
The generally problematic aspect of constituent power as 
constituting assembly lies in the crucial question of how this assembly 
comes together, in the circumstances of legitimizing this assembly. In 
On Revolution, Hannah Arendt stresses this “problem of the legitimacy of 
the new power, the pouvoir constitué, whose authority could not be 
guaranteed by the Constitutional Assembly, the pouvoir constituant, 
because the power of the Assembly itself was not constitutional and 
could never be constitutional since it was prior to the constitution itself” 
(Arendt, 1990: 163). In other words, this was a constitution before the 
constitution, which it might be better to call an institution, and which 
implies in different contexts different ways of in-stituting, but also 
different formats of participation. 
In this context Arendt particularly stresses the difference between 
the French and the (US) American Revolution. In France it was the 
National Assembly that developed the first constitution for the nation 
through its self-given pouvoir constituant according to a certain principle of 
representation in a ‘division of labor’. Unlike in France, in the USA the 
constitution was thoroughly discussed in 1787, paragraph for paragraph 
down to the last detail, in town hall meetings and state parliaments and 
supplemented with amendments. In other words, it emerged from 
countless constituted bodies in a multi-stage process. 
What is especially important to Arendt is the aspect of participation 
in the federative system of the USA, which she sees as leading to 
completely different relationships between the Constitution and the 
people in the USA and in Europe. At a closer look, however, the 
difference between the constitutional processes in France and in the US 
is not so fundamental as to explain Arendt’s strong emphasis on the 
legalistic procedure of the (US) American Revolution. Aside from the 
multiple exclusions of all women, indigenous people and slaves, the 
constitutional process in the USA was one that was borne by 
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constituted assemblies and dominated by the principle of 
representation. 
Naturally, similar problems are also involved in contemporary 
examples of the relationship between constituent assemblies and 
constitution. Even in the case of the Bolivarian Constitution, it was 
President Chavez who invoked the constituent assembly following his 
election in 1999, and due to the relatively brief period of time between 
the election of the assembly (June 2000) and the referendum (December 
2000), the issue of participation still remained limited despite all efforts 
to increase it. The top-down procedure of the European Constitution, 
in which self-organized debates did not spread throughout Europe at 
all, proved to be even less participative; and regardless of one's position 
on the issue of the rejection of the European Constitution in the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the hollow form of 
‘direct democracy’ does not even begin to substitute for a deliberative 
process involving the whole population (Raunig, 2005). Thus the ‘no’ 
should be interpreted as a break turning against the form of the 
referendum in the question of the European Constitution, or more 
generally against the caricaturing limitation of constituent power to a 
dualistic yes/no mechanism of installing or not installing a new 
constituted power. Here is Stirner again:  
What constitution was to be chosen, this question busied the 
revolutionary heads, and the whole political period foams with 
constitutional fights and constitutional questions, as the social talents 
too were uncommonly inventive in societary arrangements 
(phalansteries and the like). The insurgent strives to become 
constitutionless. (Stirner, 1927: 287; 2001) 
Stirner’s anarchistic point goes far beyond the remainders of constituent 
power in liberal representative democracy, yet it does not assert the 
possibility of a state without any form of constitution. It rather 
describes the desire of the insurrectionist to resist the endless striation 
of desire production through imposing constitutions. In a similar way, 
in Insurgencies, his book about constituent power,4 Antonio Negri (1999) 
attempts to shift the discourse from the abstract general of the 
constitution and the concomitant constitutional processes, to the 
concrete general of an ‘absolute process’. For “once the constituent 
moment is passed, constitutional fixity becomes a reactionary fact in a 
society that is founded on the development of freedoms and the 
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development of the economy” (Negri, 2003: 245). Negri thus no longer 
explains the differentiation of constituting into constituent power and 
constituted power in relation to the constitutional process, but rather on 
the distinction, which goes back to Spinoza, between potentia and potestas. 
When Negri further develops the concept of constituent power as 
an absolute process of social organization, he also starts from the 
discourse on constitution, specifically from Jean Antoine Condorcet’s 
statement, “to each generation its constitution.” Even before the 
relevant principle was specified in the revolutionary French Constitution 
of 1793, Condorcet asserted that one generation may not subject future 
generations to its laws. Negri takes this demand literally and thus goes 
far beyond the former meaning of the pouvoir constituant. He presupposes 
that constituent power can not only not arise from constituted power, 
but that constituent power does not even institute constituted power 
(Negri, 1999: 20). Initially this means that even if there were a 
permanent process of constituting the constitution in Condorcet’s 
sense, in other words a continuous adaptation of the constitution as 
abstract general to the concrete general, there would still be the 
fundamental problem of representation, of the division of labor 
between those representing and those represented, the separation 
between constituted and constituent power. 
Negri logically pursues the question of how a constituent power is 
to be imagined, which does not engender constitutions separated from 
itself, but rather constitutes itself: con-stituent power as a com-position, 
which constitutes itself in a collective process. Stirner’s individual 
anarchism summarizes the concatenation of singularities on a few pages 
with the peculiar terms of the ‘union’ [Verein] and (social) ‘intercourse’ 
[Verkehr] (Stirner, 1927: 192, 197; 2001). Negri seeks to place the 
common, the collectivity, finally a new concept of communism at the 
center of his immanent-transgressive ideas of constitution with a 
collectively envisioned self-constitution. Here constituent power 
constitutes itself, yet no longer as a unity in diversity like the French 
constituante, as a unity that represents diversity. Instead of the self-
constitution of a nation as one body that drafts its constitution itself, it 
is the constituent power of a diversity without unity, without 
uniformization. This brings both Stirner and Negri to a way of thinking 
that consistently goes beyond the constitution: just as Stirner’s insurgent 
strives for constitutionlessness, Negri’s repubblica costituente is a “republic 
that originates before the state that emerges outside the state. It is the 
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paradox of the constituent republic that the process of constitution is 
never closed and that the revolution never ends” (Negri, 2003: 80). 
Stirner’s statement about ‘becoming constitutionless’ is to be 
understood in exactly this sense: as an unfinished process and non-
molar revolution/insurrection.5 It indicates the possibility of an 
arrangement of singularities without constitution, yet not without 
constituent power and the instituting event. This instituting event 
should not establish a constituted power, but rather aims at instituting 
oneself, arranging oneself: Stirner says, “insurrection leads us no longer 
to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves” (Stirner, 1927: 
287; 2001). If constituent power is investigated in its relationship to the 
event and the process of instituting, then it is primarily the mode of 
instituting that comes into focus, in other words the question of how 
exactly the instituting event relates to the process of constituent power, 
which relationship of composition, which form the common, the con- 
of constituent power assumes in the process of instituting. The mode of 
instituting is not only symbolically effective, its tendency either toward 
authoritarian positioning or toward a com-position of the singular is 
decisive. 
The Persistence of Instituent Practice 
Particularly the genealogy of constituent power shows that the question 
of instituting is resolved in very different ways: the modes of instituting 
the constitutional process in France and the USA at the end of the 
eighteenth century were just as different as those of the present day, and 
the instituting event often decides the future of models of political 
organizing. I would like to discuss this question in more detail on the 
basis of artistic political practices of the 1930s, the 1950s and the 1990s, 
which developed various forms of instituting and thus also various 
qualities of participation. This leap from constitutional theory to specific 
micro-politics seems suitable to me for tracing the unfolding of both 
constituent power and ‘instituent practice’ – not at all as a counter-
image to the macro level of major transformations, but rather as 
transversal processes thwarting the dualism of macro/micro in their 
concatenations. 
A decade after the Soviet Proletkult had begun to open the theater 
to everyone, Bertolt Brecht responded to the question of participation 
and activation with a gesture of radical closure by developing the strict 
form of the Lehrstück (‘learning play’) from the various experiments with 
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epic theater in the 1920s. Here the precisely specified audiences become 
‘active participants’: “The learning play teaches by being played, not by 
being seen” (Brecht, 2001). By giving up the theater as a site of 
presentation, the audience as a receptive figure, the text as a finished 
form, Brecht conceived of a theater that is intended only for those 
conducting it, as communication exclusively among the active 
participants. The Lehrstück consists of playing (out) all the possible 
positions and roles in a constant change of perspective. For this reason 
Brecht repeatedly refused performances of The Measures Taken before an 
audience, calling it a “means of pedagogical work with students of 
Marxist schools and proletarian collectives”, with workers choirs, 
amateur theater groups, school choirs and orchestras. There is no 
question, however, that the Brechtian act of establishing this activated 
public only lasted a brief period of time, and its preconditions were still 
found in solitary text production. 
The Situationist International (SI), on the other hand, began as a 
collective that deployed the text more as a discursive and politicizing 
medium in manifestos and magazines, but not as a precondition for the 
practice of creating situations. From the beginnings in the 1950s, the 
point was neither an authoritarian and solitary act of instituting nor a 
passive drifting in quasi-natural situations. The question that arose for 
the SI was:  
What admixture, what interactions ought to occur between the flux (and 
resurgence) of the ‘natural moment’, in Henri Lefebvre's sense, and 
certain artificially constructed elements, introduced into this flux, 
perturbing it, quantitatively and, above all, qualitatively? (Situationist 
International, 1960) 
That a conscious and direct intervention is required beyond ‘natural 
moments’ to construct a situation is already evident in the terms créer 
and construire, which are used in conjunction with the Situationist 
situation. The Situationist definition accordingly conveys the 
constructed situation as “a moment of life concretely and deliberately 
constructed by the collective organization of a unitary ambiance and a 
game of events” (Situationist International, 1958). Entirely in keeping 
with the Brechtian tradition, an important aspect of creating situations 
consisted, not least of all, in thwarting the fixation of the relationships 
between stage and audience space, between actors and observers. The 
role of the audience was to constantly decrease, whereas the proportion 
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of those, who were now no longer acteurs but rather viveurs was to 
increase, at least ideally. 
In terms of the concrete Situationist practice, however, the SI 
already limited the collectivity of the viveurs to a three-phase hierarchy in 
1958. In this hierarchy a certain predominance is attributed to the 
director as leading coordinator, who is also permitted to intervene in 
events, whereas at the second level those consciously experiencing the 
situation directly participate, and finally at the third level a passive 
audience drawn into the situation by chance should be forced into 
action. Despite the collective form of instituting, the problem of 
participation was obviously not resolved at all, especially at the third 
level of the passive audience. It was not until just before and around 
May 1968 in Paris that the SI achieved an opening into the complex and 
unpredictable space of the revolutionary machine as a discursive 
arrangement, only to disband shortly thereafter.6 
Numerous artistic-political practices arose in the 1990s, which 
developed in transversal concatenation with local and global social 
movements. In this way, the somewhat rigidified and hierarchized 
relationship between art and politics was loosened at certain hot spots. 
In the early 1990s in Hamburg an initiative of urban planning from 
below arose from the social contexts of the autonomous squatter 
movement in the Hafenstrasse, the alternative population of the red 
light district of St. Pauli and its social initiatives, and the collective art 
practices of the politicized visual art and the leftist pop scene affiliated 
with the Golden Poodle Club. In the beginning (around 1994), it was 
simply a matter of preventing the planned ‘development’/blocking of 
the banks of the Elbe with the fake idea of a park. However, this soon 
turned into the fiction of a park of a different kind: Park Fiction. The 
self-organized arrangement of a hot spot of gentrification was not only 
intended to attack the state apparatus of traditional urban planning 
policies, but also the limited citizen’s involvement that operates as 
controlled forms of activation in between participation and mediation as 
governmental pacification. The aim of Park Fiction was not so much an 
orderly process of alternative urban planning, but rather the opening of 
a wild process of desire production. 
This idea of a proliferation of collective desire production was the 
foundation for a series of various events (Park Fiction 0-5) in 1995 and 
1996. “Initially, we were less interested in analyzing desires. Or in other 
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words, we saw it as part of our work to convey how to start desiring” 
(Dany, 1996: 56). Lectures on the theme of park and politics, 
exhibitions, raves, video evenings on unusual forms of parks impelled 
desire and knowledge production on the question of all that a park 
could be. These manifold impulses for desiring were intended to make 
the desires start to become grander. 
In October 1997 the planning container was realized as a central 
element: for six months the planning office in a container installed on 
site was open at least two days a week. The strange tools for instituting 
desires included a kneading office, a desire archive, a garden library, 
utensils for crafts, painting and drawing, information material and 
conventional planning material. With over 200 visits to households and 
businesses, people who did not yet have access to the project were 
offered possibilities for involvement with a portable action kit (a 
miniature version of the planning container). An extensive presentation 
and discussion of the results took place at a city district conference in 
April 1998 (Schäfer, 2001). 
The Park Fiction Film by Margit Czenki, which was completed in 
1999, went far beyond classical documentary aspects as a constitutive 
part of the collective desire production for a park that still did not exist: 
‘Desires will leave the house and take to the streets’ was the suggestive 
subtitle that conjoined the constituent power of desires with the 
promise of becoming public. And gradually the desires did actually 
escape the striated space that separates the private from the political. 
They ranged from bird voices on tape and a boxwood hedge trimmed in 
the shape of a poodle, a tree house in the shape of a ripe strawberry, 
mailboxes for young people whose mail is monitored by their parents at 
home, an open air cinema, an exercise hall with a green roof and 
wooden palms on rails, a women pirates fountain, platforms on rails for 
sunbathing and barbecuing, rolling sections of lawn, a boulevard of 
possibilities for which there is no room in the street, tea garden and fruit 
tree meadow, benches, flowers and a fire-breathing Inca goddess as a 
cooking sculpture, a dog racing track, a water slide into the (then clean) 
Elbe, all the way to a trash park made of the garbage of prosperity that 
is not further destructible, which would mirror the conditions in this 
part of the city. 
As art in public space, not only this desire phase should be made 
possible through support from the city, but also the process of realizing 
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the park. In the midst of this phase of the realization of construction, 
during which there were increasing conflicts with bureaucratic 
obstruction, Park Fiction was invited to take part in documenta 11. 
Instead of a spectacular, Thomas Hirschhorn-style site-specific 
intervention in Kassel, Park Fiction focused on documentation and 
archiving, once again with highly unconventional means. Finally in 2003, 
just in time for the congress ‘Unlikely Encounters in Urban Space’ 
organized by Park Fiction, in which activists from different corners of 
the world took part, the park of many islands was partially opened: the 
Flying Carpet and the Palm Island, a small amphitheater behind the 
Golden Poodle Club, the neighborhood gardens around the St. Pauli 
church and the boule grounds ‘breakfast outdoors’. Three open air 
solariums were added in 2005, the tulip-patterned Tartan Field, the dog 
garden with poodle gates and a boxwood hedge in the shape of a 
poodle, the footbridge system Schauermanns Park, two herb gardens in 
front of the parish, and the bamboo garden of the modest politician. 
The women pirates fountain and the strawberry-shaped tree house are 
still waiting to be realized. Most of all, however, the untamed ‘instituent 
practice’ of Park Fiction is still waiting for an appropriate 
contextualization of its fixed ‘objects’: the process, through which the 
park emerged – and this is a more general problem of art in public 
space, which is otherwise hardly taken into consideration – is not 
recognizable in the ‘objects’; the explosiveness of their creation, the 
linking of the singular and the collective in desire production remains 
hidden. Since more complex models of a walk-in archive have been 
made impossible by the authorities, Park Fiction finally developed plans 
for an ‘exploding archive’ with a sculpture boulevard of the non-realized 
desires and electronic access to the archive. 
In a further development of Negri’s conceptualization of constituent 
power, Park Fiction uses the term ‘constituent practice’ as a self-
designation. From the description of the ongoing impulses for collective 
desire production, however, it is particularly the quality as an ‘instituent 
practice’ that should be clear here. In terms of the two interlinking main 
components of ‘instituent practice’, a stronger participation in 
instituting can be recognized in the pluralization of the instituting event: 
especially the concatenation of so many ongoing and diversely 
composed instituting events hinders an authoritarian mode of instituting 
and simultaneously counters the closure of/in the institution Park 
Fiction. The various arrangements of self-organization promote broad 
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participation in instituting, because they newly compose themselves as a 
constituent power again and again, always tying into new local and 
global struggles. In the autonomous genealogy and presence of the 
Hafenstrasse in Hamburg, in the mixed context of the Golden Poodle 
Club and its small debate counterpart, the Butt Club, and the fraying 
social fabric of the neighborhood, Park Fiction is most of all a 
continuously insistent practice of instituting: countless smaller and 
larger impulses for collective insurrection and for the emergence of 
constituent power, a series of events, in which desiring is learned, a 
permanent new beginning, an ‘instituent practice’ that animates an 
astonishing amount and is incredibly persistent at the same time. 
 
Notes 
*  Thanks to Isabell Lorey, Stefan Nowotny and Alice Pechriggl for advice and 
critique. 
1.  Online at http://eipcp.net/transversal/0106. The essays in the first section 
of the present volume, above, are drawn from this issue of transversal. 
2.  There are intersections between Stirner’s main work The Ego and Its Own 
(1845) and Marx and Engels’s The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism 
(1845), and Stirner is directly criticized as ‘St. Max’ in Marx and Engels’s The 
German Ideology (written 1845-6). 
3.  “To ensure myself against a criminal charge, I superfluously remark 
explicitly that I choose the word ‘insurrection’ because of its etymological 
sense, not in the limited sense proscribed by the penal code” (Stirner, 1927: 
288; 2001). 
4.  In the original Italian version of 1992, the book is entitled Il potere costituente: 
saggio sulle alternative del moderno; it deals with the concept of constituent 
power based on analyses of Niccolò Macchiavelli, James Harrington, the 
(US) American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Russian 
Revolution. 
5.  With the Deleuzian turn of ‘becoming constitutionless’, I would like to 
propose an interpretation of Stirner’s ‘insurrection’ that emphasizes the 
molecularity and the aspect of process, thus also drawing a precarious 
boundary that separates this interpretation of Stirner from those of his 
right-wing readers. 
6.  See my discussion in Raunig (2007) and Gene Ray’s essay in this volume. 
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Governmentality and Self-Precarization: 
On the Normalization of Cultural Producers* 
Isabell Lorey 
(Translated by Lisa Rosenblatt and Dagmar Fink) 
For some of us, as cultural producers,1 the idea of a permanent job in an 
institution is something that we do not even consider, or is in any case 
something we decide to do at most for a few years. Afterward, we want 
something different. Hasn’t the idea always been about not being forced 
to commit oneself to one thing, one classical job definition, which 
ignores so many aspects; about not selling out and consequently being 
compelled to give up the many activities that one feels strongly about? 
Wasn’t it important to not adapt to the constraints of an institution, to 
save the time and energy to be able to do the creative and perhaps 
political projects that one really has an interest in? Wasn’t a more or less 
well-paid job gladly taken for a certain period of time, when the 
opportunity arose, to then be able to leave again when it no longer fit? 
Then there would at least be a bit of money there to carry out the next 
meaningful project, which would probably be poorly paid, but 
supposedly more satisfying. 
Crucial for the attitude suggested here is the belief that one has 
chosen his or her own living and working situations and that these can 
be arranged relatively freely and autonomously. Actually, also 
consciously chosen to a great extent are the uncertainties, the lack of 
continuities under the given social conditions. Yet in the following my 
concern is not with the question of ‘when did I really decide freely?’, or 
‘when do I act autonomously?’, but instead, with the ways in which 
ideas of autonomy and freedom are constitutively connected with 
hegemonic modes of subjectivation in Western, capitalist societies. The 
focus of this text is accordingly on the extent to which ‘self-chosen’ 
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precarization contributes to producing the conditions for being able to 
become an active part of neo-liberal political and economic relations. 
No general statements about cultural producers or all of those 
currently in a situation that has been made precarious can be derived 
from this perspective. However, what becomes apparent when 
problematizing this ‘self-chosen’ precarization, are the historical lines of 
force (Foucault 1980; Deleuze, 1988) of modern bourgeois 
subjectivation, which are imperceptibly hegemonic, normalizing, and 
possibly block ‘counter-behavior’ (Foucault, 2004a: 292). 
To demonstrate the genealogy of these lines of force, I will first turn 
to Michel Foucault’s concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’. We 
will not focus on the breaks and rifts in the lines of bourgeois 
subjectivation, but instead, on their structural and transformative 
continuities including the entanglement in governmental techniques of 
modern Western societies until today. What ideas of sovereignty arise in 
these modern, governmental dispositifs? What lines of force – i.e., what 
continuities, self-evidences, and normalizations can be drawn to what 
and how we think and feel as ‘self-chosen’ cultural producers that have 
been made precarious in neo-liberal conditions, how we are in the 
world, and specifically also in so-called dissident practices? Do cultural 
producers who are in a precarious state possibly embody a ‘new’ 
governmental normality through certain self-relations and ideas of 
sovereignty? 
With the genealogy of the force lines of bourgeois subjectivation, in 
the course of the text I will differentiate between precarization as 
deviance, and therefore as a contradiction of liberal governmentality, on 
the one hand, and as a hegemonic function of neo-liberal 
governmentality on the other, to then finally clarify the relationship 
between the two based on the example of the ‘free’ decision for 
precarious living and working. 
Biopolitical Governmentality 
With the term ‘governmentality’, Michel Foucault defined the 
structural entanglement of the government of a State and the techniques 
of self-government in Western societies. This involvement between 
State and population as subjects is not a timeless constant. Only in the 
course of the eighteenth century could that which had been developing 
since the sixteenth century take root: a new government technique, 
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more precisely, the force lines of modern government techniques until 
today. The traditional sovereign, for whom Foucault introduces the 
character from Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince from the sixteenth 
century as a prototype, and Thomas Hobbes’s contract-based voluntary 
community of subordinates from the seventeenth century, were not yet 
concerned with ruling ‘the people’ for the sake of their welfare, but 
instead, they were primarily interested in dominating them for the 
welfare of the sovereign. It was first in the course of the eighteenth 
century, when liberalism and the bourgeoisie became hegemonic, that 
the population entered the focus of power and along with it, a 
governing that was oriented on the life of ‘the people’ and making that 
life better. The power of the State no longer depended solely on the size 
of a territory or the mercantile, authoritative regulation of subordinates,2 
but instead, on the ‘happiness’ of the population, on their life and a 
steady improvement of that life. 
In the course of the eighteenth century, governing methods 
continued to transform toward a political economy of liberalism: self-
imposed limitations on government for the benefit of a free market on 
the one hand, and on the other, a population of subjects that were 
bound to economic paradigms in their thought and behavior. These 
subjects were not subjugated simply by means of obedience, but became 
governable in that, on the whole, “their life expectancy, their health, and 
their courses of behavior were involved in complex and entangled 
relationships with these economic processes” (Foucault, 2004b: 42). 
Liberal modes of government presented the basic structure for modern 
governmentality, which has always been biopolitical.3 Or, in other 
words: liberalism was the economic and political framework of 
biopolitics and, equally, “an indispensable element in the development 
of capitalism” (Foucault, 1980: 141-142). 
The strength and wealth of a state at the end of the eighteenth 
century depended ever more greatly on the health of its population. In a 
bourgeois liberal context, a government policy oriented on this means, 
until today, establishing and producing normality and then securing it. 
For that, a great deal of data is necessary; statistics are produced, 
probabilities of birth rates and death rates are calculated, frequencies of 
diseases, living conditions, means of nutrition, etc. Yet that does not 
suffice. In order to manufacture a population’s health standard, and to 
maximize it, these bio-productive, life-supporting biopolitical 
government methods also require the active participation of every single 
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individual, which means their self-governing. Foucault writes in The 
History of Sexuality:  
Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species 
in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities 
of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be 
modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal 
manner. (Foucault, 1980: 142, my emphasis) 
Here, Foucault describes two things that I consider essential: the 
modern individual must learn how to have a body that is dependent on 
certain existential conditions, and, second, he or she must learn to 
develop a relationship with his or her ‘self’ that is creative and 
productive, a relationship in which it is possible to fashion his or her 
‘own’ body, ‘own’ life, ‘own’ self. Philipp Sarasin shows the emergence 
in the context of the Western hygiene discourse of the waning 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, of ”the belief that the 
individual was largely capable of determining its health, illness, or even 
the time of death” (Sarasin, 2001: 19). This idea of the ability to shape 
and fashion one’s self never arose independent of governmental 
dispositifs. 
In the context of liberal governmental technologies of the self, the 
attribute ‘own’ always signifies ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson, 
1962). However, initially, self-relations oriented on the imagination of 
one’s ‘own’, were only applicable to the bourgeois, then gradually 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the entire population. At 
issue here is not the legal status of a subject, but structural conditions of 
normalizing societies: one must be capable of managing oneself, 
recognizing oneself as subject to a sexuality, and learn to have a body 
that remains healthy through attentiveness (nutrition, hygiene, living) 
and can become sick through inattentiveness. In this sense, the entire 
population must become biopolitical subjects (Lorey, 2006a). 
With reference to wage workers, such imaginary self-relations4 mean 
that one’s own body, constituted as the property of the self, becomes an 
‘own’ body that one must sell as labor power. Also, in this respect, the 
modern, ‘free’ individual is compelled to co-produce him or herself 
through such powerful self-relations, that the individual can sell his or 
her labor power well, in order to live a life that improves steadily. 
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Therefore, in modern societies, the ‘art of governing’ – which was 
another name given by Foucault (1991) to governmentality – does not 
primarily consist of being repressive, but instead, ‘inwardly held’ self-
discipline and self-control.5 It is the analysis of an order that is not only 
forced upon people, bodies, and things, but in which they are 
simultaneously an active part. At the center of the problem of 
government ruling techniques is not the question of regulating 
autonomous, free subjects, but instead, regulating the relations through 
which so-called autonomous and free subjects are first constituted as 
such. 
Already in the second half of the seventeenth century, John Locke, 
who according to Karl Marx, “demonstrated ... that the bourgeois way 
of thinking is the normal human way of thinking” (Marx, 1999), wrote 
in The Two Treatises of Government, that man is “master of himself, and 
proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it” (Locke, 
1823). At the beginning of the modern era, property acquired a 
supposed ‘anthropological meaning’ (Castel, 2005: 24) for both the 
bourgeois man as a prerequisite for his formal freedom as a citizen, as 
well as for the worker, who owns his own labor power and must sell it, 
freely, as wage labor. It seemed to be the prerequisite with which the 
individual could become independent and free from the traditional 
system of subordination and security. With a biopolitical 
governmentality perspective, the meaning of property, however, 
surpasses the limited levels of citizenship, capital, and wage labor and is, 
in fact, to be understood as something entirely general. For in a 
biopolitical dispositif, relations of bodily ownership apply to the entire 
population as governmental self-governing, not only to citizens or 
workers.6 The modern person is, accordingly, constituted through 
possessive individualistic self-relations, which are fundamental for 
historically specific ideas of autonomy and freedom. Structurally, 
modern self-relations are based – also beyond an economic 
interpellation – on a relation to one’s own body as a means of 
production. 
In this broad sense of economy and biopolitics, the lines of the 
labor entrepreneur, ‘the entrepreneur of one’s self’ (Pühl, 2003) as a 
mode of subjectivation, reach back to the beginnings of modern liberal 
societies and are not an entirely neo-liberal phenomena.7 This type of 
genealogy of course skips over the era of the social, the welfare state 
since the end of the nineteenth century, and ties together, the for the 
Isabell Lorey 
192 
most part compulsively constituting self-entrepreneurs in the current 
reconstruction and deconstruction of the social/welfare state with 
fundamental liberal governmental methods of subjectivation since the 
end of the eighteenth century. With the interpellation to be responsible 
for one’s self, something that had already failed in the nineteenth 
century seems to be repeating itself now, namely, the primacy of 
property and the construction of security associated with it. Property 
was introduced in the early stages of bourgeois rule as protection against 
the incalculability of social existence, as security against vulnerability in a 
secularized society and the domination of the princes and kings. 
Ultimately this applied to only a limited few, and at the end of the 
nineteenth century the nation state had to guarantee social security for 
many. However, it does not automatically follow that today the State 
must once again take on a more comprehensive social function of 
protection and security (Castel, 2005). For this would quickly reproduce 
the utterly flexible, Western nation state nexus of freedom and security 
with similar structural inclusions and exclusions, rather than break 
through it. 
Normalized Free Subjects 
In biopolitical governmental societies, the constitution of the ‘normal’ is 
always also woven in with the hegemonic.8 With the demand to orient 
on the normal – which could be bourgeois, heterosexual, Christian, 
white male, white female, national – in the course of the modern era, it 
was necessary to develop the perspective of controlling one’s own body, 
one’s own life, by regulating and thus managing the self. The normal is 
not identical with the norm, but it can take on its function. Normality is, 
however, never anything external, for we are the ones who guarantee it, 
and reproduce it through alterations. Accordingly, we govern ourselves 
in the dispositif of governmentality, biopolitics, and capitalism in that we 
normalize ourselves. If this is successful – and it usually is – power and 
certain domination relations are barely perceptible, and extremely 
difficult to reflect on, because we act in their production, as it were, in 
the ways we relate to ourselves, and own our bodies. The normalizing 
society and the subjectivation taking place within it are a historical effect 
of a power technology directed at life. The normalized subject itself is, 
once again, a historical construct in an ensemble of knowledge forms, 
technologies, and institutions. This ensemble is aimed at the individual 
body as well as at the life of the population as a whole. Normalization is 
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lived through everyday practices that are perceived as self-evident and 
natural. 
Additionally, the normal is naturalized with the effect of actuality, of 
authenticity. We thus believe, for example, that the effect of power 
relations is the essence of our self, our truth, our own, actual core, the 
origin of our being. This normalizing self-governing is based on an 
imagined coherence, uniformity and wholeness, which can be traced 
back to the construction of a white, male subject (Lorey, 2006b). 
Coherence is, once again, one of the prerequisites for modern 
sovereignty. The subject must believe that it is “master in its own 
house” (Freud, 2000: 284). If this fundamental imagination fails, then 
usually not only others perceive the person in question as ‘abnormal’, 
but the person, too, has this opinion of him or herself. 
Let’s remain with the learned way of self-relation, which is so 
existential for the biopolitical governmental modern era, and which 
applies to the entire population in very different ways. This relationship 
with one’s self is based on the idea of having an inner nature, an inner 
essence that ultimately makes up one’s unique individuality. These kinds 
of imagined ‘inner, natural truths’, these constructions of actuality, are 
usually understood as unalterable, merely able to be suppressed or 
liberated. Until today, they nourish the ideas of being able to, or having 
to, fashion and design one’s self and one’s life freely, autonomously, and 
according to one’s own decisions. These kinds of power relations are 
therefore not easy to perceive as they commonly come along as one’s 
own free decision, as a personal view, and until today produce the desire 
to ask: ‘Who am I?’ or, ‘How can I realize my potential?’ ‘How can I 
find myself and most greatly develop the essence of my being?’ As 
mentioned, the concept of responsibility of one’s own, so commonly 
used in the course of neo-liberal restructuring, lies within this liberal 
force line of possessive individualism and actuality and only functions 
additionally as a neo-liberal interpellation for self-governing. 
Basically, governmental self-government takes place in an apparent 
paradox. Governing, controlling, disciplining, and regulating one’s self 
means, at the same time, fashioning and forming one’s self, empowering 
one’s self, which, in this sense, means to be free. Only through this 
paradox can sovereign subjects be governed. Precisely because 
techniques of governing one’s self arise from the simultaneity of 
subjugation and empowerment, the simultaneity of compulsion and 
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freedom, in this paradoxical movement, the individual not only 
becomes a subject, but a certain, modern ‘free’ subject. Subjectivated in 
this way, this subject continually participates in (re)producing the 
conditions for governmentality, as it is first in this scenario that agency 
emerges. According to Foucault, power is practiced only on ‘free 
subjects’ and only to the extent that they are ‘free’ (Foucault, 1983). 
In the context of governmentality, subjects are, thus, subjugated and 
simultaneously agents, and in a certain sense, free. This freedom is, at 
the same time, a condition and effect of liberal power relations – i.e., of 
biopolitical governmentality. Despite all of the changes that have 
occurred until today, since the end of the eighteenth century, this is one 
of the lines of force through which individuals in modern societies can 
be governed. 
This normalized freedom of biopolitical governmental societies 
never exists without security mechanisms or constructions of the 
abnormal and deviant, which likewise have subjectivating functions. The 
modern era seems unthinkable without a ‘culture of danger’, without a 
permanent threat to the normal, without imaginary invasions of 
constant, common threats such as diseases, dirt, sexuality, or the ‘fear of 
degeneration’ (Foucault, 2004b: 101f).9 The interplay of freedom and 
security, self empowerment and compulsion, also with the help of this 
culture of danger, drives on the problems of the political economy of 
liberal power. 
Against this backdrop, all of those who did not comply with this 
norm and normalizing of a free, sovereign, bourgeois, white subject 
including its property relations were made precarious. Furthermore, in 
the context of the social state, which was meant to guarantee the 
security of modern insecurity, not only were women made structurally 
precarious as wives, through the normal labor conditions oriented on 
the man. Also those who were excluded as abnormal and foreign from 
the nation state compromise between capital and labor were likewise 
made precarious (Kleines Postfordistisches Drama, 2005a and 2005b; 
Mecheril, 2003). Precarization was, accordingly, until now always an 
inherent contradiction in liberal governmentality and, as abnormal, 
disturbed the stabilizing dynamic between freedom and security. In this 
sense, it was often the trigger for counter-behavior. 
Presently, normal labor conditions oriented on a male breadwinner, 
a situation largely accessible only for the majority society, is losing its 
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hegemony. Precarization is increasingly a part of governmental 
normalization techniques and as a result, in neo-liberalism it transforms 
from an inherent contradiction to a hegemonic function. 
Economizing of Life and the Absence of Counter-behavior  
The talk of the ‘economizing of life’, a discussion often struck up in the 
past several years, provides only very limited explanations of neo-liberal 
transformation processes: not only due to its totalizing rhetoric, but also 
because of the associated proclamation of what is supposedly a new 
phenomenon. ‘Economizing of life’ usually refers to certain simplified 
theses: no longer only work, but also life has fallen prey to economic 
exploitation interests; a separation between work and life is no longer 
possible and in the course of this, an implosion of the distinction 
between production and reproduction has also taken place. Such 
totalizing implosion theses speak of a collective victim status and distort 
the view of modes of subjectivation, agency, and ultimately of counter-
behavior. 
However, the thesis of the ‘economizing of life’ makes sense from a 
biopolitical governmentality perspective. It points to the power and 
domination relations of a bourgeois liberal society, which for more than 
two hundred years now has been constituted around the productivity of 
life. In this perspective, life was never the other side of work. In 
Western modernity, reproduction was always part of the political and 
the economic. Not only reproduction, but also life in general was never 
beyond power relations. Instead, life, precisely in its productivity, which 
means its design potential, was always the effect of such relations. And 
it is precisely this design potential that is constitutive for the supposed 
paradox of modern subjectivation between subordination and 
empowerment, between regulation and freedom. A liberal process of 
constituting precarization as an inherent contradiction, did not take 
place beyond this subjectivation, it is an entirely plausible resulting 
bundle of social, economic and political positions. 
In this sense, the currently lamented ‘economization of life’ is not an 
entirely neo-liberal phenomenon, but instead, a force line of biopolitical 
societies, which today perhaps becomes intelligible in a new way. The 
associated subjectivations are not new in the way that they are usually 
claimed to be. In fact, their biopolitical governmental continuities have 
hardly been grasped. 
Isabell Lorey 
196 
Were living and working conditions, which arose in the context of 
social movements since the 1960s, really in no way governmental?10 
Indeed, the thoroughly dissident practices of alternative ways of living, 
the desire for different bodies and self-relations (in feminist, ecological, 
left-radical contexts), persistently aimed to distinguish themselves from 
normal working conditions and the associated constraints, disciplinary 
measures, and controls. Keywords here are: deciding for oneself what 
one does for work and with whom; consciously choosing precarious 
forms of work and life, because more freedom and autonomy seem 
possible precisely because of the ability to organize one’s own time, and 
what is most important: self-determination. Often, being paid well 
hasn’t been a concern as the remuneration was enjoying the work. The 
concern was being able to bring to bear one’s many skills. Generally, the 
conscious, voluntary acceptance of precarious labor conditions was 
often certainly also an expression of the wish for living the modern, 
patriarchal dividing of reproduction and wage labor differently than is 
possible within the normal work situation. 
However, it is precisely these alternative living and working 
conditions that have become increasingly more economically utilizable 
in recent years because they favor the flexibility that the labor market 
demands. Thus, practices and discourses of social movements in the 
past thirty, forty years were not only dissident and directed against 
normalization, but also at the same time, a part of the transformation 
toward a neo-liberal form of governmentality. 
But to what extent are precarious modes of living and working, 
formerly perceived as dissident, now obvious in their hegemonic, 
governmental function? And why do they seem to lose their potential 
for counter-behavior? The following will offer a few thoughts without 
any claims of presenting a comprehensive analysis. 
Many of the cultural producers who have entered into a precarious 
situation of their own accord, the people of whom we are speaking here 
as a whole, would refer consciously or unconsciously to a history of 
previous alternative conditions of existence, usually without having any 
direct political relationship to them. They are more or less disturbed by 
their shift to the center of society – i.e., to the place where the normal 
and hegemonic are reproduced. That does not mean, however, that 
former alternative living and working techniques will become socially 
hegemonic. Instead, it works the other way around: the mass 
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precarization of labor conditions is forced upon all of those who fall out 
of normal labor conditions along with the promise of the ability to take 
responsibility for their own creativity and fashion their lives according 
to their own rules, as a desirable, supposedly normal condition of 
existence. Our concern here is not with these persons forced into 
precarization, but those who say that as cultural workers they have 
freely chosen precarious living and working conditions (Kuster, 2006; 
Panagiotidis, 2005). 
It is amazing that there are no systematic empirical studies of this.11 
The common parameters of cultural producers, however, should be that 
they are well or even very well educated, between twenty-five and forty 
years-old, without children, and more or less intentionally in a 
precarious employment situation. They pursue temporary jobs, live 
from projects and pursue contract work from several clients at the same 
time, one right after the other, usually without sick pay, paid vacations, 
or unemployment compensation, and without any job security, thus 
with no or only minimal social protection. The forty-hour week is an 
illusion. Working time and free time have no clearly defined borders. 
Work and leisure can no longer be separated. In the non-paid time, they 
accumulate a great deal of knowledge, which is not paid for extra, but is 
naturally called for and used in the context of paid work, etc. 
This is not an ‘economizing of life’, that comes from the outside, 
overpowering and totalizing. Instead, these are practices connected with 
desire as well as adaptation. For these conditions of existence are 
constantly foreseen and co-produced in anticipatory obedience. 
‘Voluntary’, – i.e., unpaid or low paying jobs in the culture or academic 
industries, for example – are all too often accepted as an unchangeable 
fact, and nothing else is even demanded. The necessity of pursuing 
other, less creative, precarious jobs in order to finance one’s own 
cultural production is accepted. This forced and, simultaneously chosen, 
financing of one’s own creative output constantly supports and 
reproduces precisely those relations from which one suffers and of 
which one wants to be a part. Perhaps those who work creatively, these 
precarious cultural producers by design, are subjects that can be 
exploited so easily because they seem to bear their living and working 
conditions eternally due to the belief in their own freedom and 
autonomy, due to self-realization fantasies. In a neo-liberal context they 
are exploitable to such an extreme that the State even presents them as 
role models. 
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This situation of self-precarization is connected to experiences of 
fear and loss of control, feelings of insecurity through the loss of 
certainties and safeguards, as well as fear and the experience of failure, 
social decline and poverty. Also for these reasons, ‘letting go’ or forms 
of dropping out and dropping off of hegemonic paradigms are difficult. 
Everyone has to remain ‘on speed’ otherwise you might fall out. There 
are no clear times for relaxation or recuperation. This kind of 
reproduction has no clear place, which, in turn, results in an unfulfilled 
yearning and a continuous suffering from this lack. The desire for 
relaxation to ‘find oneself’ becomes insatiable. These kinds of 
reproductive practices usually have to be learned anew. They are lacking 
in any self-evidence and have to be fought for bitterly against oneself 
and others. In turn, this makes this yearning for reproduction, for 
regeneration, so extremely marketable. 
As a result, not only the side of work, of production, has become 
precarious, but also the so-called other side, which is often defined as 
‘life’, the side of reproduction. Do production and reproduction 
therefore coincide? In these cultural producers, in an old, new way, yes. 
What they reveal is that in a neo-liberal form of individualization, parts 
of production and reproduction are deposited ‘in’ the subjects. 
Panagiotidis and Tsianos (2004: 19) also argue along these lines when 
they state: “The progressive vanquishing of the division of production 
and reproduction does not occur at home or at the workplace, but 
instead, through an embodiment of the work itself: a reflexive way of 
precarization!” Though what is materialized in the bodies, beyond the 
work, is also always the governmental life, as biopolitical governmental 
power relations function doggedly through the production of 
hegemonic, normalized bodies and self-relations. 
The function of reproduction consequently changes in the present 
context of precarious immaterial, usually individualized work and ‘life’. 
It is no longer externalized with others, primarily women. Individual 
reproduction and sexual reproduction, the production of life, now 
becomes individualized and is shifted, in part, ‘into’ the subjects 
themselves. It is about regeneration beyond work, also through work, 
but still, quite often beyond adequately paid wage labor. It is about 
regeneration, renewal, creating from one’s self, re-producing one’s self 
from one’s own power: of one’s own accord. Self-realization becomes a 
reproductive task for the self. Work is meant to guarantee the 
reproduction of the self. 
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Presenting ‘precarized’ cultural producers (that is, cultural producers 
who have been made precarious) in their entire heterogeneity in such a 
uniform fashion, it is possible to say that their subjectivation in neo-
liberalism has obviously been contradictory: in the simultaneity of, on 
the one hand, precarization, which also always means fragmentation and 
non-linearity, and on the other, the continuity of sovereignty. The 
continuity of modern sovereignty takes place through the stylizing of 
self-realization, autonomy, and freedom, through the fashioning of and 
responsibility for one’s self, and the repetition of the idea of actuality. 
An example of this is the (still) widespread idea of the modern male 
artist subject, who draws his creativity from himself, because it 
supposedly exists within him, there, where Western modernity also 
positions sex and has made it the nature, the essence, of the individual. 
In general, for the cultural producers described here, sovereignty seems 
to rest mainly in the ‘free’ decision for precarization, therefore, self-
precarization. Yet this, in turn, could be a central reason for why it is so 
difficult to recognize structural precarization as a neo-liberal 
governmental phenomenon that affects the entire society, and is hardly 
based on a free decision. Cultural producers therefore offer an example 
of the extent to which ‘self-chosen’ ways of living and conditions of 
working, including their ideas of autonomy and freedom, are compatible 
with political and economic restructuring. How else can we explain that 
in a study of the living and working conditions of critical cultural 
producers, when asked what a ‘good life’ is, they had no answer?12 
When work and life increasingly permeate one another, then that means, 
as one interviewee expressed: “work seeps into your life.” But 
obviously, not enough ideas of a ‘good life’ seep into the work, whereby 
this could then, in turn, transform into something that could collectively 
signify a ‘good life’. The counter-behavior with the view to a better life, 
which has less and less of a governmental function, is missing. 
Apparently, the belief in precarization as a liberal governmental 
oppositional position can be maintained with the help of contradictory 
subjectivation, between sovereignty and fragmentation. However, in this 
way, continuing relations of power and domination are made invisible 
and normalization mechanisms become naturalized as the subject’s self-
evident and autonomous decisions. The totalizing talk of ‘economizing 
of life’ only contributes to this by causing hegemony effects to 
disappear from view and with them, struggles and antagonisms. One’s 
own imaginations of autonomy and freedom are not reflected on within 
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governmental force lines of modern subjectivation, other freedoms are 
no longer imagined, thus blocking the view of a possible behavior 
contesting the hegemonic function of precarization in the context of 
neo-liberal governmentality. 
What is the price of this normalization? In neo-liberalism, what 
functions as the abnormal? As the deviant? What can’t be economically 
exploited in this way? Rather than focusing on the messianic arrival of 
counter-behavior and new subjectivities, as Deleuze rhetorically 
formulates with the question: “Do not the changes in capitalism find an 
unexpected ‘encounter’ in the slow emergence of a new self as a centre 
of resistance?” (Deleuze, 1988: 115)13, I believe that it is necessary to 
continue to work further and more precisely on the genealogies of 
precarization as a hegemonic function, on the problem of continuities 
of bourgeois governmental modes of subjectivation, also in the context 
of notions of autonomy and freedom that look upon themselves as 
dissident. 
 
Notes 
*  Thanks to Brigitta Kuster, Katharina Pühl, and Gerald Raunig for critical 
discussions. 
1.  ‘Cultural producers’ is used here as a paradox designation. It refers to an 
imagination of the designated subjects: that of their own autonomous 
production and of fashioning their selves. But at the same time it is about 
the fact that these ways of subjectivation are instruments of governing, thus 
functional effects of biopolitical govermental societies of occidental 
modernity. Therefore the term ‘cultural producers’ has a contradictory 
meaning and does not in first place concern artists. With this 
conceptualization I also refer to the definition by the group kpD/kleines 
postfordistisches Drama (‘little post-Fordist drama’) to which I belong, 
along with Brigitta Kuster, Katja Reichard and Marion von Osten. 
(Translators’ note: The abbreviation KPD, all capital letters, stood for the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, the German Communist Party.) “We 
employ the term ‘cultural producers’ in a decidedly strategic way. With it, we 
are not speaking of a certain sector (cultural industry), nor of an 
ascertainable social category (for example, those insured by artists’ social 
security in Germany, which is a health, pension and accident insurance for 
artists and writers) or of a professional self-conception. Instead, we are 
speaking of the practice of traveling across a variety of things: theory 
production, design, political and cultural self-organization, forms of 
collaboration, paid and unpaid jobs, informal and formal economies, 
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temporary alliances, project related working and living” (Kleines 
postfordistisches Drama, 2005b: 24). 
2.  Mercantilism was also oriented toward the growth of the population, but 
oriented more in terms of quantitative aspects than quality of life ‘of the 
people’. 
3.  For one of the few places in which Foucault points out the inseparability of 
modern governmentality and biopolitics, see Foucault (2004b: 43). On 
biopolitical governmentality as a socio-theoretical concept, see Lorey 
(2006a). 
4.  Following Louis Althusser’s thoughts, these imaginary self-relations cannot 
be separated from ‘real living conditions’, which are here the governmental 
techniques for ruling the population which, for example, materialize in the 
constitution of bodies. 
5.  I assume that it was not first under neo-liberalism that self-management 
shifted ‘inward’ and replaced a regulatory principle. Regulation and control 
are not techniques that were first established under neo-liberalism to oppose 
discipline (Deleuze, 1992; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Particularly when 
reproduction technologies along with hygiene and health are attributed a 
central biopolitical productivity of (gendered and raced) bodies, then for the 
bourgeoisie the introduction of these practices of subjectivation must be 
positioned at the beginning of the modern era, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, at the latest. 
6.  This biopolitical subjectivation is, conversely, differentiated through gender, 
race, class affiliation, religion, and hetero-normativity, which I cannot go 
into in detail here. Generally, the text focuses solely on these force lines of 
bourgeois subjectivation. It is not aiming at a comprehensive look at the 
problem of ways of subject constitution. 
7.  Foucault (2004b) on the contrary, speaks only in connection to the 
formation of neoliberal governmentality in the U.S. of the self employer; as 
does the research based on his work (Bröckling, 2000; Pieper and Gutiérrez 
Rodríguez, 2003). Lemke et al. (2000: 15) argue, for example, that first when 
the liberal regulation of ‘natural freedom’ transformed into that of ‘artificial 
freedom’, was it possible to detect “entrepreneurial behavior of 
economically-rational individuals”. Yet what is this ‘natural freedom’ other 
than the effect of governmental techniques and social struggles? And what, 
in contrast, is ‘artificial freedom’? 
8.  In his genealogy of governmentality, Foucault does not draw any explicit 
connections between the normal and the hegemonic. In order to understand 
the dynamic and meaning of governmentality, normalization mechanisms 
must be viewed explicitly in connection with the production of hegemonic 
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discourses and the related struggles. On the connection between Foucault 
and Gramsci, see Hall (1997) and Demirovic (1997). 
9.  Biopolitical governmentality structures modern societies in a specifically 
paradoxical way. “It enables”, as Cornelia Ott so succinctly states, “people 
to come to understand themselves as unique ‘subjects’, and at the same 
time, brings them together as an amorphous, unified, ‘population mass’. 
…Hereby, the flipside is always the ‘right to life’ rather than the exclusion 
or annihilation of life” (Ott, 1997: 110). On the connection between 
biopolitical sociation and colonialism, see Lorey (2006b). 
10.  Boltanski and Chiapello (2001), in contrast, assume an appropriation. 
According to their study, the changes in capitalism since the 1960s can be 
traced back to a specific integration and strategic reformulation of an 
‘artistic critique’, a critique that complains of the uniformity of a mass 
society, a lack of individual autonomy, and the loss of authentic social 
relations (see also Lemke, 2004: 176-78). 
11.  Initial approaches can be found in Böhmler and Scheiffele (2005); the study 
by Anne and Marine Rambach (2001) on precarious intellectuals in France; 
the theses by Angela McRobbie (2004) on the functionality of artists for the 
new economy; or the study by kpD (2005b). 
12.  As part of the film project Kamera Läuft! (Action! Zürich/Berlin 2004, 32”), 
at the end of 2003, the group kpD (kleines postfordistisches Drama, see 
note 1 above) interviewed fifteen Berlin cultural producers (including kpD) 
“with whom we work together for a specific form of political practice in the 
cultural field or whose work we use as a reference. … Our questions were 
based on those from Fronte della Gioventù Lavoratrice’s and Potere 
Operaio’s questionnaire action carried out in early 1967 in Mirafiori, ‘Fiat is 
our University’, which among other things, also asked about the ideas of a 
‘good life’, and organization. … With regards to a potential politicization of 
cultural producers, we were, however, also interested in collective refusal 
strategies and in the associated wishes for improving one’s own life, the life 
of others, and ultimately, social change. The only thing that was present at a 
general level in all of the interviews was the suffering from a lack of 
continuity. … We, too, found almost no alternative life concepts in our 
horizon of ideas that could counter the existing ones with anything clear or 
unambiguous” (2005b: 24; 2005a). 
13.  An extreme example of a current messianic idea is naturally the end of the 
book Empire by Hardt and Negri (2000), but also, although different and in 
a greatly weakend form, Foucault (1983) with his demand for new 
subjectivities. 
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To Embody Critique: 
Some Theses, Some Examples 
Marina Garcés 
(Translated by Maribel Casas-Cortés and Sebastian Cobarrubias/ Notas 
Rojas Collective Chapel Hill) 
Not only does it matter which principles we chose but also which 
forces, which people will apply them. (Merleau-Ponty) 
1. The problem of critique has traditionally been a problem of 
conscience. Today it is a problem of the body. How do we incarnate 
critique? How does critical thought acquire a body? If critique was used 
traditionally to combat darkness, today it must combat impotence. The 
global world is completely illuminated. Our minds are enlightened. 
There is nothing that we don’t see: misery, lies, exploitation, torture, 
exclusion, etc. – all are completely exposed and brought to light. 
Nonetheless we are capable of doing so little. About ourselves. For our 
world. We can say it all and nonetheless we have nothing relevant to 
add. To embody critique is not to find the correct wording, nor to 
become complacent in the gardens of good conscience, nor to sell the 
cheapest solutions to existing institutions. To embody critique means to 
ask how to subvert one’s life nowadays in such a way that the world can 
no longer remain the same. 
2. The critique that historically fought ignorance had a hero: the 
artist-intellectual. His words and his actions were bearers of light: 
analysis, metanarratives, denunciation, provocation… These were the 
tools of an intervention made before and about the world. The artist-
intellectual worked from his desk, from his studio. That was his balcony. 
From there, his word could remain pure or sell itself to the powers that 
be, sacrifice itself for the cause of the struggle or return the stability to 
the current order. This word could be right or wrong, faithful or 
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treacherous. The artist-intellectual could even abandon his balcony and 
join the multitude. A critique that battles impotence does not have a 
hero, or it has many. Its expression is anonymous, without a face. Its 
place of enunciation is wandering, intermittent, visible and invisible at 
the same time. Today, who is the subject of enunciation of critical 
thought? Where will we find it? If we cannot name it, that is because it 
is an anonymous and ambivalent subject. Composed of theory and 
practice, of word and action, this subject is brilliant and miserable, 
isolated and collective, strong and weak. Its truth does not illuminate 
the world, rather its truth contradicts it. If the world claims: “This is all 
there is”, there exists a we that responds: “That cannot be all.” 
3. Impotence is not the consequence of a historical weakness of 
social movements or of any other kind of political subject that we can 
think of. Their weakness is the result of a big change in social relations, 
where a logic of pertinence has been replaced by a logic of connection. 
This means that the inclusion/exclusion of each one of us is decided 
not through our relationships of pertinence to some wider collective (a 
people, community, class) but rather in our capacity of connecting. 
Connections that must be fed and renovated permanently, maintained 
by each person throughout all activities in which s/he is completely 
invested. In the network-society, everyone is on their own in their 
connection to the world. Everyone fights their specific battle in order to 
avoid losing that connectivity to the world, to avoid remaining outside, 
to avoid making a story of exclusion out of their own biography. To 
spend one’s life looking for work, to risk one’s life crossing borders: 
those are the two paradigmatic movements, the biographies of the 
precarious one and the immigrant one that we all are. The logic of 
pertinence had it own forms of domination. The logic of connection is 
simple and binary: either you are connected or you are dead. With this 
reformulation of social links – which could be understood as a result of 
the historic defeat of the workers’ movement – every life is put into 
motion toward the world. No one is sure of where they are: 
connections, personal and non-transferable, are inseparable from the 
threat of dis-connection. For this reason, this new social contract 
converts us into producers and reproducers of reality, in knots that 
strengthen the network: established unilaterally through each person. 
This network obligates through self-obligation, controls through self-
control, represses through self repression. 
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4. Impotence is not the result of a historical weakness of social 
movements, nor is it the result of an incapacity of the ‘I’. ‘I don’t 
do/cannot do anything’: not for society, not for the preservation of the 
planet, not to stop war… Nothing. This is the declaration of self-
contemplation by a subject that can only move between culpability and 
cynicism. It is the voice of that ‘I’ that is isolated in its connection to the 
network. Alone in a lonely world. Alone with all the rest. From its 
precarious and depoliticized connection, that ‘I’ is prey for moralism, 
opinion, and psychology. This ‘I’ moves between the spheres of some 
values that orbit around the world, with which s/he judges and is 
judged; the marketplace of opinions that offer this ‘I’ a position in 
society and the restrictive environment of discomfort/comfort. 
5. Fighting impotence and embodying critique must pass firstly 
through attacking that ‘I’. Attacking the values with which we fly around 
the world, attacking the opinions with which we protect ourselves from 
the world, attacking our own particular and precarious comfort. If 
critique can define itself as a theoretical-practical discourse that has 
emancipatory effects, the principal objective of critique today must be 
to free ourselves from the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is not our singularity. The ‘I’ is the 
device that simultaneously isolates and connects us to the network-
society. Each person with their values, opinions, and states of mind can 
remain calm before the world, can remain impotent before the world. 
Cynical and guilty, the ‘I’ always knows where it must remain. 
6. Against the grain of the modern tradition, developing critical 
thought does not mean bringing the subject to its highest degree of 
maturity and independence but rather, uprooting the ‘I’ from that place 
that maintains it continuously in ‘its place’ before the world. The 
modern ideal of emancipation was linked to the idea that to free oneself 
really meant to ‘takeoff’ from the world of necessity, to undo the link 
until achieving a god-like self-sufficiency, individually or collectively. 
This would be the path from the kingdom of necessity toward the 
kingdom of liberty in its diverse forms. In our network-society, the 
question of a critical or emancipatory thought should perhaps be 
different: to ask what is our capacity to conquer liberty in the act of 
networking itself. Nowadays, liberation has to do with our capacity to 
explore the networked link and fortify it: the links with a planet-world, 
reduced to an object of consumption, a surface of displacements and a 
depository of wastes; as well as the links with those ‘Others’ who, while 
always condemned to being ‘other’, have been evicted from the 
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possibility to say ‘we’. To combat impotence and embody critique then 
means to experience the ‘we’ and the ‘world’ that is amongst us. This is 
why the problem of critique is no longer a problem of conscience but of 
embodiment: it does not concern a conscience facing the world but 
rather a body that is in and with the world. This not only terminates the 
role of intellectuals and their balconies, of which we have already 
spoken, but also disposes of the mechanisms of legitimation of the 
intellectuals’ word and their mode of expression. 
7. The principal challenge for critique today is to challenge the 
privatization of our existence. In the globalized world, not only have 
goods and land been privatized but our very existence as well. The 
experience that we have of the world refers us to a private field of 
references: individual or collective, it is always self-referential. This 
privatization of existence has two consequences: first, the depoliticizing 
of the social question. This means that we have enemies but we don’t 
know where our friends or allies are. We can perceive the foci of 
aggression against our lives, but not the line of demarcation between 
friend/enemy. We can speak of financial speculation, precarity, 
mobbing,1 borders, etc. But how do we name the ‘we’ that suffers and 
struggles with these realities? By the same mechanism, the ‘enemy’ also 
becomes privatized. Every person has their own enemy, in their own 
particular problem. The multiple fronts of struggle are difficult to share. 
They infiltrate into every cell of our everyday misery, which is miserable 
precisely because in this everyday everyone is on their own, as an 
individual or in their small ghetto. But the privatization of existence also 
has a second consequence: the radicalization of the social question, 
which sinks its roots directly in our own experience of the world and 
not someone else’s. To ask for this ‘we’ requires starting from the only 
thing we possess: our own experience. The fragmentation of meaning 
contains this paradoxical virtue: we are obliged to start with ourselves. 
Here we discover the importance of abandoning the third person, which 
dominated the traditional critical thinker, and exploring our own fields 
of possible experiences. The quest for the common today requires the 
courage to drown oneself in their actual experience of the world, even if 
it is naked and empty of promises. This is what it means to embody 
critique. 
8. In Barcelona 2002, a project emerged from the necessity to begin 
a practical and collective form of critical thought. Collective, not 
because this thought does not have any proper names, but because in 
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each one of those names a ‘we’ echoes. Practical, not because it excludes 
the theoretical dimension but because the world is not the object of 
study or contemplation for this project of critical thought. Rather the 
world is the area of operations of this project’s collective body. We call 
this project Espai en Blanc, Blank Space in Catalan 
(www.espaienblanc.net). Linked to the antagonistic practices occurring 
in the city over the past few years, this project opened a breach where 
critical thought could circulate outside of the spaces of specialists and 
in/through the hands of the protagonists of real movements, in their 
fragility, their intermittence, and their anonymity. Out of the works and 
projects in which Espai en Blanc has participated, three examples will be 
mentioned to indicate what to embody critique might mean today: the 
report Barcelona 2004: el fascismo postmoderno (Barcelona 2004: postmodern 
fascism, 2004); the movie El taxista ful (The Full Taxi Driver, 2005); and 
the series of encounters ‘La tierra de nadie en la red de los nombres’ 
(No man’s land in the network of names, 2006). 
9. The first example, the ‘Barcelona 2004: postmodern fascism’ 
report, demonstrates how a theoretical intervention can be embodied in 
the city. This intervention took place in the framework of the campaign 
against the Forum Universal de las Culturas (Universal Forum of 
Cultures), a large international event organized by city institutions in 
Barcelona 2004. Espai en Blanc contributed an analysis that uncovered 
the mechanism by which the project for a multicultural city being 
proposed by the municipality was in reality the implementation of a new 
device of de-politicization and neutralization of conflicts. What we call 
‘postmodern fascism’ is based in mobilizing all the existing differences 
in the city towards a single project for that city, towards a single reality. 
However, what could be done so that this analysis didn’t just float 
above and out of Barcelona but could actually intervene and interfere in 
the city’s movements? The idea, together with the Bellaterra publishing 
house and other critical collectives in the city, was to edit and compile 
this analysis, together with other materials in a free book.2 The book 
was released at a large public gathering, and two distribution points were 
selected. Those people interested in the book, would have to personally 
go and get it and could only obtain one copy each. In two weeks 3,000 
copies were distributed. Even more interesting, though, is the fact that 
the appearance of the book provoked a mobilization. People had to 
decide for themselves how far to let their interest take them, travel to 
another part of the city, and personally relate with the editor and with 
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the collectives that were promoting the book. All kinds of people 
arrived: teachers, activists, politicians(!), and most of all, many 
anonymous folks whose intuition led them to identify with the words in 
the title or the description of the book. Many bodies were mobilized in 
order to share their rejection, rage and critiques against a model of the 
city that was getting more hypocritically aggressive everyday. 
10. The second example, the movie El taxista ful (2005), is an 
example of how all critique is done with and on our very body, with and 
on our own life, especially when our life is understood as a common 
problem. This project was born out of a long collective initiative dealing 
with the critical consequences of precarity. For years, this assembly 
called Dinero Gratis (Free Money) was wondering, how could one 
refuse to work when the factory and stable jobs no longer exist? From 
that perspective a series of campaigns, actions and writings were carried 
out that called to attention the problems that our relations with money, 
both individual and collective, present nowadays. The film director Jordi 
Solé (Jo Sol) proposed a film project about these issues. The interesting 
thing was that it wasn’t about producing a documentary about a political 
movement or a social problem, but rather using film to interrogate our 
own practices, and call to the film spectator at the same level. We 
worked without actors and without a written script. We were both 
subject and object of the process of creating this film. Together with Jo 
Sol and the non-actor Pepe Rovira, a very real fiction entered our lives: 
the story of a man that robbed taxis in order to work. This was a guy 
who wanted to have a normal life, that continued to aspire to this 
normal life, and that in the process of pursuing this dream, had become 
a thief and a lunatic in the eyes of the law and society. What would this 
guy think of us? How would he relate to us? Two lines of flight, two 
forms of resistance to the violence of work and money are found in a 
story of friendship, our true story of friendship. We don’t have a 
solution to the problem of money, nor do we have an ideology that 
explains and resolves our relationship to precarity. We have the capacity 
to present ourselves, to learn and struggle from our own field of 
possible experiences. The movie speaks form there. The movie calls to 
the audience from there. 
11. Finally, the third example is about the gatherings called ‘La tierra 
de nadie en la red de los nombres’ (No man’s land in the network of 
names) taking place in 2006. This initiative is an example of how critical 
thought is produced amongst us. That is to say, the production of 
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critical thought happens when we break the hierarchy ‘thinker-audience’ 
in order to constitute a thinking ‘we’, in order to build a collective word 
capable of advancing through the problems that are truly problems. For 
five months, Espai en Blanc called for an encounter every last Thursday 
of each month in a local coffee-bar. Each gathering dealt with a specific 
problematic (social disquiet, border spaces, the experience of ‘we’, and 
speaking up) and began with a series of questions and materials for 
consultation that were distributed through a blog site. The attendance 
was made of those that wanted to be there: no announced conferences, 
no coordinating committee, no turns to speak or rebuttal. Throughout 
the 5 months, more than a hundred people, most of whom did not 
know each other, gathered together in order to think collectively. This 
anonymous self-called assembly opened a space for politicizing our 
language and our lives. Against the privatization of our existence, a 
world amongst ‘us’ appeared. In today’s metropolises there are many 
collective happenings, we could even say that the majority of 
happenings are collective. Nonetheless, the city had completely lost the 
ability of calling itself to assemble. Its happenings are empty of a ‘we’. 
‘We’ only move if someone calls us, if there is a programmed activity, 
and if we’re told what to do. At these gatherings, we didn’t know what 
would happen, who would come, what direction the discussions would 
go in, or when silence would devour us. We came with knots in our 
stomachs. And every time, one after another, the encounter worked. 
With more or less tensions during the course of the discussion, each 
time a ‘we’ emerged that gave the happening meaning. Thanks to this 
we could think in another way. During these processes lives are shaken 
up. We no longer walk the same way when we return home. Maybe we 
don’t even know exactly what we think. Perhaps, an empty space was 
opened, a blank space where other ways of living could be explored 
together with other people. Another consciousness? No, a body better 
prepared to battle fear, a body more exposed and less isolated. A body 
that knows that its life does not belong solely to itself, and everything 
depends in that which goes beyond itself. 
 
Notes 
1.  Translators’ note: ‘Mobbing’ refers to many types of harassment and 
psychological pressures used to coerce, stress or defeat someone with 
serious emotional and physical results. The term is used most often in 
reference to the workplace and when there is some involvement (or 
 
Marina Garcés 
210 
 
tolerance) of management. It is not the same as sexual or racial harassment 
though the lines may be difficult to draw. Mobbing has also been referred to 
‘bullying’, ‘psychological terror’ and ‘emotional violence’. 
2.  This book can be downloaded at http://www.ed-bellaterra.com/ 
uploads/pdfs/FOTUT%202004X.pdf 
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The Double Meaning of Destitution 
Stefan Nowotny 
(Translated by Aileen Derieg) 
“What do we do with what we have done?” (Colectivo Situaciones, 
2003: 34). The practical self-reflexivity of this question assumes a special 
meaning, when that which was ‘done’, which the sentence refers to, 
involves an insurrection, one that can certainly be regarded as 
‘successful’, but not in the sense that the ‘success’ of this insurrection 
consisted in taking over power. Had the latter been the case, then the 
meaning of the question would inevitably have been unambiguous: a 
‘revolutionary’ break would separate what is to be done now from all 
actions that first created the preconditions for what is currently to be 
done; and this break would make the conducting of the insurrection 
appear, more or less clearly, as the subject matter of a specific 
historiography on the one hand, whereas on the other it would open up 
the terrain, in which the current task field of governing could appear 
(although its formulated objectives would certainly be expected to 
maintain a certain congruence with those of the insurrection). But what 
if no break of this kind prefigured the double sense of (past and 
present) actions? What if it was not a matter of “appropriating a truth 
about what had happened” – a truth that simultaneously presupposes 
and actuates the described break – but rather of “probing the newly 
opening perspectives for action” and ‘elaborating’ the becoming that is 
articulated in what happened? (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 34). 
Destitution as Opening: Insurrection and Deposition 
Let us look at the social and political situation, in which the opening 
question – taken from a book by the Colectivo Situaciones, a group 
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active in Buenos Aires – is specifically located; we will need to work out 
the implications that are only briefly and provisionally outlined there. 
This relates to the Argentinean insurrection movements that became 
manifest especially on 19 and 20 December 2001, which formed at the 
apex of the Argentinean state, economic and financial crisis induced by 
the neo-liberal policies of Carlos Menem and, in the end, the lack of 
international financial aid, after private savings accounts had been 
frozen, among other things, on 1 December of that year, to protect the 
parity of the Argentinean peso with the US dollar. Borne by a 
multiplicity of social actors, ranging from the Argentinean middle class, 
loudly expressing their resentment about the freezing of their savings in 
cacerolazos (‘pot-banging demonstrations’), to the unemployed people of 
various piqueteros groups and their specific forms of action (street 
barricades, collective meals, parades, etc.), the movements found their 
point of unification especially in the demand ¡Que se vayan todos! (‘All of 
them should go!’) (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003). This demand had some 
measure of success, at least in the form of a whole series of resignations 
of respectively appointed state presidents at the end of 2001 and 
beginning or 2002. 
What primarily interests me here is less a detailed discussion of the 
events in Argentina in December 2001 (see also Moreno, 2005) than a 
close observation of the motifs that the militant research of Colectivo 
Situaciones sees in them (and in which they took part): the motif of 
destitution or the deposing, destituting insurrection. What is striking 
about this motif in the analysis of Colectivo Situaciones is certainly that 
it dissolves the link between the destituting movement and the specific 
institutive gesture, which ties the deposition or disempowerment of the 
ruling political forces a priori to the political purpose or end of a re-
institution, a renewed institution and occupation of the – even if 
possibly reformed – organs of the exercise of power in the sense of 
governing: 
The sovereign and creative forces incited a rebellion, to which they tied 
no intentions of instituting power – as it is anticipated by the political 
doctrine of sovereignty –, but instead exercised their power to depose 
the established political forces. This is probably the paradox of the days 
of 19 and 20 December. An entirety of instituting forces far removed 
from founding a new sovereign order, which instead delegitimized the 
politics carried out in their names. (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 35) 
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At first glance, this suspension of the institutive end appears as a pause 
at exactly the point that is capable of evoking the political horror vacui par 
excellence: an abhorrence of the vacuum of political power and its 
functions of founding laws and social order. The political effects of this 
horror vacui are numerous: they range from the legitimization figures of 
an authoritarian, sometimes putschist power of order over the attempt 
to prevent the emergence of this kind of vacuum (invoking the specter 
of ungovernability, alleviating social tensions, pushing security 
doctrines, etc.), all the way to the themes, dominant in the history of 
leftist political theory, of possible (new) ways to fill this vacuum 
(revolutionary takeover of power, renewal of the legal systems, 
institutional apparatuses, governing techniques, etc.). The latter lead 
back to the initially mentioned configuration of the question “What do 
we do with what we have done?” which subsequently interprets the 
‘vacuum’ simply as a ‘break’ – in other words, to the configuration that 
is specifically undermined by the motif of destituting power. 
However, the vacuum is only a vacuum to the extent that it is 
measured against the aforementioned functions of political power and 
the representation of political ‘subjects’ linked to them. Relying on the 
described horror vacui in analyzing destitution decoupled from re-
institution would hence mean identifying the question of the political or 
political power with just these functions, specifically by disregarding a 
social positivity, which I would like to call political appearance here. Yet 
it is precisely this question of political appearance – especially under the 
name of ‘social protagonism’ – that concerns the Colectivo Situaciones: 
Destitution is a process of the greatest significance: if the politics 
previously carried out by a sovereign power is realized in the state 
constitution of the social, the destituting action appears to be a different 
form of conducting politics or expressing social transformation. 
Destitution holds no a-political stance: the refusal to maintain 
representative politics (of sovereignty) is the condition – and the 
premise – of a ‘situational’ thinking and of all the practices, whose 
potentials for meaning can no longer be demanded from the state. 
(Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 36) 
The “practice of destitution that expands the field of the possible” can 
thus be linked “with conducting social protagonism that is not limited 
to the functions of founding sovereignty” (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 
36) and gives expression to the aforementioned potentials of meaning 
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outside the realm of the figures of state representation. From this 
perspective, as the research of the Colectivo Situaciones shows, not only 
can demonstrations, neighborhood assemblies, barter practices or new 
forms of political organization be analyzed, but also looting, for 
example. To the extent that one is willing to abandon the view linked 
with the horror vacui described above, which makes the mere fact of 
looting appear exclusively as (ultimately abstract) evidence for the ‘war 
of all against all’ in the absence of a state power of order, looting shows 
itself to be an ambivalent network of social agency permeated by 
differences and linked with gestures of self-constraint.1 
Yet other political-social struggles can also be regarded from the 
same perspective of a social protagonism, such as the struggle of the 
Sans-Papiers, which is situated exactly on one of the central 
intersections of state political representation, namely that of coupling 
political citizenship with belonging to a (nation-) state. Not only would 
it be obviously absurd to understand migrants without papers as a 
‘revolutionary subject’ of the type seeking to take over power in some 
form, but the struggles of the Sans Papiers can also not be reduced to 
fighting for inclusion in the existing apparatuses of political 
representation – unless one disregards the structural zone of 
intersection between the (juridical, economic, etc.) dispositifs of the 
nation-state and its supra-national extensions as well as the dispositifs of 
the globalized economies and politics engendering new dependencies 
and forms of exploitation, in which these struggles are located and 
which are made manifest by them. Destitution is expressed here in 
practices of ‘becoming invisible’ (in the face of state powers of control), 
which are linked with specific knowledge productions and networks of 
social agency, as well as in new forms of political organization and the 
affirmation of a newly conceived political situationality. 
Let us note three moments of the concept and the practice of 
destitution as demonstrated here, which may shed a somewhat clearer 
light on the notion of political appearance at the same time: 
1. First, the concept of destitution is to be detached from a certain 
dialectical grid, which may appear obvious at first glance: it is not the 
‘work of negativity’ that is centrally effective in destitution, but rather a 
‘positive no’ (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003), which in the rejection of a 
certain figure of representation simultaneously – and not first through 
taking over or influencing to change institutional political functions – 
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produces a ‘self-changing’ affirmation that engenders new practices and 
modes of subjectification, from which the ‘no’ first derives its force. 
Understood in this way, destitution is neither a deposition relating to the 
purpose or end of a re-institution of the fullness of power, nor simply a 
rejection in the sense of a disinvolvement, but rather indicates, first of 
all, a social practice. 
The motif is not entirely new, even though it arrives at a new 
topicality in the contexts described. It is one of the central motifs in 
Walter Benjamin’s 1921 essay ‘On the Critique of Violence’, specifically 
in the form of the question of the positivity of the strike. More 
precisely, Benjamin distinguishes the ‘proletarian general strike’ from the 
‘political general strike;’ the latter merely seeks to achieve ends that are 
external to labor and to one’s own action, and which thus achieves no 
transformation of labor and action. The proletarian general strike, on 
the other hand, eludes, according to Benjamin, the ‘dialectical rising and 
falling’ in the historical political ‘formations of violence’ continued 
through law-making and law-preserving, because it is like “an upheaval 
that this kind of strike not so much causes as consummates” (Benjamin, 
1978: 292). The logic of action described here is that of a de-position, 
which is not oriented a priori to framework conditions of action 
modified for a performative new positing or re-institution, but rather to 
the opening of a field of changing possibilities for action (Hammacher, 
1994: 360). 
2. In all of this, however, a misunderstanding is to be avoided, which 
frequently occurs in social romantic form, grounded, however, in a 
certain – often Spinozist-influenced – variation of metaphysical natural 
law theory conceptions: the misunderstanding that the described 
affirmation is already necessarily emancipatory per se. The book by 
Colectivo Situaciones is not entirely free from this itself, yet it supplies 
clear evidence for the problems that are linked with a perspective of this 
kind: 
The most diverse slogans could be heard, first in the city districts of 
Buenos Aires, then in the Plaza de Mayo. ‘Anyone who doesn’t skip 
along is an Englishman’. – ‘Anyone who doesn’t skip along is a military’. 
Or ‘Traitors to the fatherland against the wall’. ‘Cavallo – you are a pig’. 
– ‘Argentina, Argentina’. And the cry most frequently heard on 19 
December: ‘You can stick the state of emergency up yours’. And later 
the first ‘Que se vayan todos’. The potpourri of demo slogans made the 
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struggles of the past newly manifest in the present. (Colectivo 
Situaciones, 2003: 27) 
And it is not difficult to recognize that with these struggles of the past, 
the nationalisms and chauvinisms of the past also reappear. Not only is 
the indeterminacy of the affirmation in the destituent movement, as a 
“collective affirmation of the possible” (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 
28), open to very different codings, it is also borne by ambivalences and 
historical political structurings of affect, which are by no means 
emancipatory per se or a purely rebellious present (just as little as they 
engender pure violent chaos, as the other – in short, Hobbesian – 
variation of natural law theory imaginaries would claim). Instead, they 
are permeated by re-actualizations of political and probably also 
personal ‘struggles of the past’, which underlay that which is possible 
with a pre-formed reality and – literally – reactionary facilitations. 
3. It thus seems all the more important to pay attention to the 
difference that the texts cited above introduce into a series of political 
concepts: they speak of ‘sovereign and creative forces’, which do not 
seek, however, to found a ‘new sovereign order’; of ‘instituent forces’, 
although these are not linked with ‘instituting intentions’. We can 
certainly come to an understanding about this difference that appears in 
the terminology, based on the difference between potentia and potestas 
that is currently frequently cited in political theory. In the following, 
however, the focus is on the question of the institution or instituting, 
the virulence of which has an obvious connection to the motif that was 
the starting point for these reflections: the motif of destitution and its 
relation to an expansion of the ‘field of the possible’. 
Destitution as Destruction: Subject Condition, Subjectification 
and the Question of Instituent Activity 
Let us first consider a meaning of the concept of destitution that 
appears to be diametrically opposed to the one discussed so far. In the 
final section of his book Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben 
outlines an interpretation of the modalities of possibility (to be able to 
be), contingency (to be able not to be), impossibility (not to be able to 
be), and necessity (not to be able not to be), which detaches these 
modalities from their classical roots in logic and ontology, relating them 
to a theory of subjectivity. Agamben reads the first two – possibility and 
contingency – as ‘operators of subjectification’. In contrast, 
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“impossibility, as negation of possibility […] and necessity, as negation 
of contingency […], are the operators of de-subjectification, of the 
destruction and destitution of the subject” (Agamben, 1999: 147). 
Agamben takes over the concept of destitution from Primo Levi, who 
spoke of the experience of ‘extreme destitution’ (destituzione estrema) in 
the Nazi death and concentration camps. Here it means anything but a 
deposing power; instead it characterizes an impotence that is not simply 
the absence of any capacity, but rather the experience of the annihilating 
separation of the subject from his or her executive capacities, experience 
of de-subjectification reaching to the limit of the capacity for 
experience: 
[Possibility and contingency] constitute Being in its subjectivity, that is, 
in the final analysis as a world that is always my world, since it is in my 
world that possibility exists and touches (contingit) the real. Necessity and 
impossibility, instead, define Being in its wholeness and solidity, pure 
substantiality without subject – that is, at the limit, a world that is never 
my world since possibility does not exist in it. (Agamben, 1999: 147, 
trans. modified) 
It is hardly necessary to say that a world, which is only my world to the 
extent that possibility exists in it, is also the only world that is open to 
change, a world in which ‘another world’ is possible. However, it is also 
a world that is principally in danger of being set up as ‘pure 
substantiality’, which annihilates every possibility. 
Agamben’s considerations do not at all seek to re-establish classical 
subject theory conceptions. Instead they explore a thinking – from the 
extreme of its annihilation – of living subjectivity, which is only a 
different name for a historically politically situated capacity of 
subjectification, a “a field of forces always already traversed by the […] 
historically determined currents of potentiality and impotentiality, of 
being able not to be and not being able not to be” (Agamben, 1999: 
147). This capacity of subjectification is exposed to the condition of a 
fundamental passivity, in which its specific possibilities and the capacity 
of expanding these possibilities are grounded, in which, however, also 
its seizure, its injury and its boundless destruction are located (cf. 
Blanchot, 1969: 200; and Kofman, 1987).2 It is exactly at this point that 
the theory of testimony is located, which Agamben develops in 
conjunction with the passages quoted and based on a specific 
interpretation of the problem of linguistic reference as verbally 
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actualized contingency and touching the real. A detailed discussion of 
this theory is not possible here; I limit myself to referring to the 
conjunction between the possibility of testimony and that of resistance, 
which is implicitly at stake in it.3 
What is crucial for the considerations developed here is that the 
concept of destitution, which previously appeared as destituent power, 
as a name for a capacity of subjectification – releasing the possible – 
now indicates a subject condition, which exposes every capacity for 
subjectification not only to negation or ‘alienated’ representation, but 
also the extreme of its systematic annihilation. In fact, Agamben’s 
analysis does not relate simply to the counterpart of ‘representative 
politics’ in a sense that might be situational but is also capable of 
generalization in many respects, but rather to the institutional apparatus 
of an industrialized politics of annihilation that directly takes hold of 
those it persecutes, a politics that eludes any generalization. It is a 
politics that nevertheless undoubtedly mobilized its own – 
predominantly anti-Semitic – figures of representation and never carried 
out its work of annihilation independently from strategies of symbolic 
annihilation. What destitution means in the experience of the Nazi 
camps is, in Adorno’s words, “worse than death” (1975: 364), namely 
the disintegration of subjective existence with the mobilization of all 
institutional power. 
Ultimately, however, the situational is not decided by what is capable 
of generalization, but rather by what is ‘generally valid’ in a different 
sense: namely by what, in every situation, can be actualized or robbed of 
its possibilities of actualization.4 The problem that Agamben’s analysis 
poses is thus, after all, that of the interlocking of the double meaning of 
‘institution’ (as a function of political representation, setting up the 
scope of the possible, regulating, constraining, managing it – and still 
managing it in the will to annihilation – on the one hand and as 
‘instituent practice’ on the other) with the double meaning of 
‘destitution’ (as the release of a ‘field of the possible’ and as the 
destruction of the – always contingent – possibility of subjectification as 
such). Institution and destitution, also in this sense, are by no means in a 
relationship of a dialectical opposition, the opposition, for example, that 
has long made insurrection appear as an irresolvable problem of 
political juridical theory (Nowotny, 2003b). Rather, what should be 
presumed is a relationship of complex implications, which opens up the 
field of political struggles and, to return to our initial theme, makes an 
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instituent moment that is not an end manifest in the midst of the 
destituent insurrection. 
Despite the apparent conceptual opposition, destitution as 
‘destituent power’ would thus yield the outlines of an instituent activity, 
which is emancipatorily different from the institutional apparatuses that 
limit the field of the possible and which, incidentally, perhaps cannot be 
grasped with – here largely omitted – conceptualizations of 
‘constitution’. In this sense, talk of ‘instituent forces’ (Colectivo 
Situaciones, 2003) is not to be over hastily regarded as an example of a 
‘new constitution of the multitude’ (Negri, 2007), but rather to be taken 
literally. It is possible that the reason for the frequently lamented 
poverty of political (and not only immediately political) institutions is 
specifically that the function of institutions has almost always been 
regarded as dependent on a constitution in the sense of an antecedent 
composition. And this may also be the reason why the opposition of 
constituent and constituted power, which undoubtedly seeks to 
undermine the antecedence of the composition, results in a practical 
paradox – that of the permanently ‘constituting republic’ (Negri, 2003) – 
that leaves little scope for a new understanding of the institution or the 
instituent. At this point, however, it might be possible to attempt a re-
conception of the instituent, which would not ignore the critique of the 
institutional and the power of destitution described above, but would 
instead focus on a positivity of the instituent action against this 
background. 
In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1954/55, devoted to the 
question of instituting/institution, Maurice Merleau-Ponty placed the 
concept of the institution not in a hierarchical functional conjunction 
with the concept of the constitution, but rather in opposition to it. 
Merleau-Ponty’s reflections start from a critique of the philosophy of 
consciousness, which remains inscribed in the language in which these 
reflections are formulated; nevertheless, they can certainly also be read 
in the sense of the thinking of the capacity for subjectification outlined 
above, and explicitly aim, not least of all, for a thinking of subjectivity in 
its political social historicity: 
Yet if the subject is instituent, not constituent, then one can understand 
that it is not limited to its momentary being and that the other is not the 
negative of my self. What I have started at certain crucial moments, is 
neither in a distant past as an objective memory, nor is it current as a 
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lived memory, but is found instead in this in-between realm [l’entre-deux] 
like the field of my becoming during this period of time. Hence my 
relationship to others could not be reduced to an alternative: an 
instituent subject can co-exist with an other, because that which is 
instituted is not the immediate reflection of its actions. This can be 
taken up again subsequently by itself or by others without being a 
complete re-creation. In this way it is like a hinge between the others 
and me, on the one hand, and between me and my self, on the other, as 
consequence and guarantee of our belonging to the world. (Merleau-
Ponty, 2003: 123) 
It seems that it is this kind of shared field of becoming that is meant – 
translated into the language of the political – in the question quoted in 
the beginning, “What do we do with what we have done?” which the 
power of destitution aims to open up, and whose potentials of meaning 
cannot be redeemed by the figures of existing institutional structures. It 
may become visible in events such as those of 19 and 20 December 
2001, and yet it does not exist independently from an instituent activity 
that is not completed in these events and does not end with them. 
 
Notes 
1.  As one mother, whose son was involved in looting a butcher shop, relates: 
“My son said that some of them first went to work on the cash register. So 
he threw the cash register on the floor so that the others could not get to 
the money, but should only take the food that they needed. Then a fight 
started and my son left. But first he took food for all of us and even 
brought some cheese” (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003: 107). 
2.  At the same time, at the theoretical level Agamben’s thinking is permanently 
in discussion with a ‘certain vitalism’ in post-structural theory construction, 
evident for example in Foucault and Deleuze, which refutes every 
substantialization of ‘life’, only to see in this concept, nevertheless, the 
cipher of immanent processes of subjectification (self-affection: ‘self’-
actualization and ‘self’-effectuation). 
3.  This is a conjunction that was already prefigured by Ferdinand Bruckner in 
1933, in his drama Die Rassen (Bruckner, 1990: 418): “Helene It is our only 
paltry resistance, – / Karlanner (nods) You fight. / Helene – that nothing is 
covered up, that all testimonies remain preserved.” The scope of this 
conjunction, which calls for a break in the understanding of testimony after 
Auschwitz, was hardly to be foreseen in 1933. 
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4.  Cf. the distinction between the precondition of a ‘capability of 
generalization’ of (just) ends by law, which abstracts from situationality, and 
situation-specific ‘general validity’ as criterion of justice in Walter 
Benjamin’s writing (1978); this distinction should also be noted by all those 
who, with critical intentions or not, attribute to Agamben the claim that the 
entire contemporary world is a Nazi camp. 
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Towards New Political Creations: 
Movements, Institutions, New Militancy 
Raúl Sánchez Cedillo 
(Translated by Maribel Casas-Cortés and Sebastian Cobarrubias) 
A set of recurrent symptoms is forcing us to imagine, remember, project 
and build institutions. Particular dates and events can guide us as a 
compass in understanding the necessity of institutional construction: 1 
January 1994, the day the EZLN rose up in arms against the Mexican 
government and against world-wide neo-liberal power. More than 
thirteen years have already passed since that event marked a way out 
from what Félix Guattari called the ‘years of winter’. Slightly less distant 
are the days of Genoa, 20-22 July 2001, which, without a doubt, marked 
an inflection point in the capacity of political creation/creativity of the 
so called movement of movements. The declaration of war on the 
movement by the G8 (through the Berlusconi administration) and, 
during the same year, the instauration of the regime of global war after 
September 11, closed the democratic political space that the global 
movement was building since its ‘foundational’ moment, on 30 
September 1999 in Seattle. As we know, the movement against the war 
in Iraq was qualified by the New York Times as the ‘world’s second 
superpower’. This time, though, it was about the potential of public 
opinion, a new pole of influence within the ‘democracies of opinion’, 
that is to say, a domesticated and neutralized potential. This was six 
years ago, and the in nuce political space that the movements were 
prefiguring – currently maintained by only a few experiments such as 
the Euromayday process – seems to be closing in leaps and bounds. 
This closure has been even more pronounced since the rejection by 
French and Dutch voters of the European Constitutional Treaty, 
paradoxically reinforcing the undemocratic, purely confederal and inter-
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governmental character of the process of European construction, 
Sarkozy docet. 
The consequences of this closure of political space are political 
impotence, organizational weakness and the dispelling of subjectivity – 
or, said in another way, the crisis of subjectivity production, a crisis of 
its consistency and self-organization. Those seem to be the central traits 
of the current crisis of the movement form in the European territory. 
This translates itself into an incapacity, in the first place, to build local 
and regional struggles that can express force relationships. For example, 
specific struggles in the terrain of the precarization both of salary and 
social rights; and more generally, struggles against the emergent form of 
governance intimately linked to the general mobilization of society as a 
production machine, to workfare and to warfare, which nowadays 
inform the current ‘social policies’ and labor relations in the continent 
whose center of gravity is the European Union. 
Departing from these brief notes on the current ‘conjuncture’, what 
use or heuristic potential is offered by the creation and/or 
replacement/destruction of institutions? There is indeed some use for 
reflection on institutions, especially if we are able to simultaneously 
circumscribe concrete problems to concrete and current situations and 
situate ourselves within the large quantity of critique and theory focused 
on contemporary institutions in the current conjuncture. This 
conjuncture is marked by the neutralization of the constituent power of 
social movements. It is also situated in a context where life is equally 
political and productive, in such a way that it is only formally possible to 
establish distinctions between the process of politicization of individual 
and collective lives on the one hand, and the matrixes of a new 
productive power (outside and/or against measures of value). That is to 
say, from the point of view of the capacity of capture and control over 
cooperative singularities, the technologies and mechanisms of 
networked biopower are only capable of dictating sequences of 
economic value in accordance with a social relationship among subjects, 
among creative individuals who are able to influence each other, to 
exercise power over each other, (and thus to change their own attitude), 
in accordance with mobile relationships and within an open notion of 
space-time. These criteria are marked by the generalized market of all 
forms of life, which is also a decisive dimension of the project, within 
which all the competencies of the subject should be concatenated in 
order to obtain the goals of self-valorization. 
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In this sense, the individual (as a form) as well as its relationships, 
interactions, experiences, etc. becomes essential for this neo-liberal 
ontology of production and of government. It is possible to pose the 
following hypothesis: for this productive individual, the current regime 
of war – as a constitutive element of her/his own vital world- works in 
two ways. The war regime, within the concrete parameters of different 
levels of life stability, works both as a pile of risks and uncertainties, as a 
deficit of information, of fear and hope, as well as an incentive for its 
own performance within the productive network of total social 
mobilization, as a constant confirmation of the finitude and fragility of 
his/her own project. 
Thus, an active selection of available tools and experiences becomes 
necessary. Let’s make an effort to orient ourselves. Let’s start by 
delimiting what we are referring to with the notion of ‘institution’ itself. 
I think the theme of institutions is of crucial and extraordinary relevance 
in its relationship with the problem of social and thus political counter-
powers, with the project of a network of counter-powers able to bear a 
discontinuous and unpredictable dynamic proper of constituent exodus 
happening within the complex device of capitalism-governance-war. 
What does this active selection imply? As was mentioned before, it 
would chiefly imply a radical distancing from the contents and goals of 
previous periods, contexts and projects of institutional critique and 
require the imagining of a new world of libratory institutions. It 
becomes evident that, outside of the conditions of contextualization and 
situation discussed earlier, we run the risk of inventing a new 
environment from scratch, separated and isolated from the problems of 
conflict, organization, subjectivity production and counter-power in 
new social movements. We run the risk then of making a virtue out of a 
necessity. We run the risk of using a generic reference such as 
‘institutions’ to cover the emptiness that critical practices hate or 
religiously adore, as well as to conceal the solid neutralization of the 
political space currently afoot within the European territory. 
Institutions, da capo  
Let’s come back to the term. Let’s depart from the extremely 
problematic notions of institutio and instituere. The term institutio refers to 
a foundation and a plan, a project, an elaborated intention, while 
instituere means to prepare, to arrange, to establish, but also to organize 
something that already exists, and to form and to instruct. These 
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meanings are without a doubt quite generic; however they are 
interesting in order to productively focus on the question. The goal is to 
depart from the epistemic and political imaginary blockage that arises 
with the ‘question of institutions’, which includes references (images or 
icons sometimes) as serious as the state apparatus, as well as institutions 
such as school, prison, hospital, political parties, museums and other 
public infrastructures. In this way, we can get out, at least for a moment, 
to the open air offered by instituere and the instituent. 
Gilles Deleuze offers a series of simple and stark considerations 
about the creative, positive and affirmative dimensions of generating 
institutions, in contrast with the law, with the violence of the norm. 
These considerations are written in a brief piece, linked to his work on 
David Hume, called ‘Instincts and Institutions’ (in Deleuze, 2004a: 19-
21). According to Deleuze, on the one hand, institution and instinct 
share the search for satisfying tendencies and necessities; and on other 
hand, they distinguish themselves in the moment that the institution 
works as an organized system of means for satisfaction, an institutional 
means that is able to a priori determine social modalities that frame 
individual experiences. Institutions are, in contrast with laws, the main 
structures where the social is invented, where an affirmative and not 
limiting or exclusivist know-how is produced.  
In this way, we are able to get beyond the exclusive fixation on the 
object of ‘institutions’ in its meanings used by other trains of thoughts 
and by critical practices, from the dialectics of the inauthentic and the 
alienated essence that even today inform some Situationist and neo-
Situationsist positions, as well as the institutional critique defended by 
the circles of art and ‘artivism’, to the analysis of disciplinary 
institutions, including its diagram power-resistances (psychiatric ward, 
hospital, prison, school) linked to the ‘apparently’ more ‘politicized’ 
period of Michel Foucault’s work and public life. But we know there are 
‘other’ Foucaults. The later Foucault, mainly developed and lived in the 
North American territories (USA and Canada), offers us notes full of 
inspiration, even in reference to the question of institutional creation. 
The emergence of the themes around techniques of the self and its 
relationship with governmentality, and with the technologies of the 
government of populations, is intimately linked to Foucault’s own 
experience and close relation to the minorities of desire and their 
political as well as academic expressions, from the late 1970’s until his 
death (Lazzarato, 2006b). 
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In studying contemporary neo-liberalism, Foucault discovers a self-
limitation practice on the part of government, a critique of the raison 
d’etat which is internal to the very problematic of ‘governmentality’. The 
condition of this self-limitation practice is the definition of an absolute 
reference: ‘society’, in which populations are inserted. Within society it 
is possible to discover of dynamics self-organization, processes that are 
autonomous in relation to governmental interventions; to the point that 
excessive interventionism on the part of the sate, the proliferation of 
unnecessary legal interventions, may contribute to the failure of the very 
same goals defended by the problematic of governmentality. 
Institutions and Movement: The ‘Great Tactic’ 
Let’s get back now to our own contemporary problems and ask 
ourselves about the following question: to what degree is an 
institutionalization process able to positively displace a neutralized 
political space? That is to say: could a concrete recognition and specific 
work on the issues of institutional formation be a relevant factor to 
support movements, and strengthen struggles against the regime of 
cognitive capitalism and against the regime of war/state of emergency, 
regimes that are informing the current system of governance both at the 
global and European levels? Before trying to provide a temporary 
answer to that question, we could look for inspiration in perspectives 
working on this issue, produced in the initial moments of the 
movements that followed the ‘existential revolution’ of 1968. This is the 
case in a text by Antonio Negri’s work dedicated to the critical – fatal, in 
retrospect – period of the social proletarian movement in Italy in the 
late 1970s. This urgent, preemptory and practically unknown piece was 
submitted for publication from prison after the blitzkrieg attack of the 
Italian state on 7 April 1979. The piece was called Class Politics: Five 
Campaigns (Negri, 1980). 
The situation at the time was one of total crisis of the different 
Italian autonomous political structures and perspectives. However, the 
text in question tried to interpret the crisis as a possibility for a total 
renewal of the movement, as a break with old and alien facades, tools, 
discourses and institutions, used by the political structures of the new 
movement. It attempted to grasp the crisis beyond the terms of 
‘autonomy from the political’, beyond ‘the worse the better’ enunciated 
by terrorist groups, and beyond the catastrophic positions of capitalist 
elites. Negri’s approach to the crisis as a creative crisis was based on a 
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project of political mediation, both internal as well as external to the 
new movement, as a project of building its own similar and friendly 
political space. 
According to Negri, the problem to be resolved consisted of 
breaking with the quagmire proper of the social counter-powers 
produced by the movement in a symmetric, purely military, relationship. 
This relationship was also ‘dialectic’, that is to say, dependent on the 
initiative of capital and the party system, especially in regards to spaces 
and times of conflict. Behind this approach, it is possible to see the 
difficulty of imagining a ‘transition’ outside the frameworks, deformed 
ones, of a Leninist-Bolshevik ‘seizure of power’. Negri looked for this 
‘transition’ in the exercise of collective effort (normative production by 
movements and the capacity to impose it), as well as in the deployment 
of inventive potential, and the potential of cooperating in common in 
the process of social transformation. The combination of both, the 
exercise of power and the transformation of ways of life, liberation of 
production and of singularities, was presented as an insolvable puzzle. 
For Negri, the solution to this puzzle would come from the side of 
institutional dimensions – that is to say, from the new forms of 
productive cooperation used by the social proletariat, oriented towards 
expressing the power of freedom as well as of individual and collective 
enjoyment, both always expansive and open. This is what Negri calls 
‘communist production’. These new forms of cooperation are 
inseparable from the invention of a ‘proletarian entrepreneurship’, 
understood as the defining/determining of institutional creation. 
In this way we arrive at what we could call an antagonistic use of 
Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ in the realms of the self-valorization 
by proletarian subjects and the creation of institutions as means of self-
organization of those very same processes. The operator of this 
institutionality is, according to Negri, negative work. 
The definitive defeat of the movements both of the social proletariat 
and of the minorities of desire during the 1980s, in Italy as well as 
Europe in general, paralleled the processes by which social life (material 
production and the production of subjectivity) was then being fully 
subsumed under the logic of capital, severely undermining traditional 
identities linked to labor. Despite that defeat, it would be difficult to 
refute the validity and urgency of Negri’s proposal for “building, within 
the social, centers of alternative and independent projectuality, 
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communities of negative labor, completely free and antagonistic towards 
the planning and programming of the reproduction of power of 
control.” This is then the inspirational force of the approach towards 
institutional building as an element of a ‘big tactic’ of reformulation of 
contemporary anti-systemic movements and their political potential. 
No one is unaware of the complicated (in the anthropological, 
ethical, political sense) status of the new labor force – cooperative, 
cognitive, relational and affective – born out of the conjunction of these 
diverse historical processes. Some of these incommensurable processes 
extend from the rejection of the Fordist labor by anti-systemic 
movements of the 1960s to the post-Fordist restructuring of society 
from the early 1980s on, and even from the impulse of massive 
schooling before and after 1968 in Europe to the new precarious 
subjects whose living labor is mainly cognitive, relational and affective. 
These are processes whose concomitant efficiency have, not without 
catastrophic results, produced a hybrid and monstrous species, definitely 
distant from the organic framework of capitalist modernity, as well as 
from the emancipatory counter-models of alternative modernity, 
including radical liberalism or socialism. 
Nowadays, the identity crisis around labor mentioned above, 
confuses this identity with an individual’s life/vital activity, poses a 
series of additional problems to the design of institutional restructuring. 
The notion of negative labor used by Negri, the self-valorization 
practices used by proletarian subjects needed of a temporal, rigidly 
dualist, and transitional dimension for the development of communist 
capacities on the part of all those exploited subjects, working towards 
the self-determination of such subjects. In contrast to this, though, 
living labor today is a priori presented as multiplicity, and the 
deployment of common cooperative capacities is inseparable from the 
process of singularization of each of its operators. However, it is 
precisely from this process that new models have emerged, new agents 
of enunciation consistent with other machinations and developments of 
knowledge, political cooperation and enunciation. Ex post facto, it is 
possible to draw a counter-genealogy, a diagram and program of those 
combinations, emphasizing their discontinuities of subjectification, of 
re-appropriation of cooperative nexuses and of the creation of new 
political machines. This is the case with various experiences in different 
parts of Europe. These experiences have desired to transform their 
communicative, relational, formative, creative lives, into a political life. 
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That is to say, a life made of an interface between singularity and 
commonality. This is the case of institutions such as squatted/occupied 
social centers; the political forms of global activism; internet use and the 
inverted juridical engineering of copyleft licenses and hacker 
cooperatives; and action-research groups and networks that are starting 
to grow within the (precarious) interstices of a university system in crisis 
and undergoing almost definitive restructuring. 
This is why the institutionalization of the movement is proposed as 
a means, of course. However it is a means towards self-determination, 
the free constitution of individual and collective subjectivity departing 
from a re-appropriation of the conditions of production and 
reproduction of the self. 
It should be said that this institutional revolution is inseparable from 
the ability to express counter-powers. This is to say, the capacity to carry 
out a metropolitan strike against the total productive mobilization of the 
populations. Is it possible to think about defeating the regime of 
war/exception/emergency outside of this capacity to exercise a 
collective and ethically regulated potential against the violence proper of 
the total mobilization of the metropolis? This kind of strike is only 
feasible as a result of trial and error, of material processes of 
composition and cooperation, of multilateral networking among the 
multiplicities that nowadays constitute metropolitan living labor in an 
irreversible way. 
Institution as a Political-productive Machine and Existential 
Territory: For the Immediate Present 
However, the ex ante multiplicity of forms of life and figures of 
living labor do not directly imply an antagonistic value, nor an automatic 
resistance to the production of forms of life subsumed by the capitalist 
circuit of imitation and differentiation. Our problem is precisely one of 
the consistency and resistance to the lamination of the production of 
political subjectivities, as well as its coefficients of transversality, its 
disposition towards an experience of metamorphosis. In order to 
analyze this problem adequately, we need a much richer concept of 
subjectivity production than those that are circulating among most 
political groups and movements. The most common concepts currently 
in circulation avoid contrasting the forms of subjectivity compatible 
with total productive mobilization, with pre- and trans-personal terrains. 
Additionally, they render invisible many everyday life experiences in 
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which impulses of freedom and transformation are lived within the 
microphysical registers of perception, affect and the agencements of ‘non-
significant’ enunciation. These are experienced by each subject in 
his/her relations within the productive and communicative networks 
that constitute the material and machinic support of the so-called 
‘cooperation among brains’ (Lazzarato, 2006a). 
Félix Guattari (1995) offers a formal definition of subjectivity 
production related to what he calls the procedure of ‘meta-
modelization’. This refers to a theoretical discursivity capable of 
reaching the maximum number of ontological descriptions or 
cartographies, saving the inherent pluralism of the cartographic practice. 
This allows us to trespass established domains and to avoid the anti-
productive restrictions of legality in each of the paradigms in dispute 
(Guattari, 1995). For Guattari, subjectivity is an effect of the consistence 
and existence of the agglomeration of entities that we can map 
according to four ontological functions: material and semiotic flows; 
concrete and abstract machines that work on those flows, the embodied 
universes of reference and adjacent value to each agencements of 
subjectification; and, last but not least, the existential territories marked 
by their precarity and finitude. These are the decisive elements in 
contemporary subjectivity production, and this is why they are in the 
center of the problematics of resistance and autonomy in new political 
creations. This subjectivity production, insofar as it is oriented towards 
rupture and battle against its capture, control and exploitation on the 
part of the mechanisms of new forms of capitalism, should be up to the 
task of being able to ‘navigate’ regimes of signs, and capitalist semiotics. 
This semiotics, in which one ‘swims’ and ‘bathes’, are concatenated in 
pragmatic montages, in straight-up capitalist agencies and institutions of 
enunciation. They saturate and distort efforts of both individual and 
collective singularization. 
We may ask ourselves now: could the institution be a privileged site 
or topos for the production of non-controlled subjectivity, a topos 
which is also able to ethically treat that subjectivity and care for its 
consistency? And at the same time, would not this notion of institution 
imply its permanent openness, a condition of continuous process and 
self-critique, subordinated to the irruption of metamorphoses, by new 
agencements of enunciation and of life? 
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Experiences of institutions in this sense are not lacking. These 
experiences are intimately linked to the formation of cartographic tools 
of schizoanalysis and the coining of notions such as ‘transversality’ and 
‘group-subject’. Transversality is nowadays almost a requirement for 
technical use in group dynamics, in departments of human resources 
and so forth, although it goes without saying that these are a distortion 
of the original concept. We can blame this distortion in great measure 
on the ‘systemic’ and official diversion/drifting of the trend of 
institutional analysis, a problem of which Guattari was aware even 
during the same period when those notions were being elaborated. It is 
interesting, then, to remind ourselves that transversality “works in 
groups as a dimension which is both contrary to and complementary of 
structures that generate pyramidal hierarchies and transmission modes 
that sterilize messages” (Guattari, 1964). 
The coining of terms such as transversality and group-subject 
happened in the midst of a political, institutional and existential 
adventure that is relatively well known. However, the particularity that 
the institutional invention supported by bande à Guattari created is not 
so well known. This invention intended to achieve the potential to 
politically act, think, write, intervene, and exit those apparatuses of 
capture of intellectual labor and political militancy. The most relevant 
and foundational experience of this domain of entrepreneurship for 
political minorities (minor politics) and subjectification was the CERFI 
(Centre de études, recherches et formation institutionnelles). According 
to François Fourquet, one of its founding members: 
It was founded in 1967 in order to finance, thanks to contracts for 
social research, the functioning of a federal organ, the FGERI 
(Fédération des groupes d'études et de recherches institutionnelles) [...] 
In contrast with the paralyzed apparati of the communist party and 
other leftist organizations, in contrast with those activists fascinated 
with and fooled by the hierarchies common to those organizations […], 
it was about forming a new race of militants able to encourage, not a 
party, but a network of autonomous groups that would discuss among 
themselves and would act together. Also, these groups would be able to 
recognize and affirm their unconscious desires, the denial of which was, 
for us, the main cause of the political paralysis of many leftist factions. 
(Fourquet, 1981) 
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Another founding member, Anne Querrien, insists on the CERFI as an 
agencement of life for a small network of activist intellectuals and 
technicians. Today it is difficult to understand that a small group of 
radicals could achieve research contracts with French public ministries, 
with total freedom to do what they wanted. Those contracts allowed 
around twenty people to live, research and organize, and even to be in 
charge of ‘analyzing’ the very unconsciousness of the State at work with 
the ‘advanced’ civil servant with whom they dealt: 
In some way, the CERFI was about resisting our own tendency to 
become public employees, university members or part of a union’s or 
political party’s bureaucracy, […] Our lives can be perceived as failures, 
but also as brief testimonies that resistance was possible. […] Felix’s 
and my own main hypothesis was that our institutional patrons were as 
schizophrenic as us, and that our schizoanalysis did not have to limit 
itself to the analysts’ office, to the hospital walls or the interior of our 
group […] In this sense we were neither inside nor outside power 
structures, we had a schizoanalytic relationship with several people on 
the inside of different structures of power that at the same time had 
relations among themselves. […] The scale of our tentatif was too small 
to be able to last for a long period. The global context restructured 
power forces and our intellectual guerrilla may have merely contributed 
to reinforcing some countertendencies. (Querrien, 2002) 
Today our challenge is to reinvent such gestures, impulses and modes of 
operating in the context of our current conditions. Our problem is very 
concrete: to transform those active minorities of intellectual and artistic 
labor into operators of a perspective capable of re-launching the 
movement.1 
Above all it is about promoting those modalities of experimentation 
within those domains mentioned earlier. Those domains are related to 
capture of creative capacities by new forms of networked power, market 
institutions of cognitive capitalism and juridical structures of labor 
markets. Such creative potential is also captured by those modules or 
molds of subjective expression and identification inscribed within the 
new tendencies of the neo-liberal possessive individual, who is now 
creative, cooperative, owner of (fixed) capital which is itself inscribed 
mainly in her/himself, in his/her capacity for adaptation and 
discrimination among the possibilities offered by the market. 
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Another substantive problem to be resolved, according to my view, 
is that of forming real networks of political research, thinking and 
action. These networks would not be exclusive, identity-based, nor 
‘action-ist’ nor ‘campaign-ist’. Networks that would go beyond the 
banality of the ‘new paradigm’ and would passionately tackle the 
question of their own destructive and constitutive effectiveness. They 
would know how to generate and give birth to political and 
communicative war machines, suitable, finite and irreverent war 
machines. 
It is time then for creating an (in many senses) unknown terrain of 
political invention, organization and growth. It is a terrain based on the 
self-organization and institutionalization of the collective production 
and processing of knowledges. We have also discussed that the very co-
extensivity of such dynamic in regards to the networking of precarious 
collective intelligence allow us to do certain things. For example, to 
apply our forces, to form our recombination values in a variety of 
metropolitan territories, such as: from universities to social centers, and 
from museums and cultural agencies to peripheries in which there of 
plenty of groups and cooperatives of educators, social workers and 
intercultural mediators. The ethical and political subjectification of those 
spheres is a necessity and a task that is in our hands to carry out. Given 
that the path walked by different collectives (hackers, ‘info-artists’, 
independent musicians, interns/researchers, etc.) is long enough to be 
able to overcome astonishment we can move to putting a series of 
initiatives into practice to change the current tide: from the property-
based offensive towards a recombination (in a public sphere yet to be 
created) of the communities of ‘info-production’, creation, research and 
education. It is about putting together an ‘aguascalientes’, a ‘caracol’ formed 
out of the cooperation among brains. 
In the final analysis it is about creating an instrument or way of 
doing things, that if not literally union-like, then at least one that is 
capable of promoting the care and guarantee of a new set of rights and 
the struggles against exploitation in cognitive capitalism. This would be 
done on the basis of an institutional collective enunciator that is both 
polyphonic as well as autonomous with respect to the institutions of 
cognitive capitalism and the capitalization of productive and aesthetic 
(producers of the sensitive) excess. This instrument would put into 
practice new prototypes of collective subjectification based on ‘class’ (so 
to speak) capable of including within that subjectivity all the multiplicity 
Towards New Political Creations 
235 
and heterogeneity of the new forces of contemporary living labor. This 
would be done from a perspective and promotion of the maximum 
existential singularity of each of its components. More precisely, the 
attempt is to impose the statute on the basis of the networks of 
cooperation, breaking in the first place, the individualization of 
cooperation with such institutions, which constitutes one of the primary 
means of vulnerability and division of collective intelligence. How? By 
imposing from the get go, negotiation and hiring/employment as a 
network of cooperation, finite, concrete, but open and political in its 
own definition. 
The figures of the curator, of the intern and researcher in break 
speed competition in order to obtain their project or financing, the 
precarious worker who is employed intermittently on crappy little jobs 
in museums and cultural institutions: in a few months any of these 
figures may come back to the same museum or institution, but this time 
with the status of ‘artist’ or ‘creative activist’ with better or different 
work conditions. Faced with these practices, we are trying to impose 
collective hiring/contracting and autonomous management of resources 
on the part of the network of cooperation and artistic-intellectual-
political work (that, let it be understood, should make the effort to build 
itself as a new type of institution, not a union, not a party, note a 
‘creative club’, but a new political machine). In second place, we are 
trying to make all property common: all the products of the labor of 
networked collective intelligence, especially of those created by 
members of that particular network. Daily use, the legal battles around 
copyleft licenses and the disputes and negotiations with operators of art 
and knowledge institutions over the privatization of such products are 
other elements of this new ‘charter of rights under permanent drafting’. 
We could imagine that from this type of panorama of the precarization 
of subjectification and political organization of ‘immaterial’ living labor 
in the European metropolitan regions we could see a significant swerve 
in favor of the ‘monstrous’ return of class struggle and constitution 
(always multitudinous) of the commons in the coming years. 
 
Notes 
1.  See Vercauteren (2007), who constructs schizoanalytic theoretical tools 
from the practice of militant groups, based on ten years of common work 
and collective experience with new movements in Belgium. 
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Mental Prototypes and Monster Institutions: 
Some Notes by Way of an Introduction 
Universidad Nómada 
(Translated by Nuria Rodríguez) 
Mental Prototypes 
For quite a while now, a certain portmanteau word has been circulating 
in the Universidad Nómada’s1 discussions, in an attempt to sum up 
what we believe should be one of the results of the critical work carried 
out by the social movements and other post-socialist political actors. We 
talk about creating new mental prototypes for political action. This is 
due to the importance, in our eyes, of the elusive and so often 
unsuccessful link between cognitive diagrams and processes of political 
subjectivation. That is, the link between the knowledge that allows 
powers and potentials to be tested, on one hand, and, on the other, the 
semiotic, perceptual and emotional mutations that lead to the 
politicization of our lives, become personified in our bodies, and shape 
the finite existential territories that are channeled into or become 
available for political antagonism. We believe there is a need to create 
new mental prototypes because contemporary political representations, 
as well as many of the institutions created by the emancipatory 
traditions of the twentieth century, should be subjected to a serious 
review – at the very least – given that, in many cases, they have become 
part of the problem rather than the solution. 
In this respect, the anniversary of the 1968 world revolution – an 
unavoidable reference given the month in which we are writing this text 
– shouldn’t be used as an excuse to wallow in amorphous nostalgia for 
the passing of the ‘age of revolutions’. Just the opposite – it should be 
used to demonstrate the extent to which some of the unsuitable signs of 
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that world revolution are still present in a latent state, or, to be more 
precise, in a state of ‘frustrated virtuality’. ‘68’ interests us because, even 
though it didn’t come out of the blue, it was an unforeseeable world 
event – a historical fork in the road that left a trail of new political 
creations in a great many different parts of the world. Ultimately, it 
motivates us because its unresolved connections and even its caricatures 
allow us to consider the problem of the politicization (and 
metamorphosis) of life as a monstrous intrusion of the unsuitable into 
history (the history of capitalist modernity and postmodernity).2 
Over the last forty years this latency has been subject to a series of 
quite significant emergences. The latest and perhaps most important, 
the one that is generationally closest to us, is the one in which the 
‘movement of movements’, or the global movement, played a central 
role. But in spite of its extraordinary power, it hasn’t always been 
fruitful enough in terms of generating the ‘mental prototypes’ that we 
believe are so necessary. At least, it’s not clear that it has been able to 
produce prototypes that are sophisticated, robust and complex enough 
to generate innovative and sustained patterns of political subjectivation 
and organization that make it possible to at least attempt a profound 
transformation of command structures, daily life and the new modes of 
production.3 We’ve decided to avoid a merely speculative approach, and 
to remain as far as possible from declarations of how the political forms 
of the movements ‘should-be’; rather, we try to present a series of 
experimentations – not to exemplify, but more in the manner of case 
studies, as experiences that are being tested in practice – that are 
currently trying to overcome the predicaments and shortfalls that we’ve 
just mentioned. 
The Universidad Nómada believes there is an urgent need to 
identify the differentiating features and the differentials of political and 
institutional innovation that exist in specific experimentations. We’ve 
chosen to place the emphasis on two aspects that implicitly constitute 
the two transversal themes for this diverse compilation of texts, namely: 
(a) we give preference to metropolitan forms of political intervention, 
specifically looking at one of their most frequently recurring figures – 
social centers; by this, we don’t mean to lay claim to social centers as 
fossilized forms or political artefacts with an essentialized identity, but 
to try and explore the extent to which the ‘social center form’ today 
points the way to processes of opening up and renewal (Kurnik and 
Beznec, 2008), producing, for example, innovative mechanisms for the 
Mental Prototypes and Monster Institutions 
239 
enunciation of (and intervention in) the galaxy of the precariat; and at 
the same time, and partially intertwining with the above; (b) the 
constitution of self-education networks that are developing in – and 
perhaps result from? – the crisis of Europe’s public university system.4 
Ultimately, ‘Europe’, not as a naturalized space for political intervention, 
but as a constituent process; the production of these mental prototypes 
and mechanisms of enunciation and intervention as an instituent 
process (Salvini, 2008). 
Social Centers as ‘Bodies Without Organs’ 
For a long time, and in many cases still today, squatted social centers 
(Centros Sociales Okupados in Spanish) have used the abbreviation CSO or 
CSOA (the ‘a’ stands for ‘autogestionados’, or ‘self-managed’) as a 
differentiating element in the public sphere, as a kind of semiotic 
marker of the radical nature of their project. And inevitably, some of us 
who participated in them were bound to notice the virtuous coincidence 
between this label and the Spanish for Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘body 
without organs’, ‘Cuerpo sin Organos’ or CsO, using it to try to imagine 
and put into practice the un-thought and un-spoken virtualities that we 
believe are present in the matrix of metropolitan social centers. The 
considerations found in the different articles in this 
transversal/transform dossier are heading in that same direction, that is, 
they point towards the ongoing reinvention of an institutional 
mechanism (a form of movement institution) that has already proven its 
validity and, in a certain sense, its irreversibility in terms of the politics 
of the subaltern subjects in the metropolis. But this doesn’t mean that 
the irreversible validity arises from a stable, self-referential, identical 
‘social center form’ that remains always the same as itself, but just the 
opposite, as set out in one of the collective texts included in this 
monograph (Carmona et al., 2008). 
Perhaps we could speak of the need to counteract the solidification 
of the ‘social center form’ through the production of ‘unsuitable social 
centers’, that is, projects of political and subjective creation based on 
specific powers of different configurations of the (political, cultural and 
‘productive’) make-up of the basins of metropolitan cooperation. 
Creations that wouldn’t therefore try to seal themselves off as autarkic 
rather than autonomous islands, but to transform the existing context in 
accordance with the variable possibilities expressed by counter-powers 
that would then be capable of avoiding the dialectic of the antagonism 
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between powers that tend towards equivalence.5 This would thus open 
up new, constituent dimensions in terms of spatial, temporal, 
perceptive, cooperative, normative and value-based aspects. 
Some twenty years have already gone by since squatters first made 
their appearance in the public sphere. From squatters to okupas to centros 
sociales okupados, there has undeniably been progress, evolution; but the 
experience hasn’t emerged from its neoteny stage, so to speak. There are 
obviously numerous reasons for this, and they may be complex enough 
to deserve to be fully dealt with in this dossier. In any case, this 
complexity should not be simplified by labeling the factors that delay its 
growth as ‘negative’, and those that implement the model without 
further critical consideration of its present condition as ‘positive’. The 
problem-factor of the (politics of) identity that has characterized the 
social center form, with its disturbing ambivalence, is proof of this: 
because identity politics can be blamed for many ‘evils’ and we can 
claim that this kind of politics has considerably contributed to the 
underdevelopment of the experiences and to the same errors being 
repeated; but if we don’t take into account this aspect of identity 
(politics), it is difficult to explain why the great majority of relevant 
experiences arose in the first place and persist. 
Metropolis and Identity 
From the point of view of the production of subjectivity, the act of 
disobedience and direct re-appropriation of wealth (‘fixed assets’ – 
buildings, infrastructures, etc.) is and will probably remain fundamental 
in the evolution of the social center form (and of other things). We 
should keep this in mind when we confront a relatively recent issue that 
is generating endless tense disputes in the heart of the social 
movements: the negotiation of spaces – whether we’re talking about 
negotiating the ongoing occupation of squatted social centers through 
dialogue, or about approaching public bodies for new spaces to be self-
managed. Basically, how can disobedience and re-appropriation be 
reconciled with negotiation? Or, in other words: how is it possible to 
articulate the conflict/negotiation dialectic? The crucial problem is 
along these lines, and undoubtedly a substantial source of controversy. 
There is a permanent niche of political impulses – which doesn’t just 
affect the younger participants in social centers – that cannot do 
without a predetermined way of conceiving the act of disobedience and 
conflict as an element of political subjectivation and identity. The 
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political function of social centers and identity, militancy and identity, 
and metropolitan commons and identity thus emerge as some of the 
permanent problematic nodes that end up deciding whether the 
experience is to make progress or be annulled. That is, what’s at stake 
here is the possibility of producing a new type of institutionality of 
movement that can profit from the experience gained over two decades 
of social centers in Europe. In this sense, the last thing we need is a new 
‘argument’ or a new ‘program’. What we need is to explicitly question 
the way in which we confront the ‘singularization’ of collective existence 
in the productive, cooperative and relational medium of the metropolis; 
a singularization that always entails – that ‘normally’ implies – complex 
processes of difference/identity. If we think there is a need to re-start a 
cycle of creative experimentation in relation to the social center form, it 
is not because of a fetishistic attachment to novelty, but precisely 
because the forms of singularization that we experience in our bodies 
and in our own lives are currently going through a phase of 
transformation in our cities, and inevitably require us to respond 
through the practice of risk-taking forms of political re-composition. 
One’s ‘immersion’ in the metropolis of total mobilization can’t be 
simply a willing act. The development of aspects of political 
entrepreneurship – as foreshadowed in the social centers’ production of 
services, aspects that are bio(syndicalist) and cooperative, based on 
public self-education projects and so on (López, Martínez and Toret, 
2008) – requires that we confront the dead-end streets of endemic, self-
marginalized political experiences in the city. But it also implies the need 
to clarify what we could call the supplements of subjectivation that 
allow languages, value universes and collective territories to be re-
founded as part of a device that can continue to be subversive, 
particularly on the level of forms of life. This means no longer aspiring 
to be subversive simply in terms of a dialectic of molar confrontation 
between subjects that are always pre-formed, channeling us towards a 
binary dynamic in the face of forces that have already been counted, 
with results that are already taken for granted. 
Governance as an Adversary 
Social centers’ geometry of hostility in the productive metropolis 
becomes fixed in accordance with the establishment of government 
figures that try and combine the power of centralized command with 
social diffusion of (metropolitan and transnational) powers. The multi-
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centric scheme of capitalist powers demonstrates the crisis of party-like, 
representative forms of integration. Governance has become its 
transitional mode:  
Thus when we speak about metropolitan governance we are alluding to 
a set of public practices that represent, in the face of the harmonization 
of irreducible and heterogeneous interests, the response to the inability 
of deriving decisions from an initial process of institutional 
legitimization. The weakening of traditional mechanisms of social 
regulation and the channeling of interests has in fact rendered 
subjectivities impervious to the practice of government. Governance, in 
a certain sense, constitutes the struggle to continually produce, through 
variable and flexible structures, subjectivities that are consonant with 
the ‘administrationalization’ of life, where the boundaries between 
public and private become transient and elusive. (Atelier Occupato 
ESC, 2008) 
Governance is the device that opposes social centers, the counterpart 
with productions of consensus, obedience and exclusion that have to be 
dismantled, destabilized and sabotaged. The main objective of 
metropolitan governance consists of making the shared conditions of 
life productive in accordance with the concept of the city-company; it 
consists of organizing the total mobilization of its inhabitants and of 
linguistic, emotional and financial flows in political and institutional 
terms – a total mobilization that neutralizes the political and existential 
valences that emerge from cooperation and from communal 
metropolitan life; it consists of producing a ‘government of difference’ 
based on a constant inflation of statutes, segmentations, regulations and 
restrictions that allow the subordinate groups to be ordered 
hierarchically, isolated and divided. Social centers are one of the crucial 
operators of practical criticism of metropolitan governance (and are 
destined to become even more intensely so). The fight of the social 
centers against governance takes place in the field of practices of de-
individualization; in the re-appropriation of spaces that can then be used 
to configure political situations that transform the conflict arising from 
placing a heterogeneous mix of population singularities up against the 
devices of urban income into a new motor for urban dynamics; in the 
production of new service relationships, such as those that try out a re-
appropriation of the relationships involved in care provision, which can 
de-privatize and de-nationalize the processes of reproduction and 
valorization of life that remain confiscated by metropolitan biopower 
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institutions; and in experimentation with ways of practicing and 
experiencing the time of the metropolis in the face of the total 
mobilization of frightened, anxious individuals. 
Education, Self-education and Research in Monster Institutions 
Ultimately, the medley of experiences that this dossier deals with reveals 
unequivocal traces of the monster institutions that are necessary today 
in order to bring about the inevitability of new manifestations of the 
‘frustrated virtualities’ resulting from the long and unfinished sequence 
that followed the existential revolution of 1968: this takes us back to the 
beginning and closes a circular argument that considers present 
emergences by making the most of the virtualities of the immediate 
revolutionary past. Needless to say, the case studies shown here aren’t 
exhaustive and don’t inflate these virtualities. The Universidad Nómada 
is interested in tackling the possibility of constructing these new mental 
prototypes linked to the desired monstrosity, to the need to think and 
do another, different kind of politics based on education, self-education 
and research. We believe there are four basic circuits to be 
implemented, as follows: 
(a) A circuit of educational projects, to be developed in order to allow the 
circulation of theoretical paradigms and intellectual tools suitable for 
producing these cognitive maps that can be used to (1) intervene in 
the public sphere by creating swarming points of reference and 
producing counter-hegemonic discourses; and, in addition, to (2) 
analyze existing power structures and dynamics, as well as potentials; 
(b) A circuit of co-research projects, to be organized for the systematic 
study of social, economic, political and cultural life for the purpose 
of producing dynamic maps of social structures and dynamics that 
can be useful for guiding antagonist practices, redefining existing 
conflicts and struggles, and producing new forms of expression 
endowed with a new principle of social and epistemological 
intelligibility (Malo de Malina, 2004); 
(c) A publishing and media circuit, to be designed with the aim of 
influencing the public sphere, areas of intellectual production and 
university teaching, for the purpose of creating intellectual-analytic 
laboratories and, consequently, new segments of reference and 
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criticism of hegemonic forms of knowledge and ways of 
conceptualizing the social situation; 
(d) A circuit of foundations, institutes and research centers, to be devised as 
an autonomous infrastructure for the production of knowledge, 
which would constitute an embryonic stage for forms of political 
organization by means of the accumulation of analysis and specific 
proposals. Its activities should link the analysis of regional and 
European conditions with the global structural dynamics of the 
accumulation of capital and of the recreation of the global geo-
strategic options that are favorable to the social movements. 
In some cases, the devices that make these tasks possible are already 
operating, and their manifestations can be found or intuited here and 
there, peppering the texts in the monograph we are extending with this 
short introduction. To finish off: we are talking about devices that are 
necessarily hybrid and monstrous: 
hybrid, because right from the start they make it necessary to create 
networks out of resources and initiatives that are very different and 
contradictory in nature, that appear strange and even seemingly 
incongruent among themselves; these resources and initiatives mix 
together public and private resources, institutional relations with 
relations of movement, non-institutional and informal models for 
action with forms of representation that may be formal and 
representative, and struggles and forms of social existence that some 
would accuse of being non-political or contaminated or useless or 
absurd but take on a strategic aspect because they directly give a 
political and subjectivity-producing dimension to processes of 
allocation of resources and logistical elements that end up being 
crucial for bursting onto nationalized and/or privatized public 
spheres and transforming them; 
monstrous, because they initially appear to be pre-political or simply 
non-political in form, but their acceleration and accumulation as 
described above must generate a density and a series of possibilities 
for intellectual creativity and collective political action that will 
contribute to inventing another politics; 
Mental Prototypes and Monster Institutions 
245 
another politics, that is, another way of translating the power of 
productive subjects into new forms of political behavior and, 
ultimately, into original paradigms for the organization of social life, 
for the dynamic structuring of the potential of that which is public 
and communal. 
Notes 
1.  The original document (in Spanish) presenting the Universidad Nómada is 
online at: http://www.universidadnomada.net/spip.php?article139. And 
Raúl Sánchez Cedillo’s essay in this volume has become something of a 
summary for the new phase of the Universidad Nómada. 
2.  Along these lines, see also Raunig (2008). 
3.  This is also what Paolo Virno (2004b) seems to be saying, using an accurate 
image, when he states that in recent years the global movement was like a 
huge battery that had been charged in a short, vertiginous process, but 
couldn’t find where to connect itself and discharge its power, and that it 
specifically couldn’t manage to connect with “those forms of struggle that 
are necessary in order to transform the situation of precarious, temporary 
and atypical work into political assets”. In any case, in these notes for (self-
)critical reflection, we continue to declare that the configuration process of 
the global movement already constitutes the inalienable genetic code of the 
cycle of struggles that is currently in course. 
4.  How can we avoid mentioning the centrality of ‘the university’ in the 1968 
world revolution, how students discerned the paradox of an institution that 
is in crisis in terms of its historic model, but meanwhile plays an increasingly 
central role in capitalist modes of production and valorisation? See, among 
many other recent reflections, Roggero (2007) and Atelier Occupato ESC 
(2008). See also two Universidad Nómada texts by Montserrat Galcerán, 
‘¿Tiene la universidad interés para el capital?’ (‘Are universities already of 
interest to capital?’) (http://www.universidadnomada.net/spip.php? 
article242) and ‘La crisis de la universidad’ (‘The crisis of the university’) 
(http://www. universidadnomada.net/spip.php?article184), both n/d. 
5.  Thus the type of asymmetry between powers and counter-powers that 
characterizes the movements in the new cycle of struggles that we’ve called 
‘another geometry of hostility’. See Fernández-Savater (2006). 
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